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CORNELL  STUDIES    IN    PHILOSOPHY 

No  4. 


THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT 


OF 


LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS 


BY 


VIDA  F.    MOORE,  M.S.,  Ph.D. 

Formerly  Fellow  of  Cornell  University. 


KetD  ¥orfe 

THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1901 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
.     in  2007  with  funding  from 
^     :•  IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/ethicalaspectoflOOmoorrich 


CORNELL  STUDIES    IN    PHILOSOPHY 

No  4. 


THE  ETHICAL  ASPECT 


OF 


LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS 


BY 


VIDA  F.    MOORE,  M.S.,  Ph.D. 


NeU)  ¥ocft 

THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1901 


-^-^t^ 

^■^ 


•  ••  •  • 
»  "•  •  • 
»,  •  •    • 


^y^wa^  ^1^52 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY, 

LANCASTER,    PA. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


Page. 
Chapter  I. — Lotze's  Philosophical  Motives  and  Pre- 
suppositions           I -1 3 

Chapter  II. — Lotze's  Idea  of  the  Good  ;    its  Place 

IN  his  System i4-37 

1 .  Synthesis  of  the  Good,  ReaHty,  and  Truth  .... 

2.  The  Good  that  which  has  Value 

a.  Value  apprehended  through  Feeling 

b.  Feeling  the  basis  of  Reason's  determinations 
of  Worth 

3.  Derivative    Ethical    Ideas — Unity,    Teleology, 
Personality. 

Chapter  III. — Conception  of  the  World 38-55 

1.  The  World  as  Teleological  . 

a.  The  Mechanical  View 

b.  Extent  of  Mechanism 

c.  Reconciliation  of  Mechanism  and  Teleology 

2.  The  World  as  Spiritual 

a.  The  Metaphysical  Argument 

b.  The  Ethical  Argument 

Chapter  IV. — Conception  of  God   56-76 

1 .  God  as  the  World-Ground 

a.  Argument  for  Unity  of  the  World-Ground. 

b,  Lotze's  Monism  discussed 

2.  God  as  Infinite  Personality 

a.  Passage  from  Metaphysical  to  Ethical  Con- 
ception of  God 

b.  More  precise  determinations  of  the  Absolute. 

c.  The    Absolute  the  only  complete  Person- 
ality  


8*^6187 


IV  TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 

Chapter  V. — Conception  of  the  Nature  of  Man..  . .    77-1  o] 
I .   Man  as  a  Mechanism 

a.  Mechanism  in  the  Body 

b.  Mechanism  in  Mental  Life 

c.  The  Mechanical  versus  the  Ideal  Views .  .  . 
Man  as  Personality 

a.  Feeling  the  basis  of  Personality 

h.   Reason  ;  Man's  distinguishing  characteristic 
its  goal  in  Universal  Truth  and  Worth.  .  .  . 

c.  Freedom 

d.  The  Problem  of  Evil 

e.  Immortality 


'7 


CHAPTER  I. 

Lotze's  Philosophical  Motives  and  Pre-Suppositions. 

IN  closing  his  earliest  philosophical  work,  the  Metaphysik  of 
1 84 1,  Lotze  gave  expression  to  the  conviction  that  the  true 
beginning  of  metaphysics  lies  in  ethics.  After  nearly  forty  years 
of  philosophical  activity,  he  re-affirmed  this  conviction  in  the 
closing  words  of  the  Metaphysik  of  1 879,  the  latest  of  his  works 
published  during  his  lifetime.  The  expression,  he  admits,  is  not 
exact,  but  he  still  feels  certain  of  being  in  the  right  in  seeking 
the  ground  of  that  which  should  be  in  that  which  is}  He  further 
expresses  the  hope  that  what  may  seem  unacceptable  in  this 
view  may  be  justified  in  a  future  work.  Unfortunately,  his  death, 
in  July,  1 88 1,  prevented  the  appearance  of  the  third  and  last 
division  of  his  System  der  Philosophies  which  was  to  have  treated 
of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  morals,  and  aesthetics.  The  little 
volumes  of  outlines  from  his  lecture-notes  in  part  make  good 
this  loss,  yet  Lotze's  system  must  remain  incomplete,  and  that 
too  in  what  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  the  keystone  of  the  structure. 
It  is  the  writer's  aim  in  what  follows  to  show  not  merely  that 
Lotze's  system  is  pervaded  by  his  ethical  views,  and  by  aesthetic 
ideals  scarcely  to  be  distinguished  from  ethical,  but  rather  to  show 
that  his  most  characteristic  metaphysical  doctrines  grow  out  of 
ethical  conceptions,  that  these  conceptions  are  an  essential  factor 
in  his  metaphysics,  that  without  them  his  speculative  theory  of 
the  universe  lacks  both  completeness  and  coherence. 

Perhaps  we  can  find  no  better  way  of  approach  to  our  subject 
than  to  consider  in  brief  what  were  the  motives  which  impelled 
Lotze  to  the  study  of  philosophy,  what  were  the  conditions  of 
the  time  which  gave  direction  to  his  thought,  and  what  the  ideals 
which  inspired  it.  Philosophy  is  always  a  piece  of  life,  as  Lotze 
himself  has  said,^  and  thought  can  not  be  divorced  from  the  per- 

^ Met.,  Schluss,  p.  604.  ^ Kl.  Schr.,  3,  p.  455. 


2  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS, 

...  sonali'ty.pC  tjip  :thinker.  We  shall  find  this  inquiry  the  more 
'l  ''fruitrHl'^fo^  t'hte'.Kfeason  that  we  are  not  left  to  conjecture  on  these 
,  : :  •p{jihtS;*6!'dintit^d  to*:  the  bare  facts  of  Lotze's  life,  but  have  access 
"  *  16  a  sbmewliaf  full'and  frank  confession  from  his  own  pen.^ 

Born^  May  21,  18 17,  in  Bautzen,  Saxony,  Lotze  was  a  com- 
patriot of  Lessing  and  the  elder  Fichte,  a  fact  in  which  he  felt 
much  pleasure.  He  was  the  son  of  a  physician,  and  determined 
in  early  youth  to  follow  his  father's  profession.  While  very 
young  he  was  brought  by  his  parents  to  Zittau,  and  it  was  here 
that  he  received  his  early  education.  The  gymnasium  at  Zittau 
was  an  old  institution  and  under  able  direction.  Its  corps  of 
teachers  included  men  distinguished  for  scholarship,  and  the  com- 
paratively small  number  of  pupils  was  favorable  for  careful  in- 
struction. It  is  remarked  by  Rehnisch  that  the  fact  that 
Lotze  translated  the  Antigone  of  Sophocles  into  Latin,  in  an  ele- 
gant and  masterly  manner  and  for  the  purpose  of  recreation, 
twenty  years  after  leaving  this  school,  comments  favorably  upon 
the  thoroughness  of  the  instruction  he  received  there.^  In  the 
register  of  the  gymnasium  at  Zittau  it  is  recorded  of  Lotze  that 
"  he  studied  philosophy  and  the  physical  sciences."  * 

In  his  reply  to  I.  H.  Fichte,  Lotze  says  that  it  was  a  strong 
inclination  to  poetry  ^  and  art  which  first  led  him  to  study  phi- 
losophy ;  and  unto  the  end  of  his  life  the  spectacle  of  the  world 
was  for  him  *  everywhere  wonders  and  poetry.'  ^  It  was  a  happy 
fortune  indeed  by  which  the  poetic  temperament  was  combined 
in  Lotze  with  a  taste  and  aptitude  for  the  sciences.  Keenly 
sensitive  to  the  beauty  of  the  world  and  to  the  moral  import  of 
life,  his  acute  and  analytic  mind  must  needs  explain  and  systema- 

*  Philosophy  in  the  last  Forty  Years,  Contemp.  Rev.,  Jan.,  1880.  Reprinted  io 
Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  3. 

2 1  have  made  use  of  an  admirable  brief  sketch  of  Lotze' s  life  virritten  by  E.  Reh- 
nisch, a  colleague  of  Lotze's  at  GSttingen  :  «*  Hermann  Lotze,  sa  vie  et  ses  6crits," 
Rtvue  Ph  ilosoph  ique,  1 8  8 1 . 

^Riv.  Ph.,  1 881,  p.  322. 

*-Rtv.  Ph.,  1881,  p.  322. 

^  It  may  not  be  known  to  all  the  readers  of  Lotze  that  among  his  earliest  works 
was  a  little  volume  of  poems,  published  in  1840.  See  Wm.  Wallace  :  Lectures  and 
Essays,  p.  488.     Kronenberg :  Modeme  Philosophen,  pp.  50-55. 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  623. 


PHILOSOPHICAL   MOTIVES  AND   PRESUPPOSITIONS.     3 

tize.  Speculative  and  practical  demands  were  alike  urgent  upon 
him  ;  experience  must  be  sifted,  explained,  and  unified,  in  order 
to  the  justification  and  satisfaction  of  the  ideals  of  the  speculative 
no  less  than  those  of  the  practical  reason.  This  keen  speculative 
interest  gave  Lotze  his  bent  towards  scientific  study  and  made 
of  him  a  philosopher  in  place  of  a  poet. 

Lotze  entered  the  University  at  Leipzig  at  the  age  of  seven- 
teen, with  the  purpose  of  studying  medicine.  In  the  courses 
preparatory  to  his  medical  studies  he  had  for  his  teachers  E.  H. 
Weber,  Volkmann,  and  Fechner,  while  at  the  same  time  he  came 
under  the  influence  of  Weisse,  whose  views  on  the  subject  of 
aesthetics,  especially,  had  a  lasting  effect  upon  him.  To  his  scien- 
tific training  are  due  in  large  part,  no  doubt,  that  scrupulous  cau- 
tion, that  painstaking  care  for  details,  and  that  reverence  for  facts 
which  are  so  conspicuous  in  all  Lotze's  work.  To  quote  from 
Rehnisch,  "he  will  always  be  named  among  the  masters  who 
have  made  philosophy  take  'the  sure  march  of  a  science.'"^ 
In  later  life,  to  be  sure,  Lotze's  interest  in  science  seemed  some- 
what to  wane  ;  for  when  Darwin's  theory  was  attracting  the  atten- 
tion of  all  thinking  men,  it  met  with  seeming  indifference  from 
him.  That  a  man  of  scientific  training  should  be  so  little  im- 
pressed by  a  hypothesis  of  so  great  import  for  natural  science  \^ 
somewhat  surprising.  It  may  be,  as  von  Hartmann  suggests, 
that  in  his  later  years  Lotze  was  prevented  by  weariness  from  busy- 
ing himself  with  questions  which  for  his  personal  assurance  were 
finally  settled.^ 

In  March,  1838,  Lotze  obtained  the  degree  of  doctor  of 
philosophy,  and  in  July  of  the  same  year  that  of  doctor  of  medi- 
cine. He  returned  to  Leipzig  as  a  member  of  the  Faculty  of 
Medicine  in  1839,  ^^^  ^  ^^^  months  later  became  a  member  of 
the  Faculty  of  Philosophy.  He  was  made  professor  extraordi- 
nary at  Leipzig  in  1843,  and  in  1844  was  called  to  Gottingen  to 
fill  the  chair  vacant  since  the  death  of  Herbart.  Though  fre- 
quently called  to  other  universities,  Lotze  remained  at  Gottingen 
until  the  spring  of  188 1,  when  he  finally  accepted  a  call  to  Berlin. 
He  had  but  entered  upon  his  work  there  when  his  death  occurred 

^I?iv.  Ph.,  1 88 1,  p.  336.  *  Lotzis  Philosophies  p.  42. 


4  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

in  July  of  that  year.     His  life  was  uneventful  in  incident,  and  his 
efforts  were  always  in  some  measure  restricted  by  ill  health. 

Pfleiderer  divides  Lotze's  literary  career  into  three  periods.^ 
These  may  be  designated  for  convenience  as  the  period  of  his 
scientific  and  early  philosophical  activity,  the  period  of  the  Mik- 
rokosmuSy  and  of  the  System  der  Philosophie.  During  the  first 
period  (1840-18  5  2)  Lotze's  activity  was  chiefly  scientific,  yet 
the  early  Logik  (1841)  and  the  early  Metaphysik  (1843)  ^"^^ 
within  this  period,  testifying  to  his  interest  in  philosophical  spec- 
ulation, and  anticipating  not  only  the  general  direction  which 
his  later  thought  was  to  take,  but  many  of  the  conclusions  at 
which  he  later  arrived.  These  earlier  works  seem  to  have  made 
little  impression  upon  his  contemporaries,  since  his  position  as  a 
thinker  was  very  generally  misunderstood.  Moreover,  the  scien- 
tific works  of  this  period  are  pervaded  by  a  philosophical  spirit, 
as  is  suggested  by  the  titles  even.  Lotze's  first  work,  De 
futurce  biologi<2  principibus  philosophicis,  was  a  treatise  presented 
for  the  degree  of  doctor  of  medicine.  There  followed  a  series 
of  publications  animated  by  one  purpose,  that  of  establishing  the 
laws  of  mechanism  as  the  principle  of  the  scientific  explanation 
of  vital  phenomena.  The  Allgemeine  Pathologie  ujid  Therapie  als 
Mechanische  Naturwissenschaften  appeared  in  1 842  ;  Lebenskraft, 
in  1 843  ;  Seele  und  Seelenleben  in  1 846  ;  Allgemeine  Physio- 
logie  des  Korper lichen  Lebens  in  185 1  ;  and  the  Medicinische  Psy- 
chologie  oder  Physiologie  der  Seele  in  1852. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  early  period  of  Lotze's  activity  coin- 
cides in  general  with  the  transition  to  the  new  scientific  era.^  The 
day  of  practical  modern  invention  had  dawned,  the  era  of  steam, 
of  electricity,  of  the  arrogance  of  power  vested  in  material  things. 
The  Idealism  of  Fichte  and  of  Hegel  seemed  but  a  vision  of  the 
night-time  which  fades  in  the  light  of  day.  Materialistic  theories 
were  wide-spread  and  triumphant.  Men  turned  from  metaphys- 
ical speculation  with  distrust  and  hailed  science  as  the  god  of 
the  new  day.  But  science  was  just  emerging  from  an  obscure 
past,  and  was  as  yet  uncertain  of  its  province  and  its  methods, 

^  Lotze' s  philosophische  Weitsanschauung,  pp.  7-9. 
«  See  Kronenberg  :     Moderne  Philosophen^  pp.  8-10. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  MOTIVES  AND  PRESUPPOSITIONS.     5 

and  was  not  a  little  hampered  by  tradition  and  prejudice.  As  a 
physician,  Lotze  first  directed  his  efforts  towards  correcting  and 
clarifying  the  physiological  and  medical  science  of  his  day. 
Physiology  was  at  this  time  much  dominated  by  Schelling's  phi- 
losophy of  nature.  Schelling  had  sought  to  mediate  between  the 
mechanical  explanation  of  nature  and  the  old  theory  of  a  *  vital 
force/  but  had  virtually  re-instated  the  latter  as  the  necessary  ex- 
planation of  phenomena  in  the  organic  world.  Furthermore,  the 
relation  of  mind  and  body — a  long-vexed  problem  for  philosophy 
— had  assumed  a  new  urgency  for  medical  science,  which,  in  com- 
mon with  the  other  sciences  of  the  day,  was  struggling  after  clearer 
conceptions  of  the  facts  and  principles  within  its  scope.  More- 
over, a  new  mental  science,  having  little  in  common  with  the  old 
psychology  save  the  name,  was  just  beginning  to  differentiate 
itself  from  the  physical  sciences,  and  rendered  imperative  an 
investigation  of  the  relation  between  mental  and  cortical  pro- 
cesses. In  his  scientific  writings  of  this  period  Lotze  aimed  to 
prove  once  and  for  all  the  untenability  of  the  '  vital  force '  theory 
as  an  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  living  bodies.  The  body 
is  a  mechanism,  he  held;  for  the  purposes  of  science  its  func- 
tions are  wholly  explicable  by  the  mechanism  of  natural  laws. 
Science  need  seek  no  ulterior  explanation.  The  Medicinische 
Psychologies  a  pioneer  work  of  the  new  psychology,  extends  the 
principle  of  mechanism  to  explain  the  interaction  of  mind  and 
body.  For  this  Lotze  coined  the  term  '  physico-psychical ' 
mechanism,  but  later  gratefully  accepted  the  less  awkward 
phrase,  '  psycho-physical,*  an  amendment  suggested  by  Fechner. 
Appearing  at  a  time  when  materialism  was  in  the  ascendancy, 
it  is  not  perhaps  altogether  surprising  that  the  purport  of  Lotze's 
scientific  writings  was  misunderstood.  He  was  warmly  wel- 
comed by  the  materialists  as  a  champion  of  that  theory,  while , 
by  many  he  was  classed  as  a  follower  of  Herbart.  In  his  reply 
to  I.  H.  Fichte,^  Lotze  denied  both  these  assertions,  referring 
to  his  published  writings  as  affording  ample  refutation.  Leav- 
ing the  early  philosophical  works  out  of  the  question,  the  Medi- 
cinische Psychologic  alone  contains  frequent    and   explicit  state- 

^  Streit-Schriften,  1857. 


6  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

ments  as  to  the  falsity  and  inadequacy  of  materialism  as  a  metaphy- 
sical theory.  Materialism  is  due  to  an  apotheosis  of  natural  science, 
Lotze  declared  ;^  in  its  desire  for  simplicity  it  seeks  a  false  unity 
by  ignoring  the  disparateness  of  physical  and  mental  phenom- 
ena. In  truth  the  last  result  of  scientific  analysis  but  serves 
to  emphasize  the  sharp  division  between  the  two  realms.  ^  In- 
dications are  not  lacking,  even  in  these  earlier  writings,  that 
Lotze  looked  upon  the  mechanical  explanation  of  natural  pro- 
cesses as  by  no  means  final.  For  science,  indeed,  the  explanation 
is  final ;  for  the  metaphysician  it  remains  to  explain  the  nature, 
origin,  and  meaning  of  mechanism  itself. 

The  second  period^  of  Lotze's  life  is  that  marked  by  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  Mikrokosmus,  in  three  volumes  (1856,  1858, 
1864).  In  this  work  Lotze  sought  to  unite  the  two  sides  of  one 
and  the  same  Weltanschauung,  to  show  "how  absolutely  univer- 
sal is  the  extent,  and  at  the  same  time  how  completely  subordi- 
nate the  significance,  of  the  mission  which  mechanism  has 
to  fulfil  in  the  world."  *  It  is  now  that  Lotze  definitely  under- 
takes his  life's  labor  as  the  vindicator  of  the  ideal  interpre- 
tation of  life  and  nature  against  the  materialistic  drift  of  current 
thought.  The  task  which  he  imposed  upon  himself  was  some- 
thing more  than  a  reconciliation  of  faith  and  knowledge  ^:  He 
sought  both  to  vindicate  the  reality  of  the  spiritual  needs  of  men, 
which  find  expression  in  religious  beliefs  and  in  moral  and  aes- 
thetic ideals,  and  to  determine  their  significance  for  metaphysics. 
Rehnisch  remarks  that  one  can  easily  guess  that  the  idea  of  such 
a  work  as  the  Mikrokosmus  dates  back  to  Lotze's  student  days  at 
Leipzig,  when  the  aesthetic  of  Weisse,  the  physiology  of  Weber, 
and  the  physics  of  Fechner  were  taking  deep  root  in  his  mind. 
The  convictions  of  the  Mikrokosmus  were  born  of  conflicts  waged 
in  earlier  days.^ 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  to  how  great  an  extent  Lotze's  work 

^Med.  Psy.,  1.  i,  g  3,  p.  35. 

^Med.  Psy.,  I,  I,  I  5,  pp.  55,  65. 

*To  this  period  belongs  also  the  Geschichte  der  Aesthetik  in  Deutschland^  1868. 

^Mikr.,  XV. 

«  Cf.  von  Hartmann  :  Lotze's  Philosophies  p.  45. 

^Rh}.  Ph.,  1881,  p.  331. 


PHILOSOPHICAL   MOTIVES  AND   PRESUPPOSITIONS.     7 

was  that  of  mediation  between  widely  opposed  theories.  For 
such  a  service  he  had  unusual  qualifications  both  by  nature  and 
by  training.  Not  only  did  he  seek  to  show  that  there  is  no  con- 
flict between  the  scientific  and  the  philosophical  views  of  the 
world,  but  within  the  field  of  metaphysics  his  office  was  that  oi 
reconciliation.  When  Lotze  entered  upon  his  philosophical  ca- 
reer he  found  two  rival  theories,  bitterly  antagonistic,  contesting 
the  field.  Empiricism,  to  be  sure,  had  for  the  time  being  the 
better  of  the  conflict ;  it  had  the  greater  following  and  received 
the  popular  plaudits.  But  Idealism  was  not  dead  ;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  showed  at  times  a  latent  energy  that  disconcerted  its 
foes.  Lotze  was  both  an  empiricist  and  an  idealist :  an  empiricist 
in  his  reverence  for  facts  and  his  insistence  that  experience  must 
be  the  starting-point  of  speculation,  an  idealist  in  his  interpre- 
tation of  the  empirical  order.  Thus  he  was  quick  to  see  both 
the  strength  and  the  weaknesses  of  either  metaphysical  theory. 
Throughout  his  work  we  find  this  union  of  empiricism  and  ideal- 
ism, sometimes  to  the  clarifying  of  thought  and  sometimes  to 
its  confusion. 

The  third  and  last  period  is  that  in  which  Lotze  purposed  to 
present  his  system  of  philosophy  in  completed  form,  the  com- 
prehensive view  of  God,  nature,  and  man,  which  was  the  fruit  of 
the  thought  and  labor  of  a  life-time.  The  first  two  parts  only 
of  the  projected  work  were  completed — the  Logik  appearing  in 
1874,  and  the  Metaphysik  in  1879.  The  third  part — the  prac- 
tical philosophy — was  left  unfinished  at  the  death  of  the  author. 

In  the  article  to  which  reference  has  been  made  above,^  Lotze 
states  the  philosophical  ideals,  or  '  prejudices,'  as  he  frankly  terms 
them,  with  which  he  entered  upon  his  work.  **  When  I  began 
my  philosophical  studies  the  predominant  opinion  was  still  that 
to  which  Fichte  has  given  the  distinctest  expression,  that  no 
theory  of  the  world  should  pass  for  truth  and  science  which  was 
unable  to  explain  all  the  particular  parts  of  the  world's  history 
as  independent  consequences   of  a  single  general    principle."  ^ 

1  Philosophy  in  the  last  Forty  Years. 
^Kl.  Schr.,  3,  p.  451- 


8  ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS, 

Bred  in  the  traditions  of  the  Hegelian  school,  Lotze  goes  on  to 
say,  he  never  ceased  to  keep  hold  of  the  element  of  truth  which 
Fichte's  assertion  seemed  to  him  to  contain.  At  the  same  time, 
this  assertion  seemed  to  Lotze  to  efface  an  important  distinction, 
namely,  that  between  the  all-comprehensive  system  of  the  uni- 
verse and  our  human  insight  into  this  system.  As  to  the  uni- 
verse itself,  he  felt  no  hesitation  in  presupposing  this  unity ;  but 
the  task  of  deducing  the  manifold  out  of  a  single  fundamental 
principle,  he  believed  to  be  too  great  for  the  finite  intelligence. 
Only  a  spirit  standing  in  the  center  of  the  universe  which  he  him- 
self had  made  "  could,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  final  aim  which 
he  had  given  to  his  creation,  make  all  the  parts  of  it  pass  before 
him  in  the  majestic  succession  of  an  unbroken  development."  ^ 
We  finite  beings  at  the  circumference  of  the  circle  can  hope  to 
acquire  only  an  approximate  knowledge  of  the  system  ;  it  must 
be  by  a  regressive  investigation  that  philosophy  may  seek  to  dis- 
cover what  is  the  living  principle  in  the  construction  and  course 
of  the  world.*  The  universe  is  indeed  one,  Lotze  would  seem  to 
say,  the  self-realization  of  one  ultimate  and  immanent  principle  ; 
but  the  finite  mind  may  well  prove  incapable  of  deducing  the 
many  from  the  One,  of  showing  the  logical  relation  of  the  parts 
to  the  whole  and  the  necessary  development  therefrom. 

The  unity  of  things,  in  the  sense  thus  guarded,  is  then  one  of 
the  *  prejudices  '  with  which  Lotze  set  out  upon  the  philosophical 
current  of  his  youth.  The  other  finds  expression  in  the  convic- 
tion that  ''  intellectual  life  is  more  than  thought."  ^  Here  again 
Lotze  attacks  the  Hegelian  dialectic.  Philosophy  has  erred  in 
over-rating  thought ;  knowledge  is  "not  the  sole  portal  through 
which  that  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  real  existence  can 
enter  into  connection  with  the  mind.  .  .  .  Much  goes  on  within 
us  which  even  our  thinking  intelligence  follows  and  contem- 
plates only  from  without,  and  whose  peculiar  contents  it  cannot 
exhaustively  represent  either  in  the  form  of  an  idea,  or  though 
a  union  of  ideas."  ^  Even  he  who  is  boldly  confident  that 
nothing  is  impenetrable  to  the   mind,  cannot  be  equally  con- 

^Kl.  Schr.,  3,  p.  452.  'A7.  Schr.,  3,  p.  453. 

«  Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  61 1-612.  *  Ibid. 


PHILOSOPHICAL   MOTIVES  AND   PRESUPPOSITIONS.     9 

fident  in  assuming  that  '*  thought  is  the  precise  organ  which 
will  be  able  to  comprehend  the  real  in  its  innermost  essence."  ^ 
On  the  contrary,  Lotze  believes,  the  mind  would  always  find 
that  the  objects  with  which  it  occupies  itself,  and  especially  the 
highest  principle  of  all,  contain  matter  over  and  above  that 
which  is  capable  of  being  apprehended  in  the  form  of  thought, 
even  if  the  mind  was  quite  perfect  as  an  instrument  of  in- 
tellectual apprehension.  Not  only  so,  but  the  unity  of  all 
reality  may  be  organized  on  a  plan  not  demonstrable  by  logical 
laws,  it  may  be  impossible  to  arrange  its  members  in  logical 
order.  For  instance,  the  unity  of  a  melody  is  not  less  real  and 
organic  to  the  musical  composition  because  it  does  not  lend  itself 
to  logical  proof  and  arrangement.  **  The  world  is  certainly  not 
so  constituted,"  Lotze  maintains,  "that  the  individual,  funda- 
mental truths  which  we  find  dominating  in  it  hang  together  ac- 
cording to  the  poor  pattern  of  a  logical  superordination,  coor- 
dination, and  subordination."  ^  There  will  be  occasion  later  to 
discuss  Lotze's  objections  to  Hegelianism,  and  the  merit  of  his 
contention.  The  revolt  against  what  he  deemed  an  overween- 
ing intellectualism  is  one  of  the  characteristic  notes  in  Lotze's 
writings. 

These  two  ideas,  then — the  unity  of  all  reality  and  that  life 
is  more  than  thought — are  the  convictions  with  which  Lotze  be- 
gan the  study  of  philosophy.  In  stating  them  he  affirms  his  be- 
lief that  "except  in  rare  cases,  a  prolonged  philosophical  labor 
is  nothing  else  but  the  attempt  to  justify  scientifically  a  funda- 
mental view  of  things  which  has  been  adopted  in  early  life."^ 

The  question  now  arises,  In  what  degree  are  these  ideas 
ethical  in  content  ?  But  this  question  suggests  another  :  In  how 
far  does  Lotze  distinguish  ethical  from  aesthetic  ideas  ?  On  this 
point,  as  on  many  others,  the  student  of  Lotze's  system  is 
baffled  by  an  absence  of  careful  definition,  and  accurate  and  con- 
sistent use  of  terms.  This  defect  is  especially  noticeable  in  the 
field  of  the  practical  philosophy,  where  it  is  at  the  same  time 

1  Ibid. 

^Kl.  Schr.,  3,  p.  479.     Cf.  also  pp.  472,  474. 
3A7.  ^r/5r.,  3  :  p.  455. 


lO       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

more  mischievous,  since  such  terms  as  the  Good,  the  Beautiful, 
Value,  and  the  like,  belonging  as  they  do  to  the  vocabulary  of 
everyday  life,  are  more  vague  in  their  meaning  than  are  the 
technical  terms  of  metaphysics  and  logic.  Lotze  nowhere  care- 
fully distinguishes  the  ethical  from  the  aesthetic ;  he  nowhere 
concisely  defines  what  he  means  by  the  good  or  the  beautiful. 
He  not  infrequently  uses  the  term  'aesthetic'  in  a  sense  but 
little  removed  from  its  primary  meaning,  that  is,  as  pertaining 
to  the  sensibilities  and  thus  including  both  the  ethical  and  the 
aesthetic  feelings.  It  is  evidently  in  this  sense  that  Lotze  uses 
the  word  when  he  says  that  the  metaphysical  reasons  for  be- 
lieving in  the  unity  of  Being  have  been  reinforced  by  '  aes- 
thetic inclinations '  which  have  yielded  a  prejudice  as  to  the 
nature  of  this  Being.  ^  Again  he  speaks  of  the  connection  of 
the  elements  of  the  world  in  an  '  aesthetic  unity '  of  purpose 
or  meaning.  ^  It  is  in  this  sense  too,  I  think,  that  we  must 
interpret  the  *  aesthetic '  faith  in  the  validity  of  logical  principles, 
which  he  posits.^  The  interpretation  of  the  term  as  including 
ethical  as  well  as  aesthetic  sentiment  is  less  obviously  necessary, 
perhaps,  in  the  last  two  cases  cited  than  in  the  first ;  yet  '  aes- 
thetic *  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term  is  quite  evidently  in- 
adequate to  express  Lotze's  meaning  here.'* 

The  beautiful  and  the  good  Lotze  classes  together  as  ideas  of 
worth  or  value  :  "  We  can  conceive  of  the  '  beautiful '  and  the 
'  happy '  or  '  blessedness  *  as  united  with  the  Good  into  one 
complex  of  all  that  has  value."  **  It  will  be  necessary  later  to 
ascertain  as  nearly  as  possible  what  Lotze  means  by  the  good 
and  by  value.  For  our  present  purpose  it  suffices  to  say  that 
the 'good  subjectively  is  the  'blessedness'  of  sensitive  beings; 
objectively  it  is  some  end  to  be  realized.^  The  beautiful  as  well 
as  the  good  has  a  subjective  significance  in  the  happiness  its 
contemplation  gives,  and  an  objective  significance  in  adaptation 

^Met,  I  84. 

*Met.,  I  195. 

^Logik,  §364. 

*Miir.,  2:  pp.  272-273;  P/ii/.  of  Relig.,  \  4;  Pract.  Phil,  \  7. 

6  Outl.  of  Met.,  \  92. 

^Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  614-717  ;    Outl.  of  Met.,  I  92  ;    Phil.  ofPelig.,  §§  66,  67. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  MOTIVES  AND  PRESUPPOSITIONS.    11 

to  an  end/  In  our  attempts  to  analyze  experience,  we  arrive 
at  three  irreducible  elements — universal  laws  or  necessarily  valid 
truths,  immediately  given  facts  of  reality,  and  determinations  of 
worth.^  Our  universe  cleaves  apparently  into  these  three  realms 
of  Truth,  Reality,  and  Worth.  It  is  Lotze's  belief  that  the  In- 
finite Reality  **  unfolds  itself  in  one  movement  which  for  finite 
cognition  appears  in  the  three  aspects  of  the  good  which  is  its 
end,  the  constructive  impulse  by  which  this  is  realized,  and  the 
conformity  to  law  with  which  this  impulse  keeps  in  the  path  that 
leads  towards  its  end."^  Beauty  is  defined  by  Lotze  rather 
vaguely  as  an  appearance  to  immediate  intuition  of  a  unity  of 
these  three  factors  or  realms  which  cognition  is  unable  com- 
pletely to  unite.*  Only  in  the  totality  of  the  world  can  we 
presuppose  a  perfect  congruity  of  the  three ;  but  wherever  in  a 
single  phenomenon  the  parts  act  harmoniously  towards  the  reali- 
zation of  an  end,  in  accordance  with  laws  not  imposed  upon 
them  from  without  but  immanent  in  them  as  a  spontaneous  and 
joyous  activity,  that  object  we  term  beautiful.  It  is  beautiful 
because  '  it  repeats  in  a  picture  that  we  can  intuit '  the  general 
idea  of  Beauty — the  ^  perfect,  reciprocal  involution '  of  the 
realms  of  Truth,  Reality,  and  Worth. ^ 

It  is  evident  that  no  sharp  distinction  can  be  made  between  the 
good  and  the  beautiful  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  here  laid 
down.  Both  denote  that  which  has  worth,  on  the  subjective 
side  for  the  sensitive  beings  within  the  range  of  whose  experi- 
ence they  come,  on  the  objective  side  in  an  end  which  conforms 
to  the  world-aim.  The  good  is  a  higher  category  than  the 
beautiful,  we  are  told ;  ^  it  is  not  in  and  of  itself  also  beautiful, 
but  first  becomes  beautiful  in  the  course  of  its  actualization.  In 
the  final  result  of  synthesis  the  Good  is  the  supreme  principle, 
the  highest  and  sole  Reality.^     The  beautiful  is  good  in  that  and 

1  Outl.  of  Esthetics,  ^§  6,  7,  l6. 

«  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  461  ;  Cf.  Outl.  ofJEs.,  §  8. 

^  Mikr.y  3  :  p.  616. 

*^Outl.  of^s.,  U9y  14. 

6  Ou//.  of  ^s.,  U  lo»  14,  23. 

e  Out/,  of^s.,  I  II. 

"^  Mikr.,  3  :  615,  623. 


12       ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS 

SO  far  as  it  is  beautiful,  for  in  just  this  measure  it  epitomizes  in 
concrete  form  the  complete  and  perfect  Idea  of  the  Good  which 
is  also  the  Idea  of  Beauty. 

To  return  to  the  question  previously  raised :  In  how  far  are 
the  two  pre -suppositions  which  Lotze,  by  his  own  confession, 
brought  to  the  study  of  philosophy,  ethical  in  their  content? 
There  is  abundant  proof  that  Lotze's  unitary  conception  of  the 
world  was  at  least  influenced  in  large  measure  by  ethical  consid- 
erations. The  citations  from  the  Metaphysik  and  the  Logik  indi- 
cate how  constantly  the  ethical  problem  is  present  to  his  thought. 
Ethical  considerations  are  for  him  bound  up  with  those  that  are 
religious  and  aesthetic  as  well.  Lotze  is  wont  to  group  all  these 
together  as  pertaining  to  spiritual  needs,  to  the  demands  of  the 
heart  as  over  against  those  of  the  speculative  reason.^  In  the 
Metaphysik  Lotze  expressly  asserts  that  his  doctrine  of  the 
unity  of  the  world-ground  rests  upon  a  purely  speculative  basis, 
while  at  the  same  time  he  confesses  himself  not  to  be  indiffer- 
ent to  the  religious  interests  involved  in  such  a  conception.^  But 
while  the  strictly  metaphysical  aspect  of  the  problem  may  admit  of 
proof,  or  of  a  rational  apprehension  which  approximates  to  proof, 
the  essential  unity  of  the  three  realms  of  truth,  reality,  and  worth 
under  the  concept  of  the  Good  is  an  ideal  of  the  practical  reason 
which  the  speculative  reason  is  unable  completely  to  vindicate  or 
to  explain.^  It  is  '  reason  appreciative  of  worth  '  that  affirms 
the  unity  of  the  Supreme  Principle  which  realizes  itself  in  all 
that  is.  That  the  universe  should  be  one^  one  in  purpose  and  in 
harmony,  is  an  ethical  no  less  than  an  aesthetic  or  religious  de- 
mand. 

It  is  a  principle  of  Lotze's  epistemology,  constantly  reiter- 
ated, that  the  truth  which  is  necessary  for  thought  is  valid  for 
the  reality  to  which  thought  applies  it.'*  The  ethical  instinct 
in  Lotze  makes  it  an  incredible  notion  to  him  "  that  the  uni- 
verse should  be  split  in  two  in  such  a  way  that  the  whole  intel- 

^  See  Introd.  to  Mikr.  ;  Introd.  to  Ph.  of  Relig.,  \  4. 
*Met.,  \  233. 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  461,  617  seq.  ;   Outl.  ofjEs.,  I  9. 
^ Logik,  II  303-312;  Mikr.,  i  :  pp.  393-398- 


PHILOSOPHICAL  MOTIVES  AND  PRESUPPOSITIONS.    1 3 

lectual  life  has  always  to  do  with  an  external  reality  which  is 
eternally  impenetrable  to  it."  ^  It  is  faith  in  the  essential  moral 
veracity  of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  its  essential  rationality,  that 
stings  him  to  revolt  against  that  view  which  represents  thought 
as  missing  its  mark,  as  aiming  at  things  per  se,  but  perforce 
contenting  itself  with  '  mere  phenomena.'  On  the  contrary, 
reality  does  not  elude  thought ;  reality  is  not  a  hidden  world 
of  noumena,  it  is  the  world  we  know  in  experience.^  Epis- 
temologically,  then,  the  world  of  reality  is  a  unity.  That  the 
unity  of  the  ultimate  principle  is  at  bottom  an  ethical  demand 
even  more  than  a  speculative,  can  appear  fully,  however,  only 
when  inquiry  has  been  made  into  the  nature  of  the  Unit  Being, 
and  this  inquiry  must  be  left  for  a  subsequent  chapter. 

The  second  of  Lotze's  early  prejudices,  the  conviction  that  the 
intellectual  life  is  more  than  thought,  springs  obviously  from  an 
ethical  root.  He  means  here  cognitive  thought,  and  he  recog- 
nized in  the  mental  life  other  data  than  those  of  cognition,  and 
other  ends  than  those  of  theoretical  knowledge.  Thought  is  the 
instrument  for  the  apprehension  of  truth ;  feeling,  or  '  reason 
appreciative  of  worth,'  for  the  apprehension  of  value.  The 
good  belongs  to  the  realm  of  value,  which,  Lotze  held,  is  related 
to  the  realm  of  truth  as  end  to  means.  But  whatever  the  rela- 
tion which  may  finally  be  established  between  the  two  realms,  we 
are  not  warranted  at  the  start  in  giving  truth  the  precedence  of 
value,  or  in  making  cognition  superior  to  the  practical  reason. 

^Kl.  Schr.,Z'  p.  453- 

2Cf.  Mikr.y  I:  pp.  396-397. 


CHAPTER   II. 
Lotze's  Idea  of  the  Good  ;  its  Place  in  his  System. 

PFLEIDERER,  who  is  perhaps  the  most  sympathetic  of  his 
critics,  characterizes  Lotze's  philosophy  as  a  lofty  ethico- 
religious  Idealism  upon  the  basis  of  a  moderate  and  cautious 
realism.^  The  Idea  of  the  Good  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  the  domi- 
nating idea  of  Lotze's  system.  The  Good  is  the  ground  of  all 
that  is,  and  the  end  for  which  everything  is  as  it  is.  Actuality  is 
not  a  mere  course  of  the  world,  it  is  the  '  kingdom  of  God.'  ^ 
The  meaning  of  the  world  is  what  comes  first,  Lotze  says  in  the 
conclusion  to  the  Metaphysik.  This  meaning  is  not  simply  some- 
thing which  subjected  itself  to  the  order  established  ;  rather  from 
it  alone  comes  the  need  of  that  order  and  the  form  in  which  it  is 
realized.  Elsewhere  Lotze  affirms  that  *'  all  metaphysical  truth 
consists  only  in  the  forms  which  must  be  assumed  by  a  world 
that  depends  upon  the  principle  of  the  Good."  ^  It  is  the  purpose 
of  this  chapter  to  develop  Lotze's  conception  of  the  Good,  to 
show  in  a  general  way  its  significance  for  his  system,  and  to  point 
out  certain  ethical  ideas  derived  from  this  primary  conception 
which  determine,  in  large  measure,  his  characteristic  metaphys- 
ical doctrines. 

Lotze  begins  always  with  experience,  with  the  empirical  facts 
that  lie  close  at  hand.  The  unity  which  philosophy  seeks  with 
sure  instinct  must  be  for  him  a  unity  found  by  the  converging  of 
the  threads  of  the  manifold.  To  the  theoretical  reason  no  such 
unity  is  apparent.  On  the  contrary,  what  we  find  is  a  diversity 
of  elements  apparently  irreducible  and  ultimate  :  *'  All  our  analy- 
sis of  the  cosmic  order  ends  in  leading  back  our  thought  to  a 
consciousness  of  necessarily  valid  truths,  our  perception  to  the 

^Pfleiderer:  Lotze' s  philosophische  Wdtanchauung,  pp.  62-63. 
^  Ph.  of  Relig.,  §  80. 
3  Outl.  of  Met. ,  \  93. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF    THE   GOOD.  1 5 

intuition  of  immediately  given  facts  of  reality,  our  conscience  to 
the  recognition  of  an  absolute  standard  of  all  determinations  of 
worth''  ^  Lotze  speaks  of  these  as  *  elemental  forms  of  our 
knowledge  '  ^  and  as  '  realms  '  or  *  powers.'  ^ 

This  cleavage  of  our  universe  into  the  realms  of  truth  or  uni- 
versal law,  reality,  and  worth,  presents  a  problem  insolvable  by 
the  theoretical  reason.  We  are  not  able  to  embrace  all  three  in 
one  comprehensive  notion,  or  from  any  one  to  obtain  the  others 
by  logical  deduction.  The  three  involve  one  another,  imply  one 
another,  but  the  connection  is  obscure.  The  necessary  truths,  or 
universal  laws,  tell  us  merely  what  must  follow  from  given  con- 
ditions. They  are  hypothetical  in  their  nature,  they  never  state 
what  is,  but  only  what  must  be  if  something  else  is.  They  do 
not  give  us  reality,  but  they  imply  reality.  On  the  other  hand, 
reality  as  given  to  us  in  intuitions  is  never  presented  as  neces- 
sary ;  it  simply  is.  Other  and  quite  different  forms  of  reality  are 
conceivable.  Again,  our  ideas  of  worth  do  not  point  to  a  definite 
world  of  forms  as  their  proper  consequence ;  they  attach  them- 
selves to  but  a  part  of  the  content  of  reality,  and  are  imperfectly 
realized  therein.*  This  incoherence  baffles  thought,  which  aims 
at  unity,  and  is  moreover  the  source  of  perplexing  doubts. 

The  key  to  Lotze's  entire  system  is  found  in  his  conviction 
that  these  three  realms  are  ultimately  one.^  There  is  but  one 
real  power  and  this  appears  to  us  **  under  a  three-fold  image 
of  an  end  to  be  realized — namely,  first  some  definite  and  desired 
Good,  then,  on  account  of  the  definiteness  of  this,  a  formed  and 
developing  reality,  and,  finally,  in  this  activity  an  unvarying  reign 
of  law."  ®  This  view  Lotze  terms  a  confession  of  his  philosophic 
faith.  Near  the  end  of  the  Mikrokosmus  he  speaks  of  it  as  the 
consummation  towards  which  he  has  been  all  the  while  working, 
though  without  feeling  entitled  to  make  explicit  use  in  the  fore- 

'^  Mikr.y  3  :  p.  461  ;  cf.  3  :  pp.  610,  616. 

^Mikr.y  3  :  p.  46 J. 

3  Outl.  ofJEs.,  \  8. 

^Mikr.y  3  :  pp.  461-462. 

5  Cf.  Pfleiderer  :  Lotze's  philosophische  Weltanschauung^  p.  63  ;  Thieme  :  Der 
Primat  der  praktischen  Vernunft  bei  Lotze,  pp.  21-26 ;  Vorbrodt :  Principien  der 
ethik  und  Religionsphilosophie  Lotze^  s,  p.  lO. 

^  Mikr.y  3:  pp.  609-610. 


l6        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

going  portion  of  his  work  of  a  philosophic  view  from  which  its 
parts  taken  separately  might  seem  to  be  logically  developed.^ 
The  final  synthesis  of  Truth,  Reality,  and  Worth  is  the  goal  of 
Lotze's  thonght,  fore-shadowed  from  the  start ;  only  from  this 
final  point  of  view  are  his  metaphysical  tenets  thoroughly  intelli- 
gible in  themselves  and  in  their  combination  as  a  system.  The 
one  real  principle  is  the  Highest  Good  f  this  is  the  genuine  reality 
"  in  the  sense  that  all  else  is  in  relation  to  it,  subordinate,  de- 
duced, mere  semblance  or  means  to  an  end."  ^  The  whole  sum 
of  Nature  is  but  the  condition  of  the  realization  of  the  Good.'* 
Those  principles  gained  by  abstraction  from  the  mode  of  behavior 
of  'things'  and  termed  by  us  general  laws,^  are  but  the  formulae 
of  a  universal  mechanism  by  which  the  Good  as  Supreme  Principle 
realizes  itself^  This  is  the  meaning  of  Lotze's  statement  that  the 
beginning  of  Metaphysic  lies  in  Ethics,  that  the  ground  of  what 
should  be  is  to  be  sought  in  that  which  is.'^  In  this  sense  Lotze's 
system  is  a  teleological  Idealism  ;  everything  exists  only  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  it  has  its  necessary  place  in  the  purpose  which 
embraces  all  reality.^  The  conviction  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
Good  Lotze  declares  to  be  the  source  of  his  respect  for  scien- 
tific investigation  into  the  mechanical  order  of  nature,  as  well 
as  of  his  "  obstinate  refusal  to  see  in  all  mechanism  anything 
more  than  that  form  of  procedure  which  is  given  by  the  highest 
reality  to  the  living  development  of  its  content."  ^ 

Granting  that  the  connection  between  the  three  realms  is  ob- 
scure, let  us  inquire  a  little  further  into  this  connection  and  the 
grounds  for  believing  that  it  exists. 

^Mikr.,  3:  pp.  459-460. 

*  Outl.  of  Met.  ^  \  93  ;  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  620-623. 

8  Ouil.  of  Met.,  I  92. 

^Mikr.,  I  :    p.  447. 

6  Outl.  or  Met.,  |  ZZ- 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  616-618. 

'  Met.,  Schluss. 

8Cf.  Erdmann :  Hist,  of  Philos.,  p.  309;  Santayana  :  Lotz^s  Moral  Idealism^ 
Mind,  1890, 

^Mikr.,y.  p.  622.  Thieme  points  out  that  Lotze  was  indebted  to  Weisse  for 
these  three  ideas.  Der  Primal  der  praktischen  Vernunft  bei  Lotze,  p.  26.  In  the 
primacy  given  to  the  ethical  element  we  see  the  influence  of  Fichte  as  well. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF  THE   GOOD,  IJ 

As  regards  the  world  of  reality,  human  reason  and  insight  are 
helpless  before  the  task  of  showing  why  the  world  should  take 
just  the  forms  we  find  in  it  in  order  to  the  realization  of  the  end. 
Our  knowledge  of  nature  and  of  history  is  far  too  limited  to 
admit  of  our  tracing  the  development  of  the  supreme  principle. 
A  boundless  insight  into  nature,  Lotze  believes,  would  at  least 
make  it  appear  that  reality  is  indissolubly  connected  with  the 
realm  of  Worth  and  Good.^  The  plan  of  the  universe  in  its  de- 
tails is  necessarily  hid  from  finite  beings.  The  existence  of  evil 
and  of  sin  in  nature  and  in  history  presents  an  insurmountable 
difficulty  to  finite  reason.^  In  fact,  we  are  forced  to  admit  a 
"  chasm  between  the  realm  of  ideas  or  final  purposes,  and  the 
realm  of  real  means."' 

Lotze  is  strongly  averse  to  the  attempt  to  deduce  the  universe 
from  a  single  principle.  All  such  attempts  are  fore-doomed  to  fail- 
ure, he  believes.  This  has  been  the  chief  source  of  error,  accord- 
ing to  his  thinking,  in  the  great  constructive  systems  of  philos- 
ophy. To  quote  from  the  Outlines  of  Metaphysics :  ^'Although 
we  apprehend  the  Highest  Good  as  the  one  real  principle  on 
which  the  validity  of  the  metaphysical  axioms  in  the  world  de- 
pend, we  cannot  regard  it  as  a  principle  of  cognition  that  can  be 
profitably  converted  into  a  major  premise  from  which  to  deduce 
the  sum  of  metaphysical  truth.  .  .  .  The  very  name,  the 
Highest  Good,  designates  the  content,  the  essentia  of  the  highest 
principle,  but  not  the  form  of  existence  which  we  must  attribute 
to  it  as  a  conditioning  cause  of  the  world  of  phenomena."  * 
The  real  world  in  all  its  varied  forms  can  never  be  shown  to  be 
the  inevitable  consequence  and  expression  of  the  principle  of  the 
Good.  Lotze  gives  some  suggestions  as  to  the  course  that  must 
be  taken  by  arguments  aiming  at  a  thorough  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem ;  ®  yet  all  such  arguments  must  inevitably  be  inadequate.  Such 
proof  alone,  Lotze  admits,  could  fully  justify  his  belief  that  the 
sphere  of  mechanism  is  unbounded,  but  its  significance  everywhere 
subordinate.® 

»  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  609.  *  Outl.  of  Met.,  \%  93-94- 

^Mikr.  3  :  p.  610.  ^Mikr.,  3  ;  pp.  618-619. 

«  Outl.  of^s.  I  14.  ^Mikr.,  3:  p.  618. 


1 8        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

Universally  valid  truths,  also,  though  they  cannot  be  deduced 
therefrom,  are  intelligible  only  with  reference  to  the  Idea  of  the 
Good/  That  there  is  a  realm  of  truth  at  all  seems  to  Lotze  con- 
ceivable only  in  a  world  the  ultimate  principle  of  which  is  ethical, 
and  which  has  as  its  goal  the  realization  of  the  Good.^  Knowl- 
edge is  not  in  itself  an  ultimate  end  ;  in  the  last  resort  it  has  worth 
only  as  offering  a  clue  to  the  true  meaning  of  existence.^  All 
ultimate  principles,  whether  those  of  the  theoretical  reason,  or  of 
ethics  and  aesthetics,  are  intelligible  only  as  expressions  of  an 
order  realized  in  the  world  by  the  Good  as  the  supreme  principle. 
Order,  indicating  purpose,  is  the  testimony  of  the  world  without 
us  and  the  world  within  us  to  a  dominating  ethical  principle.  In 
the  Logik  Lotze  shows  that  the  speculative  ideal  itself  points  be- 
yond logic  to  the  content  of  a  supreme  principle  which  is  the 
ultimate  ground  of  the  universal  laws  themselves,  of  the  direction 
in  which  the  world  as  a  whole  develops,  and  of  the  individual 
forms  which  reality  assumes  at  each  moment*  In  the  con- 
clusion to  the  Metaphysik  we  find  the  following  statement :  *^  All 
those  laws  which  can  be  designated  by  the  common  name  of 
mathematical  mechanics,  whatever  that  name  includes  of  eternal 
and  self-evident  truths,  and  of  laws  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  are 
everywhere  valid — all  these  exist  not  on  their  own  authority, 
nor  as  a  baseless  destiny  to  which  reality  is  compelled  to  bow. 
They  are  (to  use  such  language  as  men  can)  only  the  first  con- 
sequences which  in  the  pursuit  of  its  end,  the  living  and  active 
meaning  of  the  world  has  laid  at  the  foundation  of  all  particular 
realities  as  a  command  embracing  them  all." 

But  while  emphasizing  the  subordination  of  Reality  and  Truth 
to  the  Good,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  three  realms  form  one 
universe.  The  distinction  of  the  three  is  a  distinction  for  thought 
only.  There  is  but  one  world-process,  from  which  thought  ab- 
stracts three  elements — the  field  in  which,  the  means  by  which, 
the  end  for  which  the  whole  is.     There  can  be  no  separation  of 

'^Mikr.y'^:  pp.  619-620. 

2Cf.   Thieme :    Der  Primal  der  praktischen    Vernunft  bei  Lotze ^y^.  13-14  ; 
Vorbrodt :  Principien  der  Ethik,  p.  36. 
*Mikr.^  Introd.,  pp.  vi-viii. 
^Logik,liSl.  • 


LOTZE  S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  I9 

Truth  from  Reality ;  the  former  is  and  is  reaHzed  in  the  latter. 
No  truth,  no  law  "can  exist  within  the  world  before,  outside,  be- 
tween, or  above,  the  '  things '  concerning  which  it  is  assumed  to 
hold  good."  ^  *  Law  '  is  nothing  else  than  the  thing's  mode  of 
behavior.  The  *  thing '  is  its  unvarying  nature  as  expressed  in 
its  mode  of  behavior ;  it  is  no  kernel  or  core  of  reality  apart 
from  this ;  its  sole  reality  is  its  mode  of  action.  The  law, 
then,  is  the  thing.^  A  general  law  is  an  abstraction  corre- 
sponding to  the  abstract  conception  of  thing.^  The  superficial 
view  by  which  Reality  and  the  realms  of  Universal  Law  stand 
over  against  one  another,  must  then  be  modified  and  corrected. 
There  is  no  inert  and  plastic  Reality  which  is  subjected  to  the 
universal  dominion  of  Law ;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  there  any 
system  of  eternally  valid  Truths  which  exist  prior  to  Reality  and 
condition  its  form  and  action.  Reality  is  activity  in  accordance 
with  immanent  law. 

But  neither  can  Reality  and  Truth  be  separated,  save  in 
thought,  from  the  Good.  The  Good  is  not  something  apart  from 
the  world,  hovering  over  it,  as  it  were,  and  directing  its  progress 
towards  a  goal.  The  universe  is  One  Being  in  whom  Reality, 
Truth,  and  the  Good,  are  indissolubly  united.  The  Absolute  Be- 
ing may  be  conceived  under  differing  aspects  as  the  sole  Reality, 
the  Supreme  Principle,  or  an  Infinite  Process,  realizing  an  end. 
This  Being,  which  must  also  be  conceived  as  the  highest  and 
only  true  Personality,*  '  faith  calls  God.'  Because  in  ethical 
attributes  is  found  the  most  adequate  expression  of  His  nature, 
the  idea  of  the  Good  is  the  fundamental  conception.^  What  is 
for  metaphysics  the  World-Ground,  is  for  the  personal  appre- 
hension of  man  '  the  Highest  Good  personal '  ^  or  '  Living  Love.'  ^ 
For  the  Infinite  there  was  "no  Reality  within  which  He  had  to 
realize  His  creation,  nor  laws  which  prior  to  Himself,  of  them- 

1  Outl.  of  Met.,  I  96. 

2  Outl.  of  Met.,  II  25,  26,  32,  34;  Mikr.,  3:  p.  481. 
^Outl.  of  Met.,  l\  32-33. 

^Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  563-568  ;  Ph.  of  Relig.,  U  33,  41- 
^Mikr.,  3 :  pp.  615-623  ;  Ph.  ofRelig.,  \  81. 
«  Outl.  of  Met.,  \  92. 
"^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  615. 


20       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

selves  determined  what  was  possible  and  what  was  impossible."  ^ 
All  that  exists  is  but  the  Infinite  Being  ;  on  no  other  assumption 
is  the  '  relatedness  '  of  things  intelligible.  Nor  can  we  think  of 
the  Infinite  as  conditioned  by  a  system  of  pre-mundane  laws. 
That  which  we  know  as  the  sum  of  universal  truths  is  but  *  the 
mode  of  action  of  Omnipotence.'  ^ 

The  solution  of  this  problem  by  thus  resolving  what  seemed 
three  irreducible  elements  of  our  world  into  one,  a  trinity  within 
a  unity,  is  a  solution  not  afforded  by  the  theoretical  reason.  It 
is  not  susceptible  of  proof.  **  In  our  theoretic  cognition,"  says 
Lotze,  "  we  shall  never  get  further  than  a  faith  founded  on  cer- 
tain motifs  that,  nevertheless,  in  the  totality  of  the  world  this 
perfect  concord  [that  is,  of  the  Good,  Reality,  and  Truth]  does 
take  place."  ^  The  justification  of  this  faith  will  appear  more 
clearly  when  the  concept  of  Value  has  been  considered  somewhat 
in  detail,  and  to  this  we  will  now  turn  our  attention. 

The  concept  of  Value,  or  Worth  ( Werth),  holds  an  important 
place  in  Lotze's  philosophical  system.  It  is,  therefore,  espe- 
cially unfortunate  that  we  have  nowhere  a  full  and  systematic 
statement  of  his  views  on  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  religion,  wherein 
the  discussion  of  Value  would  find  place.  This  is  due  chiefly  to 
the  fact  that  the  third  part  of  his  System^  that  which  was  to  con- 
tain the  practical  philosophy,  was  never  completed.  One  must 
also  deplore  in  Lotze's  treatment  of  this  subject  a  certain  con- 
fusion in  the  use  of  terms  and  a  lack  of  careful  analysis,  in 
marked  contrast  with  his  close  and  cautious  reasoning  on  meta- 
physical and  logical  subjects. 

The  concept  of  Value,  as  used  by  Lotze,  includes  both  the 
Good  and  the  Beautiful.  In  one  connection,  he  adds  to  these  the 
*  happy,*  or  *  blessedness,'  as  uniting  with  the  Good  and  the 
Beautiful  to  form  "one  complex  of  all  that  has  value."*  Else- 
where he  enumerates  the  good,  the  beautiful,  and  the  holy,  or 

»  Mikr.^  3  :  p.  598. 

^Mikr.,  3 :  p.  589  ;  Cf.  3  :  pp.  606-607  ;  Ph.  of  Relig.,  \\  48,  49»  54- 

«  Outl.  of  jEs.y  \  14;  Cf.  Mikr.,  4:  pp.  466,  612. 

<  Outl.  of  Met.,  §  92. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  21 

righteousness,  as  comprising  our  Ideas  of  what  has  worth. ^  In 
spite  of  some  confusion  here,  it  is  clear  enough  that  Lotze  means 
to  distinguish  the  judgment  of  worth  from  the  merely  cognitive 
judgment  of  fact  or  of  truth.  The  content  of  the  latter  judgment 
is  immutable  but  indifferent.  The  content  of  the  former  we  pro- 
nounce '  beautiful '  or  '  good ' ;  it  is  not  indifferent  to  us,  it  has 
worth.  In  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Lotze  examines  the  concep- 
tion of  a  world-aim.  Such  an  aim  can  be  only  that  which  has 
supreme  value,  and  his  conclusion  is  that  only  to  happiness,  or 
'  blessedness,'  can  supreme  value  be  attributed.^  Nothing  other 
than  '  blessedness '  can  be  the  world-aim,  since  "  nothing  else 
affirms  itself  so  unconditionally  and  immediately  in  respect  to 
its  value. "^  Only  in  regard  to  blessedness  is  the  question  absurd 
why  it  rather  than  something  else  should  be  the  final  purpose  of 
the  world.  In  just  this  end  the  goodness  of  the  world  consists. 
It  is  only  in  eternal  blessedness  that  the  final  end  of  all  world- 
faring  is  realized  ;  this  is  the  aim  for  the  realization  of  which  every 
thing  is  as  it  is,  and  every  law  of  the  world  commands  what  it 
commands.*  But  just  as  there  is  no  pleasure  in  general,  every 
pleasure  having  a  definite  xontent,  so  the  world-aim  of  blessed- 
ness is  not  realizable  in  a  general  sense,  but  only  in  the  concrete.* 
We  must  turn  our  attention  to  the  standard  of  value  as  appre- 
hended by  the  individual. 

The  idea  of  worth  can  have  meaning  only  with  reference  to 
a  subject  capable  of  sensibility ;  ®  hence  the  importance  of  the 
feelings  as  affording  the  basis  of  all  judgments  of  value.  All 
values,  says  Lotze,  are  apprehended  primarily  by  means  of  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  and  pain  :  "  There  is  nothing  at  all  in  the  world 
which  would  have  any  value  until  it  has  produced  some  pleasure 
in  some  being  or  other  capable  of  enjoyment."  "^  It  is  feeling  that 
makes  us  aware  of  the  world  of  values  under  the  world  of  forms,^ 

^Cf.  Pract.  Fhilos.,  ^  I2. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  66. 

^Outl.  of  yEs.,  ^13. 

*Cf.  Kl.  Schr.,  3  :  p.  539  ;  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  309-3 lO. 

«Cf.  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \\  66,  69,  79. 

^  Mikr.y  3  :  p.  614. 

'^ Pract.  Philos.,  §  8  ;  Cf.  Mikr.,  i  :  p.  280. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  272-273. 


22       ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

and  so  gives  us  the  key  to  the  meaning  of  our  universe.  The 
all-pervading  mechanism  of  nature  finds  its  goal  in  an  inner 
world  of  pleasure  and  of  finite  enjoyment/  Vorbrodt  believesr 
that  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  feeling  is  for  Lotze,  as  will  for 
Wundt,  the  primary  function  out  of  which  all  others  grow.^ 
It  is  certainly  essential  to  a  comprehension  of  Lotze' s  system 
that  his  doctrine  of  the  feelings  as  the  instrument  of  value  be 
clearly  understood.  No  principle  of  his  philosophy  has  been 
more  severely  criticised,  and  none  is  perhaps  more  open  to 
criticism. 

Primarily,  the  standard  of  value  is  pleasure-pain.  From  this 
purely  subjective  and  individual  experience,  an  objective  and 
universal  standard  emerges  later,  as  an  attempt  will  be  made  to 
show ;  but  the  elementary  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  form  the 
basis  of  all  those  judgments  of  worth  which  constitute  so  impor- 
tant a  part  of  the  activity  of  the  human  mind.  In  the  Medici- 
nische  Psychologie,  Lotze  discusses  the  mechanism  of  the  feelings 
in  their  significance  for  psychical  life.^  The  capacity  to  respond 
to  excitations  with  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  is  the  distinctive 
characteristic  of  the  physical  life  he  attributes  to  things.  If  an 
atom  of  a  so-called  material  mass  be  supposed  to  have  a  soul  life, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  grant  it  ideas,  but  we  must  attribute  to  it 
this  primal  experiencing  of  pleasure  and  pain.*  Nothing  is  real 
that  does  not  feel  as  well  as  act ;  reciprocal  action  implies  neces- 
sarily a  being  that  feels,  that  measures  crudely  the  value  of  its 
inner  states  by  joy  and  desire,  pain  and  aversion.  There  can  be 
no  action  without  passion.^  Pleasure  and  pain  finally  reduce  to 
reaction  to  stimulation  in  harmony  with,  or  opposed  to,  vital 
evolution.^ 

Pleasure-pain  is,  furthermore,  the  basis  of  self-consciousness, 
and  therefore  of  personality.  Not  in  the  relation  of  thought  to 
the  thinker,  but  in  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  is  the  Ego  first 

1  Mikr. ,  2  :  p.  320. 

•Vorbrodt :  Principien  def-  Ethik  «.  j.  w.,  pp.  II,  15. 

«See  Med.  Psy.,  Buck  2,  Kap.  2. 

^Med.  Psy.,  pp.  1 33-134,  234;  cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  p.  269;  A7.  Schr.^  2  :  p.  82  f. 

«  Mikr.y  3  :  p.  535. 

^Mikr.f  I  :  pp.  269-271;  2 :  p.  315  ;   Ouil.  of  Psy.y  \  48. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  23 

conscious  that  its  individual  states  belong  to  it,  are  its  own/ 
For  this  self-feeling  the  simpler  experiences  are  adequate  no  less 
than  the  higher  and  more  complex.  Without  it  the  "  consum- 
mate intelligence  of  an  angel  could  not  rise  to  the  knowledge  of 
itself  as  an  Ego";  with  it  "the  crushed  worm  undoubtedly  dis- 
tinguishes its  own  suffering  from  the  rest  of  the  world."  To  each 
stimulation  from  the  outer  world  the  soul  reacts  with  feeling  as 
well  as  sensation.  A  special  pleasure  or  pain  corresponds  origi- 
nally to  each  simple  sensation,  and  this  element  of  feeling  meas- 
ures the  value  of  the  stimulation  for  the  individual.^  To  the  sen- 
sation the  mind  responds  with  a  judgment  of  being ;  to  the  feel- 
ing, with  a  judgment  of  value.  Judgments  of  being  express 
facts ;  judgments  of  value,  the  worth  of  these  facts.^ 

Feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  therefore,  point  beyond  mere 
sentiency,  their  value  is  not  merely  subjective  and  individual.  It 
is  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  human  sentience  that  we  not 
only  never  apprehend  sense-impressions  as  indifferent  contents, 
but  also  that  in  the  accompanying  feelings  we  never  become 
aware  merely  of  a  value  for  us,  but  of  an  intrinsic  value  as  well.* 
This  judgment  {Beurtheihuig)  of  value  is  never  wholly  absent 
even  in  case  of  the  lower  senses,  where  it  is  suppressed  by  the 
intensity  of  self-reference,  but  becomes  increasingly  prominent  in 
the  higher  senses,  until  in  sound  and  color  almost  every  trace  of 
egoistic  interest  may  be  effaced.^  There  is  a  ''  tendency  to  see 
in  the  nature  of  external  things  a  virtue  peculiar  to  themselves, 
an  immediate  worth  or  the  reverse,  recognized  by  our  pain  or 
pleasure  but  not  dependent  on  their  presence."  ^  Thus  feeling, 
even  in  its  simplest  and  most  primitive  manifestations,  shows  an 
inclination  to  transcend  the  individual.  In  its  recognition  of  an 
intrinsic  worth  in  things,  it  postulates  a  realm  of  objective  values. 
At  the  moment  that  it  announces  itself  to  consciousness  as  the 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  280;  2  :  pp.  313-314;  OutL  of  Psy.,  l\  52-53  ;  Philos.  of  Relig.y 

§37. 

*Mikr.,  I  :  p.  272;  2,  p.  182. 

3Cf.  Thieme  :  Der  Primat  der  prakischen  Vernunft  bei  Lotze,  pp.  5-9. 

*  Werth  an  sick,  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  185.     Cf.  also  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  217-218,  321. 

^  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  187-188. 

^  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  193. 


24       ETHICAL  ASPECT   OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

well-being  or  ill-being  of  the  organism,  it  also  points  away  from 
the  subjective  and  particular  experience  to  a  universal  and  sov- 
ereign order. ^  But  feeling  further  serves  as  the  basis  of  the 
highest  activity  of  intelligence — that  of  'reason  appreciative  of 
worth.'  ^  As  inspiring  and  guiding  the  Ideals  of  reason,  feeling 
realizes  its  highest  function.  In  its  judgments  of  worth,  reason 
likewise  fulfils  its  highest  destiny.  Here,  as  in  the  simplest  sense 
experience,  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  yields  the  data  on  which 
the  judgment  is  based.  This  true  function  of  feeling  becomes 
clear  as  we  consider  its  relation  to  the  aesthetic,  moral,  and  theo- 
retical Ideals.  An  Ideal,  as  the  term  itself  implies,  is  a  product 
of  thought.  However  based  upon  and  rooted  in  the  immediate 
and  particular,  an  Ideal  is  universal,  conceptual.  As  such,  it 
implies  necessarily  the  activity  of  thought.  Feeling  may  enter 
into  account  as  a  determining  factor  of  much  importance,  but  an 
Ideal  can  not  be  a  feeling-product  merely. 

In  his  treatment  of  aesthetics,  Lotze  insists  that  we  apprehend 
the  beautiful  only  in  the  form  of  an  Idea,  or  an  Ideal. ^  Pri- 
marily, indeed,  beauty  consists  in  the  subjective  feeling  of  aesthetic 
pleasure  ;  but  we  are  speedily  under  the  necessity  of  attributing 
an  objective  reality  to  the  beautiful.  It  claims  a  universal  validity 
which  is  not  satisfied  in  the  individual  pleasure.*  We  have  seen 
that  the  general  Idea  of  Beauty  implies  reference  to  purpose,  to 
a  world-plan  in  which  the  end  to  be  realized,  the  reality  in  which, 
and  the  laws  by  which,  it  is  realized,  are  believed  to  be  perfectly 
synthesized.^  Any  object  is  beautiful  in  the  degree  that  it  pre- 
sents this  congruity  of  means,  law,  and  end,  and  thus  conforms 
to  and  suggests  the  general  Idea  of  Beauty.  It  is  enough  to 
note  here  that  the  aesthetic  judgment  is  based  upon  the  imme- 
diate feeling  of  pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  the  beautiful  ob- 
ject, but  involves  a  reference  to  an  Ideal  of  universal  and  absolute 
worth.    The  value  of  the  beautiful  object  consists  not  in  the  merely 

*  Cf.  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  341-342. 

^Einer  werthempfindenden  Vernunft.  Mikr.,  I  :  p.  274.     Cf.   Mikr.,  I  :  p.  276, 
werthbestimmenden  Vernunft. 
^Outl.of  Ms.^  I  7. 
<Cf.  Outl.  of  yEs.,  §§  1-2,  4-6,  16. 
^Outl.of^s.,  \l  10,  23. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  2$ 

sentient  pleasure  it  gives  us,  but  rather  in  the  apprehension  of  a 
teleological  meaning  of  the  world  which  the  pleasure  serves  to 
indicate.  Here  we  find  implied  the  activity  of  a  worth-determin- 
ing reason.^  The  immediacy  of  the  judgment  of  beauty  as  based 
upon  feeling,  and  the  idea  of  purpose  involved  in  the  judgment, 
are  doubtless  to  be  traced  to  the  influence  of  Kant's  third 
Critique. 

The  moral  Ideals  of  the  practical  reason  are  likewise  the  out- 
growth of  an  appreciative  feeling.^  Ethical  ideals  vary  with  de- 
gree of  culture  and  are  in  large  measure  the  result  of  culture. 
Morality  never  depends  on  culture  alone,  however  ;  it  has  its 
roots  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  and  rests  on  a  basis  of 
feeling.'  The  feeling  of  pleasure,  Lotze  asserts  with  the  utmost 
emphasis,  is  the  positive  basis  of  the  judgment  of  moral  value. 
An  indissoluble  connection  exists  between  the  notion  of  pleasure 
and  the  notion  of  worth. ^  The  fear  of  Hedonism  has  often  led 
to  the  statement  that  the  good  is  pleasing  because  it  is  good,  not 
good  because  it  is  pleasing.  This  caution  Lotze  repudiates  as  un- 
necessary^, and  boldly  asserts  that  to  be  good  and  to  be  pleasing 
designate  exactly  one  and  the  same  thing.^  The  way  in  which  he 
further  defines  his  meaning  serves,  however,  somewhat  to  modify 
this  statement.  The  pleasurable  feeling,  he  says,  is  the  sole  means 
by  which  the  specific  and  inherent  value  of  things  is  realized,  just 
as  light  "  must  illumine  things  in  order  that  their  different  colors, 
which  they  do  not  have  in  darkness,  may  originate."  That  is, 
the  feeling  of  pleasure  is  the  medium  and  index  of  a  value  that 
is  not  purely  subjective.  Pleasure  is  the  only  absolutely  self- 
assertory  end,  since  every  other  may  be  called  in  question,  while 
this  alone  is  a  self-evident  good.®  If  obedience  or  disobedience  to 
ethical  law  were  to  occasion  no  trace  of  pleasure  or  pain  to  any 
sensitive  being,  it  would  be  utterly  incomprehensible  why  just  the 
obedience  and  not  the  disobedience  should  have  obligatory  force. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  273-274. 

^Mikr.y  I  :  p.  276. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  277. 

^Mikr.,  2  :  p.  316  f.;  Pracl.  Philos.,  \  7. 

^Pmct.  Philos.,  §  8. 

^  Pract.  Philos.,  §4. 

'^Philos.  ofRelig.,  \  67;  Pract.  Philos.,  §  9. 


26       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

"  It  is  impossible  to  understand  what  is  to  constitute  the  '  value  ' 
of  any  action  if  its  results  are  not  able  to  produce  some  '  good ' 
.  .  .  and  this  latter  always  exists  only  in  the  pleasure  of  some 
sensitive  spirit."^  Many  statements  might  be  quoted  from  Lotze's 
various  works  which  assert  as  strongly  as  any  of  the  foregoing 
the  primary  dependence  of  ethical  value  upon  the  feeling  of 
pleasure.^  Moreover,  ethics  has  to  do  with  conduct,  action  ;  and 
pleasure  and  pain  are  the  springs  of  practical  activity.^ 

This  is  by  no  means  the  whole  account  of  the  matter,  however. 
We  straightway  find  new  factors  entering  in,  which  modify  the 
hedonistic  estimate,  and  lead  to  a  new  standard  of  value.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  abstract  pleasure,  pleasure  in  general,  which 
can  be  reduced  to  the  merely  qualitative  determination  of  greater 
or  less.  On  the  contrary,  every  pleasure  is  specific,  it  is  pleasure 
in  something,  and  therefore  differs  qualitatively  from  every  other 
pleasure.*  Thus  every  feeling  of  pleasure  leads  away  from  the  self 
and  its  agreeable  consciousness  to  an  objective  excellence.  This 
is  the  first  remove  from  egoism,  and  proves  that  pleasure  posited 
as  an  end  in  itself  involves  a  logical  absurdity.^ 

While  egoism  is  theoretically  the  only  motive  power  of  our 
activity,  as  a  matter  of  fact  its  inadequacy  is  soon  obvious.^  It 
contains  an  internal  contradiction  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  germ  of 
a  higher  principle.  Not  only  is  its  earliest  reference  to  some  ob- 
ject external  to  the  self,  but  the  object  of  desire  is  also  early  trans- 
formed from  the  sensible  to  the  ideal/  Moreover,  the  egoistic  im- 
pulse is  constantly  checked  and  thwarted  by  the  external  conditions 
of  life.®  But  further,  the  very  egoism  which  prompts  to  a  com- 
parison of  one's  self  with  others,  by  this  very  act  forces  the  recog- 
nition of  some  well-established  standard  and  ground  of  comparison. 
The  superiority  in  which  egoism  finds  satisfaction  would  lose  its 
value  if  it  were  wholly  unique.     It  is  a  superiority  shared  with 

1  Philos.  ofRelig.,  \  67. 

2See  J/zir.,  2:  pp.  308-310;  313-333. 

^Mikr.,  2:  pp.  313-316. 

*  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  321 ;  Tract.  Philos.,  §  8  ;    Outl.  of  Psy.,  §  49. 

5  Mikr. ,  2  :  p.  320. 

^  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  327. 

"^ Mikr.,  2:  pp.  324-325. 

^ Mikr.,  2  :  p.  327. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD,  27 

Others,  albeit  rare,  and  as  such  it  must  be  inteUigible  in  itself  by 
reference  to  universal  notions/  **The  hidden  shackle  which  egoism 
carries  about  with  it  in  its  inevitable  dependence  upon  the  justi- 
fication of  a  universal  is  very  soon  transformed  into  an  external 
bond."^  Continual  reference  to  the  judgment  of  others  tends  to 
supplant  the  individual  by  the  universal,  and  to  bind  each  indi- 
vidual to  his  fellows.  The  *  unconquerable  impulse  towards 
imitation'  assists  this  non-egoistic  tendency.  Hence  a  capacity 
for  self-subordination,  for  self-conquest  through  higher  ideals  of 
conduct  and  character,  and  the  basis  of  genuine  moral  evolution.^ 
Conscience  enters  into  account  to  modify  still  further  the 
egoistic  character  of  feeling.  Lotze  does  not  define  precisely 
what  he  means  by  conscience.  It  is  evidently  conceived  by  him 
as  a  rational  principle  which  presupposes,  however,  an  original 
'  sense  of  obligation '  as  an  essential  characteristic  of  the  human 
mind.*  To  a  certain  kind  of  excitation  the  mind  reacts  according 
to  its  nature  with  what  we  term  moral  feelings  and  judgments. 
The  definite  content  of  our  ethical  ideals  can  only  be  developed 
through  experience.^  The  notions  of  Good  and  good  things  are 
reached  through  conscience  on  the  basis  of  feeling.  Conscience 
approves  and  enjoins  certain  dispositions  and  actions,  and  these 
we  term  good.  Such  a  thing  as  a  moral  judgment  of  conduct  is 
possible  only  on  the  assumption  that  such  conduct  leads  to  pleas- 
ure and  pain.^  When  conscience  prescribes  practical  laws  the 
conduciveness  of  which  to  our  happiness  we  do  not  directly  see, 
we  yet  assume  that  it  is  there.^  An  unconditioned  ought  is  un- 
thinkable.^ Conscience  further  reveals  to  us  the  different  values 
of  pleasures  ;  that  is,  it  assigns  to  the  various  pleasures  their  rank 
as  higher  or  lower  in  the  scale  of  worth.^  The  effort  to  attain 
pleasure  conscience  pronounces  to  be  in  itself  natural  and  without 

'  Cf.  Mikr.y   2  :  pp.  328-330. 

^Mikr.,  2:  p.  331. 

3  Cf.  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  332-340. 

^Mikr.,  2:  pp.  312,  342. 

sCf.  Mikr.,  2:  p.  311  ;  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  76. 

^Pract.  Philos.,  g  15. 

"^  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  3 1 9-320. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  79. 

^Pract.  Philos.,  §  9  ;  Mikr.,  2  :  322. 


28        ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

blame,  but  not  in  the  least  degree  meritorious.  Only  such  con- 
duct as  is  not  determined  by  the  end  of  personal  pleasure  re- 
ceives this  latter  ascription  of  value/  Only  the  satisfaction  of  con- 
science itself  is  exempt  from  all  fluctuations  of  value.'  "We 
should  not  even  call  good  the  frame  of  mind  of  him  who,  by 
a  choice  involving  no  sacrifice,  should  simply  prefer  the  worth 
which  is  greater,  both  objectively  and  to  him,  to  the  worth  which 
is  lesser ;  on  the  contrary,  that  which  for  the  feeling  mind  is 
the  nearest  and  most  urgent  worth,  must  be  sacrificed  to  some 
other  worth,  which  to  it,  as  feeling,  is  not  greater — the  welfare  of 
self  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  content  of  a  supreme  command."' 
Had  egoism  any  claim  to  supremacy  left  it,  we  should  find  the  last 
trace  of  such  a  claim  repudiated  by  the  fact  that  conscience 
further  enjoins  benevolence  as  the  supreme  principle  of  conduct* 

Thus,  as  in  the  case  of  aesthetic  Ideals,  so  also  at  the  basis  of 
the  moral  Ideals  we  find  pleasure  and  pain  affording  the  data  of 
the  practical  reason's  determinations  of  worth.  As  before,  we 
find  also  a  rational  principle  present  at  the  very  beginning,  mani- 
fest in  the  simplest  assignment  of  value  to  an  immediate  object. 
This  rational  principle  increases  in  potency  until  in  the  ideas  of  a 
moral  world-order,  of  universally  valid  moral  law,  of  the  dignity 
and  destiny  of  man  as  a  moral  being,  that  which  is  of  merely 
immediate  and  subjective  value  for  feeling  is  quite  transcended. 
Feeling  itself,  however,  is  not  transcended.  It  is  present  from  first 
to  last;  without  it  there  is  no  apprehension  of  value  whatever. 

In  this  connection,  and  before  proceeding  to  consider  the  in- 
fluence of  feeling  in  the  formation  of  the  Ideals  of  the  theoretical 
reason,  it  may  be  well  to  ask  in  how  far  Lotze  has  succeeded  in 
maintaining  a  middle  ground  between  Hedonism  and  Rational- 
ism. It  is  quite  consistent  with  his  general  philosophical  posi- 
tion as  a  mediator  between  empiricism  and  idealism  that  Lotze 
should  see  the  truth  in  both  these  opposed  ethical  theories,  for 
Hedonism  may  be  regarded  as  the  expression  of  ethical  realism, 

"^  Pract.  Philos.,  \  4. 
^Mikr.,  2  :  p.  323. 
3  Mikr.f  3  :  p.  614. 
^Praci.  Philos.,  |  15  ;   Phihs.  of  Relig.,  \  68. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  29 

and  Rationalism  the  expression  of  ethical  idealism.^  He  saw 
clearly  the  necessity  of  admitting  both  sensibility  and  reason  as 
factors  in  moral  life.  He  recognized  with  equal  clearness  the 
errors  involved  in  any  attempt  to  resolve  morality  into  either 
feeling  or  reason,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other.  He  has  not, 
however,  it  seems  to  me,  been  wholly  successful  in  showing  how 
the  two  elements  must  be  harmonized  in  a  complete  theory. 

In  his  criticism  of  Hedonism,  Lotze  has,  with  great  acuteness, 
put  his  finger  upon  the  exact  spots  of  weakness  in  the  argu- 
ment. The  notion  of  pleasure  as  the  end  of  action  is  absurd, 
he  says,  since  it  is  always  an  object  which  is  aimed  at,  and  not  the 
feeling  excited.^  This  is  the  distinction  that  Professor  James 
makes  between  a  pleasant  act  and  an  act  pursuing  pleasure.^ 
Lotze  sees  also,  with  J.  S.  Mill,  that  pleasures  must  be  dis- 
tinguished qualitatively ;  he  further  sees  what  Mill  failed  to  see, 
that  such  a  qualitative  distinction  is  incompatible  with  the  hedo- 
nistic theory.  Lotze  recognizes  also  in  ethical  commands  an 
obligatory  value  and  majesty  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the 
hedonistic  measure.*  He  does  not  fail  to  emphasize  the  rational 
element  in  moral  experience  and  development.  Even  self-reali- 
zation as  the  end  falls  under  his  condemnation  as  essentially 
egoistic.  The  'self-enjoyment  of  one's  own  fair  personality,' 
he  contends,  is  not  the  true  end  of  life.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  Lotze  has  criticised  no  less  keenly  the  ex- 
treme rationalistic  ethics.  The  purely  formal  character  of  the 
Kantian  ethics  is  revolting  to  him.®  **  An  unconditioned  '  ought ' 
is  unthinkable  ;  and  only  a  conditioned  '  ought  *  is  possible  which 
attaches  advantages  and  disadvantages  to  the  observance  or  non- 
observance  of  what  is  prescribed."^  Again,  he  says  :  "  No  ethics 
can  avoid  having  reference  to  a  purpose  that  is  final  and  in  itself 
of  absolute  value.     No   matter  to  what  extent  many  rigorous 

^  See  J.  Seth  :  Principles  of  Ethics^  p.  152. 

^  Mikr.y  2  :  p.  321. 

8  James:  Principles  of  Psychology  yWy^^.  ^^^-^^^.^ 

*Cf.  Philos.  of  Relig.,  §§77-78. 

^  Pract.  Philos.,  §  29. 

^Pract.  Philos.,  §  5. 

'  Philos.  of  Relig.y  \  79. 


30       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

systems  formulate  their  highest  ethical  laws  apparently  without 
any  such  regard,  still,  in  addition  to  the  assurances  that  they  are 
the  highest  laws,  the  conclusion  must  always  be  suppHed  :  what 
then  would  be  the  result  if  these  laws  were  not  obeyed  ?  "^ 

Lotze's  way  of  treating  the  ethical  problem  suggests  his  solu- 
tion of  the  epistemological  problem.  Just  as  knowledge  is  the 
result  of  the  mind's  reaction  upon  data  given  in  sense,  so 
morality  depends  ultimately  upon  data  given  in  feeling.  Both 
sensation  and  feeling  are  subjective,  but  in  the  case  of  both  it  is 
true  that  the  subjective  experience  is  taken  by  reason  as  the  index 
of  something  objective.  In  both  cases  we  must  suppose  an  orig- 
inal activity  of  mind  and  a  further  work  of  elaboration  in  thought. 
Thus  far  Lotze's  ethical  theory  is  intelligible,  and  commends  it- 
self by  its  recognition  of  both  feeling  and  reason  as  indispensable 
factors.  In  finding  the  ultimate  criterion  of  value  in  the  pleasure 
produced  in  sensitive  beings,  however,  Lotze  finally  reverts  to  the 
position  of  Hedonism.  After  building  up  an  ethics  out  of  sensi- 
bility and  reason,  in  the  end  he  finds  the  supreme  good  in  sensi- 
bility. Reason,  judging  of  worth  by  the  aid  and  inspiration  of 
feeling,  finds  its  goal  not  in  an  objective,  but  in  a  subjective  good.^ 

Now  this  position,  it  seems  to  me,  logically  implies  the  denial 
of  that  which  Lotze  seeks  most  strenuously  to  prove — the  vaHd- 
ity  of  our  moral  ideals.  In  order  to  this,  ethical  value  must 
be  conceived  as  objective  as  well  as  subjective.  To  quote  words 
which  put  this  with  clearness  and  force :  '*  The  objectivity  of 
good  is  no  less  essential  than  the  objectivity  of  truth.  To  make 
truth  subjective,  to  resolve  the  object  of  knowledge  into  the  ex- 
perience or  consciousness  of  the  knowing  subject,  were  to  destroy 
truth  and  knowledge.  .  .  .  Intellectual  subjectivity  means  intel- 
lectual scepticism,  or  the  decentralization  of  knowledge.  And  to 
make  the  good  subjective,  to  resolve  the  ethical  object  into  the 
experience  or  consciousness  of  its  subject,  is,  no  less  inevitably, 
to  destroy  the  good.  ...  If  we  are  to  avoid  moral  skepticism 
we  must  avoid  ethical  subjectivity,  or  the  decentralization  of  the 
good." '     We  have  seen  that  Lotze  assigns  an  objective  worth 

^Philos.  ofRelig.,  \   67.     Cf.  Mikr.^  2  :  pp.  317-320, 
2Cf.  Philos,  ofRelig.,  I  67 ;  Pract.  Philos.,  \  8. 
3  J.  Seth  :  Principles  of  Ethics ^  p.  120. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  3 1 

to  things,  a  worth  of  which  the  subjective  experience  is  the  index. 
We  have  then  a  world  of  objective  values.  But  in  what  does  the 
value  of  things  consist  ?  Lotze's  answer  is  that  things  possess 
value,  after  all,  only  in  that  and  in  so  far  as  they  produce 
pleasure  in  sensitive  beings.  But  this  is  to  turn  back  upon  his 
own  track,  to  deny  objective  value,  and  to  lapse  into  Hedonism.^ 
And  yet  it  is  unfair  to  attach  to  a  man's  theory  a  name  which 
is  not  only  distinctly  repudiated  by  him,  but  which  is  in  fact  con- 
tradicted by  important  elements  in  his  doctrine.  A  hedonist 
Lotze  is  not,  in  spite  of  his  reversion  to  the  hedonistic  standard. 
This  final  reference  of  objective  values  to  the  pleasure  of  sensi- 
tive beings  is  quite  extraneous  and  contradictory  to  his  ethical 
doctrine.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  while  Lotze  saw  clearly 
the  inadequacy  both  of  reason  and  of  sensibility  as  the  sole 
standard  of  value,  and  readily  granted  that  both  must  be  taken 
into  account,  yet  he  failed  to  apprehend  the  manner  of  their  syn- 
thesis in  moral  life.  Not  only  so,  but  he  failed  to  apprehend 
clearly  the  lack  of  such  a  synthesis  and  the  need  of  one.  The 
result  of  this  double  failure  is  the  vacillation  that  we  have  noted 
regarding  the  standard  of  worth.  As  it  stands,  his  theory  is 
unsatisfactory  in  that  it  contains  contradictory  elements.  To  be 
just  to  Lotze,  however,  we  must  again  remember  that  his  theory 
of  ethics  was  never  put  forth  in  systematic  completeness.  An 
attempt  to  do  this  would  very  likely  have  revealed  to  him  the 
inconsistencies  of  his  position. 

Let  us  turn  from  this  excursion  into  Lotze's  ethics  to  resume 
the  course  of  our  discussion.  The  feelings  have  an  important 
function  in  the  formation  of  the  Ideals  of  the  theoretical  reason  as 
well  as  in  aesthetic  and  moral  Ideals.  This  function  will  appear 
most  clearly  perhaps  if  we  consider  feeling  as  influencing  theory, 
and  as  affording  a  criterion  of  truth. 

*  Reason  appreciative  of  worth '  yields  the  Ideals  of  the 
speculative  activity.     Lotze  here  distinguishes  reason  (Vernunft) 

1  The  mere  fact  that  Lotze  makes  benevolence  the  fundamental  ethical  principle, 
does  not,  of  course,  save  his  theory  from  Hedonism.  This  easy  transition  to  an  altru- 
ism that  interprets  the  good  as  another's  pleasure,  even  to  the  denial  or  exclusion  of 
one's  own,  is  as  obvious  a  makeshift  to  avoid  the  full  consequences  of  Hedonism  as 
when  Mill  maintains  that  in  order  to  obtain  happiness  it  must  not  be  explicitly  sought. 


32       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

from  understanding  (Verstand)  by  just  this  difference,  that  the 
understanding  is  purely  cognitive,  disinterested,  but  reason  is  a 
higher  and  more  characteristically  human  activity  ;  it  is  cognizant 
of  worth,  and  "  rejects  even  the  thinkable  so  long  as  it  \^  only 
thinkable,  and  does  not  besides  by  the  inherent  excellence  of  its 
content  win  recognition  of  its  worth  in  the  world. ^  "  If  we  ex- 
amine our  theory  of  the  universe  as  the  matured  product  of  cul- 
ture, we  find  it  to  a  large  extent  determined  by  the  requirements 
of  our  reason.  For  example,  the  effort  to  unify  by  bringing  to- 
gether particulars  under  a  general  law,  and  general  laws  under 
principles  of  yet  wider  application,  is  a  dictate  of  the  worth-deter- 
mining reason.  This  is  an  ideal  which  inspires  scientific  research, 
and  it  is  the  crowning  conception  of  philosophy.^  "  In  its  feeling 
for  the  value  of  things  and  their  relations,"  says  Lotze,  ''  our  rea- 
son possesses  as  genuine  a  revelation  as  in  the  principles  of  logical 
investigation  it  has  an  indispensable  instrument  of  experience."  ^ 
But  feeling  further  must  be  taken  into  account  as  an  aid  in 
establishing  the  criterion  of  truth.  All  ultimate  principles,  theo- 
retical and  practical  alike,  rest  upon  the  strength  of  their  own 
self-evidence.  They  neither  need  nor  are  capable  of  proof  The 
criterion  of  their  validity  consists  wholly  in  the  immediate  clear- 
ness and  certainty  with  which  they  thrust  themselves  upon  us  as 
necessarily  true."*  The  whole  structure  of  thought  and  of  practi- 
cal life  is  built  upon  these  foundation-stones.  We  can  no  more 
doubt  them  than  we  can  doubt  our  own  existence.  The  real 
ground  of  our  confidence  lies  beyond  cognition,  in  reason  appre- 
ciative of  value  through  feeling.  For  it  is  quite  possible  to  ask 
with  Descartes  whether  we  are  not  so  constituted  that  what  is 
false  must  yet  appear  to  us  to  be  necessarily  true.  In  the  face 
of  this  scepticism  "  we  are  left  with  nothing  but  the  confidence  of 
reason  in  itself,  .  .  .  the  certainty  .  .  ,  that  there  is  a  meaning 
in  the  world,  and  that  the  nature  of  that  reality  which  includes 
us  in  itself  has  given  our  spirits  only  such  necessities  of  thought 

»  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  273-274  ;  Cf.    Outl.  of  Psy.,  U  loo-ioi. 

2Cf.  Mikr.y  2:  p.  274. 

^  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  275. 

<Cf.  Logik,  \l  200,  301 ;   Outl.  of  Logic,  \  70;  Kl.  Schr.,  3,  pp.  529,  S40-54I* 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF   THE   GOOD.  33 

as  harmonize  with  it."  ^  In  the  immediate  assurance  which  we 
feel  of  the  worth  of  the  world  and  of  the  world-order  lies  the  se- 
curity for  the  truth  of  our  knowledge.^  Our  confidence  in  ultimate 
principles,  then — a  "  confidence  which  logic  can  never  justify,  but 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  logic  "  ^ — is  nothing  else  than  a 
moral  and  aesthetic  faith  grounded  in  the  conviction  of  their  worth. 
We  are  warranted  "  in  passing  from  the  incontestable  value  of  an 
object  of  thought  to  a  belief  in  its  reality,"  Lotze  says.  Though 
they  have  the  appearance  of  committing  a  fallacy,  such  beliefs 
in  fact  "  rest  upon  an  extremely  broad,  though  unanalyzed  foun- 
dation of  perception ;  .  .  .  starting  from  the  reality  of  a  as  given 
in  experience,  they  connect  with  it  the  reality  of  b^  which  is  not 
so  given,  but  which  appears  to  follow  from  ^  as  a  necessity  of 
thought."  *  It  is  really  faith  in  the  moral  integrity  of  the  universe 
which  demands  that  what  the  thinking  spirit  is  constrained  to 
believe  to  be  true,  shall  be  true.  The  aesthetic  condemnation  of 
a  world  hopelessly  disordered  and  unmeaning  is  closely  allied 
to  the  ethical  demand,  but  is  of  secondary  importance.  As  we 
have  seen,  at  the  root  of  all  judgments  of  value  lies  feeling ; 
and  thus  feeling  lends  its  aid  to  reason  in  affording  the  criterion 
of  truth. 

Here  it  may  be  well  briefly  to  notice  the  criticism  of  Lotze' s 
doctrine  of  the  feelings  by  Professor  Jones.  The  gist  of  this  is, 
that  Lotze  has  assigned  to  feeling,  one  by  one,  the  functions  of 
thought.  Feeling  with  its  consciousness  of  worth  yields  the 
judgment  of  value  ;  feehng  must  inspire  knowledge,  give  the  im- 
pulse to  know ;  feeling  supplies  the  cognitive  ideal,  affords  the 
criterion  of  truth,  guarantees  the  principles  of  thought,  and  *'  fills 
its  otherwise  empty  forms  with  the  value  which  alone  renders 
them  adequate  to  reahty."  ^  Thought  thus  shorn  of  its  preten- 
sions becomes  a  mere  formal,  arranging  activity,  and  can  never 
yield  knowledge.^     Jones   asks  very  pertinently  whether  feehng 

1  Outl.  of  Met.,  \  94. 

2Cf.  Logik,  I  303. 

^Ibid.,  \  349. 

^  Ibid.,  §348. 

5  Jones,  Doctrine  of  Thought,  pp.  5  7-60,  70-72. 

^ Ibid.,  pp.  119,  283. 


34       ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

can  yield  the  judgment  of  value  apart  from  and  without  the 
cooperating  activity  of  thought.  Can  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain  be  identified  with  the  judgment  of  value  ?  ^  Surely  not ; 
but  I  do  not  so  understand  Lotze.  The  foregoing  discussion 
has  failed  of  its  purpose  if  it  has  not  shown  the  writer's  belief 
that  Lotze's  doctrine  necessarily  implies  the  activity  of  thought 
operative  upon  the  data  of  feeling  from  the  first.  The  judgment 
of  value  is  based  upon  feeling;  it  is  not  pronounced  by  feeling. 
Feehng  waits  upon  sensation,  though  it  is  not  reducible  to  sensa- 
tion. Sensation  yields  data  for  the  judgment  of  reality,  feeling 
for  the  judgment  of  value.  Feehng,  unaided,  can  no  more  give 
us  value,  than  can  sensation,  unaided,  give  us  knowledge.^ 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  show  how  feehng  enters  into  the 
Ideals  of  the  practical  and  the  theoretical  reason ;  but  in  no  case 
does  it  assume  the  functions  of  thought  in  so  doing.  Feehng, 
alone,  cannot  be  said  to  afford  the  criterion  of  truth  on  Lotze's 
view,  it  seems  to  me.  Ultimate  principles  rest  upon  their  own 
self-evidence  ;  they  are  necessities  for  our  thought.  The  final 
ground  of  our  conviction  of  their  validity  is  in  our  conviction  that 
the  world  has  worth  and  meaning.  But  this  conviction  is  itself  a 
judgment — the  summing  up,  as  it  were,  of  all  our  judgments  of 
worth.  It  could  never  be  reached  by  thought  independently  of 
feeling,  and  surely  never  by  feeling  independently  of  thought. 
The  source  of  the  error  in  this  interpretation  of  Lotze  is  to  be 
traced,  I  believe,  to  a  misconception  of  the  meaning  of  the  term 
*  feeling '  as  used  by  him.  '  Feeling '  is  sometimes  used  by 
Lotze  to  signify  mere  sentiency,  mere  unmediated  experience. 
It  not  infrequently,  however,  connotes  a  far  richer  content,  one 
that  is  mediated  and  verified  by  our  entire  cognitive  experience. 
To  urge  the  former  of  these  uses  and  ignore  the  latter,  is  hope- 
lessly to  confuse  and  distort  Lotze's  doctrine.  Professor  Jones 
seems  to  me  quite  justified,  however,  in  his  complaint  that  Lotze 
"  has  not  sufficiently  analyzed  feeling,  to  lay  bare  the  presence  of 
thought  in  its  data,  and  to  show  unmistakably  the  emptiness  and 
unintelligibility  of  these  data  apart  from  thought."  ^ 

1  Op.  cit.y  pp.  297-298. 

2  Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  p.  272  ;  p.  182  ;  2  :  p.  322.    Outl.  of  Psy.y  \\  49-50. 

3  See  Jones,  Doctrine  of  Thought,  p.  302. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF  THE   GOOD,  35 

In  his  concept  of  Value  and  his  doctrine  of  the  feelings  as  the 
means  of  its  apprehension,  we  find  the  clue  to  Lotze's  hostility  to 
Hegel.  His  recoil  from  Absolute  Idealism  no  less  than  from 
Materialism  determined  his  philosophical  attitude.  Even  his  earlier 
works  contain  criticisms  of  Hegel/  and  the  later  works  abound  in 
them.  At  every  point  he  finds  cause  of  revolt  against  the  Hegelian 
doctrine  as  he  conceived  it.  We  may  hesitate  to  agree  with  Caspari 
when  he  says,  ''Man  darf  mit  vollen  Rechte  sagen :  Lotze  hatte 
Hegel  ilberwundenJ*  ^  Against  his  own  interpretation  of  Hegel, 
however,  Lotze's  arguments  seem  quite  conclusive.  He  objects 
to  Hegel's  doctrine  for  two  reasons,  which  perhaps  in  the  end 
reduce  to  one  :  First,  any  attempt  at  2.n  a  priori  deduction  of  the 
world  from  one  supreme  principle,  he  deems  futile  and  certain  to 
lead  to  false  conclusions.  The  empiricist  in  him,  the  cautious 
instinct  of  the  man  of  science,  revolts  against  such  a  proceeding 
as  ignoring  concrete  facts.  The  second  objection  is  very  closely 
allied  to  this,  namely,  that  Hegel's  identification  of  logic  with 
metaphysics,  of  thought  with  reality,  ignores  the  concrete  con- 
tent of  reality.  A  merely  logical  development  postulated  as  the 
end  and  meaning  of  the  world,  Lotze  contends,  is  a  sacrifice  of 
the  wealth  of  content  to  the  etiquette  of  form.^  In  particular, 
there  is  involved  the  sacrifice  of  the  individual  life,  the  wealth  and 
worth  of  personality.  This  is  the  argument  to  which  Lotze  re- 
curs again  and  again  in  the  chapter  on  "  The  Meaning  of  His- 
tory." *  According  to  the  view  which  he  attributes  to  Hegel, 
individuals  count  for  nothing  in  history ;  their  efforts  have  no 
worth  and  significance  in  themselves,  and  their  happiness  and 
peace  are  not  among  the  ends  of  historical  development.^  Against 
what  he  deems  the  Hegelian  deification  of  thought,  Lotze  insists 
upon  the  recognition  of  the  entire  content  of  consciousness. 
Experience  is  'richer  than  thought,'  is  a  phrase  constantly 
reiterated  by  him.  As  we  have  seen,  he  believed  that  conscious- 
ness yields  other  data  than  those  of  cognition,  and  data  of  incal- 

iCf.  Outl.  of  Met.,  1 841,  pp.  34-38;  Med.  Fsy.,  I,  3,  I  14- 

2  Caspari,  Hermann  Lotze,  p.  7. 

3  Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  43-45,  463  ;  Kl.  Schr.,  3  :  p.  454 ;  Outl.  of  Met.,  H  II,  90, 

177- 

^  Mikr.,  VII,  2. 

^Ibid.,  3  :  pp.  33,  36,  38-39,  44. 


36       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

culable  significance  for  personality.  To  exalt  cognition  and 
ignore  feeling  is  to  "  acknowledge  only  one-half,  and  that  the 
poorer  half  of  the  world."  ^  It  is  to  "  impoverish  faith  without 
enriching  knowledge."  ^ 

It  would  be  outside  the  scope  of  this  inquiry  to  discuss  the 
mooted  question  as  to  the  true  interpretation  of  Hegel,  whether 
the  thought  which  he  equates  with  being  is  to  be  conceived  as 
abstract  or  as  concrete.  If  we  agree  with  Caird,  McTaggart,  and 
others,  that  the  thought  of  the  dialectic  is  not  thought  as  an  ele- 
ment in  experience,  merely  coordinate  with  sense,  giving  the  form 
to  experience  while  sense  affords  the  matter,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
that  it  is  thought  that  transcends  the  distinction  between  subject 
and  object,  and  includes  the  object  within  itself,^  then  thought  is 
concrete,  there  is  no  denial  of  content,  and  Lotze's  criticism  of 
Hegel  has  missed  its  mark.  On  the  other  hand,  any  philosophy 
that  finds  in  cognition  the  sole  principle,  and  loses  sight  of  the 
practical  in  the  exaltation  of  the  theoretical,  is  best  met,  as  Lotze 
would  meet  it,  by  reference  to  personality,  and  the  complete  con- 
tent of  experience. 

I  have  sought  to  show  that  the  ethical  element  is  so  far  pre- 
dominant that  Lotze's  entire  system  is  based  upon  the  Idea  of  the 
Good.  Out  of  this  fundamental  conception  grow  certain  deriva- 
tive ideas  which  serve,  in  some  measure,  as  regulative  ideals  in 
the  construction  of  all  his  metaphysical  doctrines.  These  ideas 
are  unity,  teleology,  and  personality.  The  relation  of  these  de- 
rivative ideas  to  the  Idea  of  the  Good  is  too  obvious  to  need 
more  than  indication  here.  All  three  must  receive  further  expli- 
cation and  discussion  in  subsequent  chapters.  It  has  been  pointed 
out  that  Lotze  was  committed  to  a  unitary  conception  of  the  world 
for  ethical  reasons  before  he  attempted  his  theoretical  exposition  of 
the  World-Ground  as  necessarily  a  unitary  being.  There  can  be 
but  one  principle,  as  there  is  but  one  end.  The  idea  of  teleology 
is  also  implicit  in  Lotze's  fundamental  conception.     The  Good,  as 

^Mikr.,  3:  p.  44- 

aCf.  Ibid,  3  :  pp.  536,  612  ;    Philos.  0/ Relig.,  I  4 ;    Ouil.  of  Met.,  ?§  87-90. 

3Cf.  Hegel:  Logik,  I,  18-27,  46-48,  62. 


LOTZE'S  IDEA    OF    THE   GOOD.  37 

conceived  by  Lotze,  is  an  active  principle  which  realizes  itself  in 
all  reality.  To  justify  his  belief  in  a  final  purpose  which  pre- 
scribes the  course  of  the  world,  is  the  chief  aim  of  Lotze's 
philosophical  undertaking.  The  raison  d'etre  of  the  Mikro- 
kosmus  is  the  harmonizing  of  the  teleological  with  the  mechan- 
ical view.  The  idea  of  personality  likewise  follows  directly 
from  the  Idea  of  the  Good  and  the  concept  of  Value.  Value  can 
exist  only  for  a  spiritual  being  capable  of  apprehending  it.  The 
Good  as  supreme  reality  is  in  the  highest  degree  personal.  Hu- 
man life  has  dignity  only  as  it  partakes  of  this  attribute  of  God. 
In  the  subsequent  chapters  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  show 
how  these  ethical  conceptions — personality,  teleology,  and  unity, 
— underlie  and  condition  Lotze's  doctrine  of  the  world,  of  man, 
and  of  God. 


CHAPTER    III. 

Conception  of  the  World  :  The  World  Teleological  and 

Spiritual. 

A  TTENTION  will  be  confined  in  this  chapter  to  two  aspects 
-^~^  only  of  Lotze's  cosmology — the  world  as  teleological  and 
as  spiritual.  The  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  world  we  shall  re- 
serve for  later  consideration  in  connection  with  Lotze's  idea  of 
God. 

Both  the  fundamental  conceptions  with  which  we  are  here  con- 
cerned are  in  themselves  ethical,  and  are  inspired  by  an  ethical 
motive  as  well.  Teleology — the  doctrine  of  final  causes — neces- 
sarily involves  the  concept  of  plan  or  end,  which  is  essentially 
ethical  in  content.  As  used  in  ethics,  this  concept  doubtless  im- 
plies purpose  consciously  directed  towards  an  end.  Whether 
or  not  it  is  granted  that  teleology  in  the  broad  sense  likewise  con- 
tains this  implication,  it  must  at  least  be  allowed  that  the  teleo- 
logical conception  implies  a  goal  whither  things  and  events  tend 
by  forces  inherent  in  them,  or  a  plan  within  which  things  stand 
related  as  parts  to  a  whole,  and  are  perfectly  intelligible  only  by 
reference  to  the  whole.  In  this  sense  the  concept  is  still  ethical. 
Progress  towards  a  goal  implies  a  good  realized  by  such  prog- 
ress ;  the  recognition  of  a  relation  of  parts  to  the  whole  implies 
a  meaning  which  conditions  this  relation.  Thus  we  are  unable  to 
avoid  terms  which  have  at  least  a  distinct  ethical  reference. 

The  concept  of  spiritual  existence  is  not  less  obviously  ethical. 
To  be  spiritual  is  to  exist  for  self,  m  some  vague  sense,  at  least. 
Self-existence  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  ethical  conduct — that  is,  of 
self-determination  in  distinction  from  determination  by  external 
forces.  To  be  spiritual  is  the  primary  condition  of  personal  be- 
ing, and  only  personal  beings  are  ethical,  since  for  them  only 
can  the  good  be  an  end,  or  conduct  be  possible. 


CONCEPTION  OF  THE    WORLD.  39 

It  is  clear  that  ethical  motives,  also,  impel  Lotze  to  attribute 
a  teleological  and  spiritual  character  to  the  world.  His  entire 
philosophical  activity  has  its  spring  in  the  effort  to  vindicate  the 
reality  of  ideal  ends.  He  steadfastly  maintains  the  right  to  seek 
such  vindication.  The  practical  reason,  originating  in  feeling  and 
ripened  into  judgment,  constrains  to  seek  an  interpretation  of 
reality  in  accord  with  its  ideals  of  worth.  To  be  inspired  and 
guided  thus  is  as  justifiable — nay,  as  inevitable — as  to  be  in- 
spired and  guided  by  the  theoretical  reason.  Lotze's  funda- 
mental conception  of  the  cosmos  makes  purpose  supreme.  The 
teleological  view  has  a  value  which  can  not  be  gainsaid,  and 
which  demands  a  theoretical  solution  of  the  problem  presented 
by  reality.  Lotze's  insistence  on  the  spiritual  character  of  the 
world  grows  out  of  his  conception  of  value  as  apprehended  by 
feeling,  and  the  ethical  demand  that  everything  that  is  real  shall 
not  merely  exist,  but  enjoy  its  existence. 

Science  has  accustomed  us  to  the  thought  of  law  as  the  funda- 
mental aspect  of  the  world,  Lotze  says  in  his  introduction  to  the 
Metaphysik  '}  but,  in  truth  the  idea  of  plan  or  end  was  the  original 
norm  of  investigation.  It  was  not  as  instances  of  a  universal  rule 
that  men  first  conceived  things,  but  as  parts  of  a  whole,  as  bound 
together  *by  the  unchangeable  purport  of  a  plan.'  This  idea 
of  the  universe,  Lotze  adds,  is  the  true  one,  but,  unfortunately, 
barren  of  results  when  made  the  starting-point  of  speculation. 
We  have  to  do  with  a  concrete  reality,  rich  and  manifold,  and 
only  after  an  exhaustive  study  of  the  world  as  we  find  it,  could 
we  hope  to  speak  with  confidence  of  a  plan  that  unites  all  the 
particulars  into  one  organic  whole.  Yet,  even  the  short-sighted 
and  perhaps  distorted  view  of  nature  which  each  of  us  gains  dur- 
ing a  brief  life-history,  reveals  a  world  in  which  there  is  much 
that  is  purposive,  albeit  in  conjunction  with  much  that  is  indiffer- 
ent.^ The  system  of  universal  and  necessary  laws  seems  to  im- 
ply purpose.^  The  fact  that  we  live  in  a  world  of  events  rather 
than    happenings  is  inexplicable  otherwise.     When  such  argu- 

"^Met.,  I  X. 

^  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  31. 

^Met.,  u  92-93 ;  cf-  U  27, 58-59. 


40       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

ments  as  these  are  reinforced  by  the  promptings  of  the  moral  and 
religious,  nature,  we  can  readily  account  for  the  widespread  con- 
viction that  the  world  is  teleological. 

But  the  teleological  view  straightway  finds  itself  in  conflict 
with  a  very  different  one,  namely,  the  mechanical  view  of  the 
world.  If  the  former  has  a  powerful  ally  in  the  spiritual  insight 
and  aspirations  of  men,  the  latter  points  with  assurance  to  the 
splendid  structure  of  natural  science  as  its  vindication,  and  to  ex- 
perience and  reason  as  its  sponsors.  In  his  introduction  to  the 
Mikrokosmus,  Lotze  has  outlined  this  struggle  of  opposing  views, 
and  defined  as  the  aim  of  this  notable  work  the  reconciliation  of 
the  ideal  and  the  mechanical  explanations  of  the  world.  He  was 
admirably  fitted  for  the  undertaking  by  his  sympathy  with  the 
ideals  of  both  science  and  philosophy.  His  intimate  knowledge 
of  science  in  several  of  its  branches,  and  that  familiarity  with 
scientific  methods  which  belongs  only  to  the  trained  worker, 
made  it  impossible  for  him  to  undervalue  or  greatly  to  misinter- 
pret the  findings  of  science.  Whether  or  not  he  was  successful 
in  his  venture  is  a  question  upon  which  opinions  will  necessarily 
differ.  The  solution  of  any  problem  not  a  matter  of  demon- 
stration must  always  remain  doubtful ;  the  same  arguments  ap- 
peal with  unequal  force  to  different  minds,  according  to  natural 
bias  and  all  the  subtle  factors  in  personality. 

Before  we  can  decide  as  to  the  merits  of  the  dispute  between 
mechanism  and  teleology,  it  is  necessary  to  get  a  clear  notion  of 
what  is  involved  in  the  mechanical  conception.  As  is  usually  the 
case  with  terms  that  are  neither  strictly  technical,  nor  yet  wholly 
relegated  to  ordinary  speech,  some  confusion  prevails. 

Lotze  calls  attention  to  two  inadequate  and  erroneous  concep- 
tions, which  still  prevail  in  some  measure,  and  tend  to  obscure 
the  truth.  Mechanism  as  applied  to  natural  phenomena  has  been 
used  to  describe  sometimes  a  peculiar  mode  of  activity,  some- 
times a  particular  class  of  effects.  The  notion  which  underlies 
this  usage  is  in  both  cases  untenable,  Lotze  maintains.^  Mech- 
anism as  a  distinct  mode  of  action,  a  mere  external  action  that 
takes  no  account  of  the  inner  relations  of  things,  can  nowhere  be 

^  Met.,  II  221-223. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  4 1 

found  in  nature.  Even  in  the  inorganic  world,  chemism,  with 
its  recognition  of  elements  having  specific  qualities,  opposes  itself 
to  this  view.  Every  sort  of  natural  process  implies  qualitative 
differences  in  things,  and  a  mode  of  action  determined  by  their 
inner  nature.  There  is  no  action  which  is  merely  external.^ 
Science  may  make  use  of  such  an  abstraction,  but  let  us  not  de- 
ceive ourselves  by  fancying  it  a  reality.  This  view  of  the  matter 
is  closely  related  to  Lotze's  analysis  of  cause,  and  follows  directly 
from  his  belief  that  reciprocal  action  depends  upon  the  inner 
nature  of  things.^ 

But  the  idea  of  mechanism  as  applying  to  a  special  class  of 
effects  involves  the  same  error.^  For  we  nowhere  find  in  nature 
a  special  class  of  products  due  to  mechanical  activity,  whether 
the  term  mechanical  be  interpreted  in  this  external  sense  or  in 
any  other.  If  by  mechanism  we  mean  a  merely  external  action, 
then  there  is  nothing  in  nature  which  is  so  produced.  Gravita- 
tion, motion,  electrical  and  chemical  action — all  the  forces  we 
know — produce  results  dependent  upon  the  nature  of  that  upon 
which  they  act.  But  if  by  mechanism  we  mean  action  in  accord- 
ance with  universal  laws,  then  every  class  of  effects  is  produced 
by  mechanical  agency,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  designating  any 
particular  class  as  mechanical  in  distinction  from  the  rest.'* 

The  mechanical  conception  of  nature,  of  which  Lotze  is  himself 
a  zealous  supporter,  comprises  two  necessary  features  :  It  first 
regards  nature  as  a  universal  system  of  law,^  and  secondly,  re- 
garding every  effect  as  produced  in  accordance  with  law,  the 
mechanical  view  seeks  to  determine  the  effect  with  accuracy  by 
ascertaining  the  elements  and  their  action.^  Some  necessary  con- 
nection in  things  has  always  been  sought  since  men  began  to  think 
about  the  world  in  which  they  find  themselves ;  and  the  thought 
that  the  world  is  a  whole,  and  is  to  be  accounted  for  as  such, 
was  early  developed.  By  the  mechanical  conception,  however, 
something  different  from  this  is  meant.  The  conception  of 
mechanism  is  rather  that  nature   necessarily  forms  a  whole,  not 

J  Met.,  §  221.  *Cf.  Mikr.,  XV ;  l:  p.  488. 

^Met.,  l\  56-57.  ^Mikr.,  I:  pp.  31-32. 

^  Met.,  \\  222-223.  ^Mikr.y  i:  p.  34. 


42        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

only  in  its  import,  but  in  its  laws  ;  that  the  various  forms  which 
nature  assumes  are  distinguished  from  one  another  not  by  dif- 
ferent laws,  but  by  different  modes  of  applying  the  same  laws.^ 
Nothing  is  isolated  and  alien.  Everything  stands  in  reciprocal 
relations  with  everything  else.  No  form  of  existence  evolves  state 
out  of  state  according  to  a  law  peculiar  to  itself  The  law 
immanent  in  its  nature  is  a  universal  law,  because  all  things  have 
to  some  extent  a  common  nature.  In  the  final  analysis,  nature's 
products  differ,  not  in  the  kind,  but  in  the  combination  of  ele- 
ments.^ But,  furthermore,  in  attempting  a  mechanical  explanation 
of  the  world,  science  is  forced  to  the  analysis  of  the  concrete  wholes 
of  experience  into  their  parts.  It  is  soon  evident  that  there  can 
be  no  law  of  the  whole,  save  as  the  result  of  the  action  and  in- 
teraction of  the  parts.  And  so  natural  science,  pushing  its  analy- 
sis further  and  further,  has  been  obliged  to  assume  the  existence 
of  ultimate  elements  not  perceptible  to  the  senses,  innumerable, 
indestructible,  and  unchangeable  in  their  properties.^ 

It  is  important  to  notice  here  two  points  especially  significant 
for  Lotze's  view.  First,  science  is  not  concerned  as  to  the  origin 
of  the  elements  ;  it  assumes  them  because  they  are  necessary  for 
explanation,  but  it  does  not  assume  that  they  are  unconditioned.* 
Further,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  elements,  it  may  be  said  that,  in  gen- 
eral, scientific  interest  centers  not  in  what  an  element  is,  but  in  how 
it  acts.  Thus,  while  science  may  for  its  own  purposes  abstract  from 
the  nature  of  the  elements,  it  can  have  no  object  in  denying  to  them 
a  specific  nature.  On  the  contrary,  chemistry,  at  least,  requires 
such  an  assumption.  The  scientific  assumption  that  force  inheres 
in  the  elements  of  the  body  with  an  unvarying  mode  of  operation, 
implies,  certainly,  that  these  elements  are  not  mere  indifferent 
points,  but  rather  that  they  act  as  they  do  by  virtue  of  being 
what  they  are.®  In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  elements, 
Lotze  shows  the  influence  of  Fechner  and  of  Herbart.^ 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  84  ;  cf.  2  :  pp.  45-46. 

2Cf.  Mikr.,  i:  pp.  20-21,  32. 

3Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  34-37- 

^Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  37-38. 

6Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  27,  38-40,  56;  Met.,  I  193. 

«Cf.  Met.,  §§188,  191. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD,  43 

The  essential  factors  in  the  mechanical  view,  then,  are  that  all 
occurrences  in  nature  are  events  issuing  in  accordance  with  uni- 
versal laws,  and  that  all  natural  products  are  capable  of  analysis 
into  ultimate  elements  whose  modes  of  action  are  the  laws  that 
prevail  throughout  nature.  The  mechanical  principle  as  thus 
conceived  reaches  over  the  whole  domain  of  nature,  inorganic  and 
organic  alike.  We  have  seen  that  Lotze's  scientific  labors  were 
directed  chiefly  towards  one  aim,  to  prove  the  validity  of  mechan- 
ical law  as  the  principle  of  living  bodies,  in  opposition  to  the 
*  vital  force'  theory.^  A  considerable  portion  of  the  Mikrokosmtis 
also  is  devoted  to  showing  the  prevalence  of  mechanism  in  the 
human  body.  As  we  shall  see  later,  mechanism  extends  its  sway 
to  the  psychical  Hfe  of  man,  and,  in  some  measure,  at  least,  to  his 
moral  life.  Lotze  insists  that  the  mechanical  principle  is  universal 
in  extent.^  Nor  should  we  forget  that  to  admit  a  universal 
mechanism  meant  more  in  Lotze's  day  than  in  our  own.  By 
most  of  Lotze's  contemporaries  he  was  understood  to  have  com- 
mitted himself  to  materialism — at  least  before  the  publication  of 
the  Mikrokosmus — and  to  be  adding  the  force  of  his  logic  to 
strengthen  that  position. 

But  from  Lotze's  point  of  view,  to  admit  mechanism  is  not  to 
exclude  teleology.  The  mechanical  explanation  is  by  no  means 
final.  Nowhere  is  mechanism  the  essence  of  the  matter,  Lotze 
insists.^  It  is  the  point  of  view  of  science,  which  seeks  to  explain, 
not  to  interpret ;  it  by  no  means  excludes  an  interpretative  view 
of  nature.*  The  mechanical  view  assumes  its  data  in  the  world 
as  given.  Its  task  is  the  elaboration  and  explanation  of  these 
data.  As  we  have  seen,  it  asks  no  questions  as  to  the  origin  of 
things,  it  simply  accepts  them  as  it  finds  them  ;  or  when,  as  in  its 
search  for  elements,  it  is  forced  beyond  sense,  it  assumes  what- 
ever is  necessary  for  its  purposes.  In  its  explanation  of  things, 
the  mechanical  view  seeks  only  the  laws  in  accordance  with  which 
things  act.  It  leaves  unexplained  the  origin  of  things,  the  nature 
of  things,  and  the  action  of  things  as  proceeding  from  their  nature. 

J  See  also  Met.,  W  224-227. 

2Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  26,  28-29,  84,    154-156,  448-450  ;  3  •  P-  618. 

^Mikr.,  I  :    pp.  448,  451  ;  Met.y  I  229. 

<  Mikr. ,  2  :  p.  6. 


44       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

Hence  mechanism  leaves  room  for  the  teleological  inquiry  why 
things  are  as  they  are.  To  be  sure,  philosophy  as  well  as  science 
finds  itself  unable  to  push  its  inquiry  back  to  the  origin  of  things. 
It  cannot  hope  to  show  why  we  have  just  the  forms  of  reality  that 
we  have,  nor  why  the  laws  of  their  action  are  precisely  as  they 
are.  No  man  sees  more  clearly  than  Lotze  the  futility  of  such 
questionings,  nor  is  any  man  further  from  accepting  a  cheap  and 
easy  teleology.^  Yet  the  attempt  to  unify  our  knowledge,  to 
comprehend  the  parts  in  relation  to  the  whole,  is  natural  and 
legitimate.  A  comprehensive  view  compels  the  intelligence  to 
transcend  the  bare  mechanical  conception.  The  fact  that  the 
world  is  a  cosmos,  that  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty  are  realities 
for  us,  that  value  is,  as  well  as  fact — this  is  a  view  of  the  world 
that  is  great  with  import.  Reason  would  seem  to  dictate  the 
belief  that  a  creative  and  progressive  purpose  is  active  in  the 
selection  and  arrangement  of  the  elements,  and  is  thus  the  basis 
of  that  order  which  we  find  in  the  world.^  To  this  conviction 
mechanism  can  not  say  nay,  for  it  makes  no  pretence  of  affording 
an  ultimate  explanation  of  things. 

Not  only  does  the  mechanical  view  of  nature  leave  room  for 
the  teleological  view,  but  it  implies  some  such  ulterior  explana- 
tion. Order  implies  purpose,  law  implies  end.  Nature  as  a  vast 
and  complicated  system  of  laws  implies  something  wrought  out 
thereby.  A  comprehensive  view  of  things  can  but  regard  mech- 
anism as  a  system  of  means  to  some  end.  Granting  a  supreme 
purpose  animating  all  reality,  what  better  instrument  could  pos- 
sibly be  devised  for  its  realization  than  just  such  a  system  of 
mechanical  laws  as  prevails?  All  finite  things  could  then  be 
conceived  as  acting  in  accordance  with  law  immanent  in  the  na- 
ture which  is  theirs  by  original  endowment,  and  each  having  its 
own  place  and  import  in  the  plan  which  embraces  the  whole. 
All  mechanism  would  be  but  the  coherent  system  and  means  by 
which  individual  ends  are  realized  within  the  unity  of  the  whole. 
If  such  a  system  be  conceived  to  exist,  we  can  see  how  the  form 
of  it  might  be  abstracted  from  particular  instances,  and  come  to 

1  See  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  17-32. 

2Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  p.  35  ;  2  :  pp.  3-4,  24. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  45 

be  regarded  as  mere  law,  mere  necessity,  quite  apart  from  the 
ends  which  are  realized  by  its  means/ 

Lotze  is  not  content,  however,  with  showing  that  mechanism 
does  not  exclude  teleology,  or  even  that  mechanism  implies  tele- 
ology. Any  theory  that  aims  at  completeness,  he  confesses, 
**  must  comprise  some  definite  representation  of  the  relation  in 
which  in  nature  the  archetypal  thought  must  stand  to  the  efficient 
causes  of  its  representative  realization''  ^  It  is  characteristic  of 
Lotze  that  his  'aim  exceeds  his  grasp.'  Some  lack  of  con- 
structive boldness,  some  excess  of  the  cautious  and  critical  spirit 
— or,  it  may  be,  a  breadth  and  keenness  of  vision  that  revealed 
the  scope  of  problems  and  the  difficulties  in  the  way — always  held 
him  back  from  presenting  more  than  a  hesitating  and  tentative 
solution.  As  to  the  case  in  hand,  Lotze  points  out  the  inade- 
quacy of  two  attempts  at  the  reconciliation  of  the  mechanical  and 
teleological  views,  and  from  his  criticism  of  these,  as  much  as 
from  any  direct  statements,  we  are  able  to  infer  his  own  view. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  anthropomorphic  teleology  that  regards 
the  world  as  a  purposive  creation,  sustaining  the  same  relation  to 
God  that  our  human  products  do  to  our  adapting  and  designing 
wisdom.  Lotze* s  chief  objection  to  this  view  is  that  it  postulates 
an  alien  material  that  first  exists  and  then  is  wrought  upon  by 
God.^  The  second  seeks  to  avoid  this  fatal  opposition  of  adaptive 
purpose  and  the  means  of  its  realization  by  blending  the  two  as 
matter  and  form,  the  Ideal  in  the  real.  Here  Lotze  evidently  has 
in  mind  Plato  and  Aristotle,  as  well  as  the  Idealists  of  modern 
days.  Without  fully  escaping  the  difficulty  of  the  former  view, 
this  has  the  further  defect  of  reducing  the  creative  purpose  to  an 
unconscious  reason. "* 

To  explain  his  own  position,  Lotze  has  recourse  to  the  stand- 
point set  forth  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Any  complete  theory 
of  the  universe  must  recognize  a  realm  of  universal  laws,  of  Ideas 
of  value,  and  of  reality,  or  experience,  boundless  in  the  wealth  of 

1  Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  449-450 ;  2  :  pp.  46,  465  ;  3  :  PP-  616-619,  622-623.  Outl. 
efMet.,  U  70-75. 

2  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  9. 
^Mikr.,  2:   pp.  10-12. 
^Mikr.^  2:  pp.  12-14. 


46        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

its  forms  and  events.  In  this  wealth  of  reality  we  have  to  trace 
both  the  laws  of  all  phenomena,  and  the  Ideas  which  give  worth 
to  all  being  and  doing.^  The  relation  of  reality,  necessary  laws, 
and  Ideas  of  worth,  must  be  organic.  The  true  and  complete 
teleology,  according  to  Lotze's  conviction,  is  that  which  recog- 
nizes reality  as  the  field  in  which,  and  universal  laws  as  the  means 
by  which.  Ideas  are  realized.  It  is  only  at  the  close  of  the  long 
argument  of  the  Mikrokosmus  that  Lotze  reaches  this  crowning 
conception,  and  feels  that  he  has  in  some  measure  justified  his 
belief  that  "  the  sphere  of  mechanism  is  unbounded,  but  its  sig- 
nificance is  everywhere  subordinate."  ^  He  does  not,  however, 
leave  the  matter  with  quite  the  vagueness  of  this  general  con- 
ception. Closer  examination  shows,  he  maintains,  "  that  in  all 
the  elements,  a  certain  purposiveness  in  action  not  merely  is  com- 
patible with,  but  ought  hardly  to  be  sundered  from,  the  funda- 
mental conceptions  of  the  mechanical  theory."^  Mechanism 
must  needs  assume  an  original  nature  of  the  elements,  by  virtue 
of  which  they  manifest  the  properties  characteristic  of  them. 
But  grant  that  no  action  is  merely  external,  that  on  the  contrary 
the  elements  react  according  to  their  inner  nature  upon  all  stimu- 
lation from  without,  and  you  have  opened  a  wide  door  for  teleo- 
logy. The  possibility  of  an  inherent  purposiveness  in  things,  of  a 
tendency  to  evolve  improving  reactions,  in  a  word,  the  possibility 
of  progress  towards  a  goal,  becomes  obvious.* 

In  the  Metaphysik,  Lotze  links  his  teleology  with  his  doctrine 
of  the  unity  of  all  things  in  the  World-Ground.  Organic  life, 
especially,  implies  purpose,  and  hence  a  conscious  subject  that 
conceives,  wills,  and  realizes  ends.^  Such  a  being  can  only  be  an 
immanent  God.  Law  is  intelligible  only  as  the  activity,  the  in- 
dwelling vitality,  of  the  One  Being,  a  real  and  potent  presence  in 
the  innermost  life  of  each  element.^  But  '*  the  Absolute  is  no 
magician  ;  it  does  not  produce  things  in  appropriate  places  out  of 
a  sheer  vacuum."^  Rather  it  manifests  itself  in  a  plan  which  is 
developed  according  to  a  system  of  laws.     Hence  organic  and 

^Mikr.,  2  :  p.  15.  ^  Met,^  g^  229-230. 

^Mikr.y  3  :  p.  618;  cf.  pp.  616-620.  ^  Met.,  \\  230,  232-233. 

3  Mikr.,  2  :  p.  34.  "^  Met.,  \  233. 
^Mikr.y  2:  pp.  35-44. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  47 

inorganic  being  are  everywhere  dependent  on  what  we  term 
mechanical  causes,  and  exhibit  a  law  of  progress  or  evolution. 
This  conviction  is  the  ground  of  Lotze's  "  obstinate  refusal  to  see 
in  all  mechanism  anything  more  than  that  form  of  procedure — 
susceptible  of  isolation  in  thought — which  is  given  by  the  Highest 
Reality  to  the  living  development  of  its  content,  which  content  can 
never  be  exhaustively  expressed  by  this  form  alone. "^ 

Thus  his  defense  and  exposition  of  the  teleological  view  of 
nature  leads  us  back  to,  and  is  grounded  in,  his  fundamental  as- 
sumption, that  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Good  as  dictating  the 
forms  and  laws  of  reality.  At  least  we  may  say  that  this  is  a 
brave  attempt  to  solve  a  long- vexed  problem.  And  in  making  the 
attempt  Lotze  in  no  wise  minimizes  the  difficulties  of  the  under- 
taking ;  his  is  no  superficial  teleology  that  wins  an  easy  triumph. 
His  correction  of  the  mechanical  conception,  showing  the  inade- 
quacy of  a  mere  external  mechanism  ;  his  insistence  upon  the 
universal  validity  of  the  mechanical  principle  rightly  understood  ; 
the  clearness  with  which  he  points  out  the  incompleteness  of 
mechanism  as  a  final  explanation,  and  his  noble  attempt  to  prove 
a  teleological  principle  active  in  the  world  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  a  universal  mechanism,  all  are  features  which  give  to 
his  work  a  great  and  lasting  value.  For  Lotze's  own  genera- 
tion this  work  had  a  special  value  which  it  can  have  for  no  other. 
In  our  day  the  echoes  of  the  strife  which  the  last  generation 
waged  for  and  against  the  claims  of  science,  are  dying  away. 
Science  no  longer  makes  pretensions  to  give  the  final  explanation 
of  the  world-order,  nor  is  it  any  longer  provoked  into  a  hostile 
attitude  by  misapprehension  and  distrust.  Yet  the  opposition  be- 
tween the  real  aspect  of  things,  and  the  ideal  view  which  seeks  to 
interpret  this  order,  is  perennial ;  and  for  this  reason  Lotze's  ar- 
gument in  behalf  of  teleology  has  permanent  value  for  philosophy. 

That  the  ultimate  elements  which  compose  the  world  are  in 
their  essential  nature  spiritual,  is  a  belief  which  Lotze  held  con- 
sistently throughout  his  life,  and  to  which  he  gave  expression 
in  all  his  important    works.     There    can  be  no  doubt  that  he 

1  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  622. 


48        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

himself  held  this  conception  to  be  an  intrinsic  and  necessary  ele- 
ment in  his  system ;  to  many  it  must  seem  accidental  merely,  a 
union  of  the  poetic  and  the  bizarre,  the  effect  of  which  is  rather 
to  repel  than  to  attract.  It  suggests  the  monadology  of  Leib- 
niz, with  some  important  modifications,  however.  The  imma- 
terial, soul-like  atoms  of  Leibniz  are  isolated  ;  the  monads  '  have 
no  windows,'  each  lives  its  life  within  itself,  sustaining  no  recip- 
rocal relation  with  others.  The  theory  of  a  pre-established  har- 
mony involved  in  this  conception  is  distasteful  to  Lotze ;  it  implies 
determinism,  and  denies  to  the  monads  the  joy  of  active  realization 
of  ends.  Such  a  world,  he  frequently  repeats,  would  gain  noth- 
ing by  being  realized.^  His  own  monadology  is  explicitly  based 
upon  the  concept  of  interaction,  and  presupposes  the  unity  which 
Leibniz's  world  lacks. 

The  doctrine  that  the  world  is  spiritual  Lotze  supports  by  two 
lines  of  argument,  one  of  which  is  metaphysical,  and  the  other 
ethical.  He  does  not  keep  the  two  distinct,  but  passes  over  from 
the  metaphysical  argument  to  the  ethical  so  easily  as  to  suggest 
that  the  force  of  the  latter  is  perhaps  primarily  greater  with  him, 
and  influences  his  metaphysical  theory  to  a  degree  of  which  he  is 
unconscious.  The  metaphysical  considerations  which  led  Lotze 
to  the  doctrine  in  question,  have  to  do  with  three  closely  related 
problems — that  of  the  being  of  things,  the  unity  of  things,  and  the 
reciprocal  action  of  things.  These  we  will  consider  in  brief  before 
turning  to  the  ethical  argument. 

In  the  Metaphysik,  Lotze  discusses  at  length  the  notion  of  the 
being  or  essence  of  the  *  thing.'  The  first  conclusion  reached  is 
that  the  *  thing '  is  not  to  be  identified  with  its  quahties,  whether 
these  qualities  be  conceived  as  sensible  or  as  supersensible.^  A 
thing  is  more  than  the  sum  of  its  qualities,  its  essence  is  not  in 
them ;  the  quahties  change,  none  of  them  belong  to  the  thing 
absolutely,  but  only  under  certain  conditions.  The  thing  is  per- 
manent in  spite  of  changing  states.  All  qualities  are  adjectives, 
and  can  be  thought  of  only  as  predicates  affirmed  of  a  subject.^ 

^Met.,  ^  16-20;  Mikr.,  3:  pp.  516-519. 
^  OutL  of  Met.,\\T. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD,  49 

Things  can  not  be  qualities,  but  can  only  have  them.^  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  neither  is  the  essence  of  things  to  be  sought  in  a 
kernel  or  substratum,  itself  void  of  qualities.  A  core  of  reality, 
quite  void  of  properties,  can  not  become  the  basis  of  qualities. 
All  possibility  of  change  in  things,  of  their  assuming  new  forms, 
depends  upon  their  having  determinate  properties  by  which  they 
offer  definite  points  of  contact  to  the  conditions  operating  upon 
them.  Furthermore,  this  conception  implies  a  world  of  isolated 
and  alien  things,  and  hence  denies  order  and  connection  by  nat- 
ural law.^ 

The  positive  conclusion  following  these  negative  results  is  that 
the  nature  of  the  thing  is  to  be  sought  only  in  its  modes  of  action. 
The  mode  of  behavior  of  a  thing  is  its  essence.  A  thing  is  '  a 
law  of  change';  its  being  is  activity,  change  within  fixed  limits 
and  according  to  a  method  of  procedure  peculiar  to  itself.^  This 
result  is  significant  for  the  point  in  question,  since  it  argues  that 
the  ordinary  notion  of  things,  at  least,  needs  modification  and 
correction.  If  Lotze's  reasoning  is  sound,  the  'thing,'  instead 
of  being  fixed  and  inert,  is  essentially  active,  a  permanent  subject 
of  changing  states. 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  unity  of  the  *  thing,* 
which  is  the  next  step  in  Lotze's  conception  of  the  nature  of 
things,  and  affords  his  proof  that  this  nature  is  spiritual.  The 
'  thing '  is  ever  changing,  yet  we  are  obliged  to  assume  a  certain 
unity  in  the  midst  of  change.^  A  *  thing '  appears  in  a  series  ot 
forms  ;  the  concept  of  change  involves  the  necessity  of  regarding 
all  members  of  this  series  as  *  states  '  of  one  and  the  same  abiding 
reality.^  The  *  thing '  then  must  be  conceived  as  the  "  subject 
of  its  own  predicates,"  the  "support  of  its  own  properties,"  that 
which  maintains  itself  as  a  unity  in  the  midst  of  change.  Only 
one  kind  of  being  can  sustain  such  a  relation  to  its  states,  and  that 


'^Outl  of  Met,,  §  19. 

^Qi.MeL,  §§24,  26,32,  34. 
*-OutL  of  Met.,  §22;  Met.,  §96. 

^Outl.  of  Met.,  \  36.     The  term  *  states  '  Lotze  admits  is  not  a  good  one,  but  he 
uses  it  in  default  of  a  better. 


so       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

is  spiritual  being. ^  A  thing  can  be  a  unity  only  by  opposing 
itself  as  such  to  the  multiplicity  of  its  states ;  it  can  be  distinct 
from  its  states  only  by  distinguishing  itself  from  them.^  The 
only  case  of  such  unity  in  multiplicity  that  we  know  we  find  in 
our  own  inner  life.  The  only  real  unity  that  we  are  able  to 
think,  therefore,  is  the  unity  of  spirit ;  only  spirit  can  be  the  sub- 
ject of  states.*  "  It  is  the  spirit  only  which  solves  this  riddle  by 
memory,  which  through  a  living  coherence  in  one  consciousness 
of  what  is  really  successive  first  reveals  to  us  the  only  possible 
meaning  for  the  aforesaid  unity."* 

Lotze's  conclusion  is,  then,  that  "all  that  is  real  is  mind."* 
What  we  call  '  things  '  are  better  than  they  seem.  There  is  no 
need  to  posit  two  different  kinds  of  being  in  the  world — spirit 
and  something  different  from  spirit  f  on  the  contrary,  there  can 
be  no  other  form  of  existence  than  "  spiritual  beings  like  our- 
selves, which,  in  feeling  their  states  and  opposing  themselves  to 
their  states  as  the  unity  that  feels,  satisfy  the  idea  of  a  per- 
manent subject."  '^  The  demands  made  by  the  notion  of  '  things  ' 
can  be  met  only  by  that  which  is  of  the  nature  of  mind.  But 
a  further  problem  presents  itself  in  the  notion  of  the  interaction 
of  things,  and  this  problem  likewise  demands,  in  order  to  its 
solution,  that  things  be  conceived  as  spiritual  beings.  '^  To  be  is 
to  stand  in  relations,"  Lotze  repeatedly  affirms.^  But  to  stand  in 
relations  can  mean  nothing  else  than  reciprocal  action.^  Every- 
thing stands  in  reciprocal  relations  with  everything  else.  The 
very  being  of  things  consists  in  their  sustaining  these  relations, 
in  acting  and  being  acted  upon.  This  is  the  sole  meaning  of  the 
activity  which  is  the  thing.  But  such  reciprocal  action  of  things 
implies  the  capacity  of  being  affected  and  of  producing  effects. 

iCf.  Met.,  U  96-97  ;  J^i^r.,  3  :  pp.  521-523. 

^Met.,  I  96. 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  522. 

*Outl.  of  Met.,  I  83. 

^Mikr.,  3:  p.  531. 

6  Outl.  of  Met.,  §  83  ;  Met.,  I  248. 

-^Met.,  ^97. 

8  Outl.  of  Met.,  ^10;  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  465  seq. 

9  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  524  ;  Met.,  I  82. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  5 1 

In  other  words,  action  implies  passion,  feeling.  Interaction  has 
no  meaning  when  applied  to  unconscious  existence ;  it  is  only  the 
being  that  feels  that  can  receive  impressions  and  react  upon  them/ 
In  order  to  make  intelligible  the  notion  of  the  interaction  of 
things,  therefore,  as  well  as  their  being  and  their  unity,  we  are 
forced  to  assign  to  the  '  thing '  a  spiritual  nature.^ 

What  shall  we  say  as  to  the  cogency  of  this  metaphysical 
argument  ?  That  it  is  not  convincing  must,  I  think,  be  generally 
granted.  Lotze's  analysis  of  the  thing  is  not  without  value,  cer- 
tainly ;  but  the  step  by  which  he  passes  from  the  necessary  unity 
of  things  to  their  spirituality  is  quite  unwarrantable.  By  what 
right  do  we  make  the  anthropomorphic  assumption,  that  the 
reality  outside  us  can  exist  only  in  the  same  form  as  that  which 
we  have  learned  through  inner  experience  to  know  as  the 
peculiarity  of  our  own  conscious  spiritual  nature?^  Lotze  in 
a  measure  forestalls  this  objection,^  maintaining  that  while  any- 
thing that  really  exists  may  have  its  own  mode  of  existence,  yet 
we  may  not  assume  an  unknown  object  of  such  a  kind  as  would 
without  reason  conflict  with  the  inferences  we  cannot  avoid. 
The  conception  of  the  thing  as  commonly  held  is  not  of  such 
value,  he  implies,  that  we  need  to  maintain  it  at  the  cost  of  an 
appeal  to  a  wholly  unknown  possibility.  Moreover,  if  '*  such 
peculiarity  of  existence  is  asserted,  the  further  predicates  as- 
signed to  it  must  correspond  "  ;  but  Lotze  believes  that  he  has 
shown  conclusively  that  unity  and  interaction,  two  concepts  which 
we  find  ourselves  obliged  to  attach  to  things,  are  inconsistent  with 
any  other  form  of  existence  than  spirit.  It  is  surely  pertinent  to 
reply  that  the  thing  is  not  unknown ;  that,  in  so  far  as  we  know 
it,  it  does  present  itself  as  a  unity,  and  as  sustaining  reciprocal 
relations  with  other  things,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  never 
gives  the  least  evidence  of  possessing  psychical  life.  The  bur- 
den of  proof  must  rest  with  him  who  asserts  that  things  are 
spirits,  and  Lotze  cannot  be  said  to  have  proved  his  case. 

1  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  525  ;  Cf.  Outl.  of  Met.,  \\  26,  83-84. 

2Cf.  Mikr.,  3:  pp.  547-548. 

3Cf.  Hartmann  :  Lotze' s  Philosophie,  P-  55- 

^Met.,  §98. 


52        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

It  is,  perhaps,  not  without  significance  that  Lotze  finds  himself 
obliged  somewhat  to  modify  his  own  conception  in  the  course  of 
his  argument.  His  argument  for  the  spirituality  of  all  being 
hinges  upon  the  fact  that  the  thing  must  be  conceived  as  the  sub- 
ject of  changing  states.  Yet  once,  at  least,  he  explicitly  rejects 
this  statement  as  inaccurate  and  misleading,  and  substitutes 
another  which  puts  the  matter  in  quite  a  different  light.  Instead 
of  conceiving  a  as  the  subject  of  the  states  a,  /9,  y,  through 
which  it  passes,  he  substitutes  as  a  more  exact  statement  that  ^, 
*' while  it  is  continuously  changing,  remains  always  within  a 
*  closed  series  *  of  forms,  every  one  of  which  can  be  transformed 
by  means  of  definite  conditions  into  every  other,  and  no  one  of 
which  can  be  transformed  by  means  of  any  condition  into  any 
form  foreign  to  this  entire  series."  ^  Had  Lotze  held  fast  to  this 
formulation,  he  would  have  found  the  transition  to  psychical  life 
more  difficult.  The  unity  of  the  thing,  as  thus  expressed,  is  by 
no  means  analogous  to  the  unity  of  consciousness. 

Nor  should  we  forget  that  to  appeal  to  our  inner  experience 
of  unity  in  change,  is  not  to  adduce  an  explanation  of  this  ex- 
perience. In  some  manner  inexpHcable  to  us,  we  know  that  the 
manifold  streams  of  our  psychical  life  flow  together  in  the  unity 
of  the  self;  but  the  unity  of  consciousness  is  far  too  involved  in 
mystery  to  warrant  our  using  it  as  a  principle  of  explanation 
which  may  be  applied  to  other  phenomena.  Moreover,  this 
unity  of  our  conscious  hfe  involves  self-consciousness,  which  can 
not  be  predicated  even  of  animals,  to  say  nothing  of  things  com- 
monly termed  inanimate.  How  far  the  animal  may  be  a  psychical 
unity  we  have  small  means  of  ascertaining.  If  unity  depends  on 
consciousness,  it  may  well  be  questioned  whether  so  low  a  grade 
of  mentality  as  must  be  possessed  by  *  things,'  if  they  possess 
mentality  at  all,  could  give  the  unity  required  by  Lotze  for  the 
reality  of  the  thing. 

However  convincing  to  Lotze's  own  mind  these  metaphysical 
considerations  may  have  been,  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  ethical 
argument  constrained  him  to  the  belief  that  things  are  spiritual. 
Selfless  things  can  have  no  value,  no  meaning  for  themselves. 

J  Outl.  of  Met.,  1 36. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  53 

Only  that  can  have  value  which  never  merely  is^  but  is  for  itself 
{fiir  sich  ist),  that  is,  knows,  feels,  enjoys,  or  possesses  itself; 
and  only  spirit  can  meet  this  requirement.^  Lotze's  poetical  im- 
agination pictures  a  universe  pulsing  with  joy  throughout  the 
whole  range  of  being,  each  element  contributing  its  own  tone  to 
swell  the  harmonious  symphony  which  is  the  joy  of  the  Infinite,  to 
whom  alone  belongs  full  consciousness  of  self  and  of  the  whole. 
No  part  of  the  cosmos  is  bhnd  and  lifeless  ;  the  glow  of  feeling 
and  enjoyment  pervades  all.  '*  All  pressure  and  tension  under- 
gone by  matter,  the  rest  of  stable  equilibrium,  and  the  rending 
asunder  of  former  connections,  all  this  not  only  takes  place, 
but  also  in  taking  place  gives  rise  to  some  enjoyment."^  It 
is  to  Lotze  an  incredible  and  revolting  thought  that  'things' 
exist  merely  to  minister  to  souls  ;  that  one  half  of  creation  "  has 
no  function  whatever  save  that  of  serving  the  other  half."  ^  Why 
should  there  be,  he  asks,  a  world  of  things  which  themselves 
gain  nothing  by  existing,  but  ''  would  only  serve  as  a  system  of 
occasions  or  means  for  producing  in  spiritual  subjects  represienta- 
tions  which  after  all  would  have  no  likeness  to  their  productive 
causes  ?  Could  not  the  creative  power  dispense  with  this  round- 
about way,  and  give  rise  directly  in  spirits  to  the  phenomena 
which  it  was  intended  to  present  to  them  ?  Could  it  not  present 
that  form  of  a  world  which  was  to  be  seen  without  the  interven- 
tion of  an  unseen  world  which  could  never  be  seen  as  it  would 
be  if  unseen  ?"  *  Here,  as  in  some  other  passages,  Lotze  seems 
haunted  by  the  spectre  of  a  Kantian  world  of  things-in-themselves, 
alien  and  impenetrable  to  the  perceiving  mind.  The  alternative 
suggested  —  the  explanation  of  phenomena  given  by  subjective 
Idealism  —  Lotze  elsewhere  rejects  as  "an  unconditional  renun- 
ciation of  all  pretensions  to  knowledge."  ^ 

Objective  Idealism,  likewise,  while  it  avoids  the  error  of  the 
former  view,  yet  fails,  according  to  Lotze,  to  give  a  satisfactory 
solution  of  the  problem.     By  making  things  immanent  in  the  Ab- 
iCf.  Outl.  of  Met.,  Iz. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  406;  Cf.  pp.  40S>  4o8,  445- 

^  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  397-398- 

*  Met. ,  §  97  ;  cf.  also  98. 

6  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  526  ;  Cf.  Outl.  of  Met.,  \\  78-83. 


54       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

solute,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  mere  states  or  actions  of  the 
Absolute,  without  'being-for-self,'  it  denies  to  them  any  true  re- 
ality and  grants  them  an  apparent  existence  only/  Lotze's  chief 
criticism  of  Idealism  in  this  connection,  is  not  that  it  denies  ob- 
jectivity or  externality  to  things,  but  that  nothing  is  gained  for 
selfless  things  by  such  externality.^  Idealism  presents  us,  indeed, 
with  an  ordered  world  of  things,  objective  for  our  cognition,  but 
having  only  apparent  reality  because  having  no  existence  for  self. 
Why  not,  Lotze  asks,  transform  the  assertion  that  only  minds 
are  real,  into  the  assertion  that  all  that  is  real  is  mind  ?  ^  To  be 
real  is  to  exist  for  self;  but  existence  for  self  can  be  predicated 
only  of  the  being  that  feels  its  own  states,  is  the  unitary  subject 
of  its  states,  and  by  just  this  which  is  its  very  essence,  detaches 
itself  in  some  measure  from  the  Infinite.  Hence  *  realness,'  '  real 
existence,'  belongs  to  spiritual  beings  only,  and  to  them  in  differ- 
ing degrees.  It  reaches  its  highest  stage  in  the  self-conscious 
being  that  knows  itself  as  an  Ego,  but  ''  is  not  absent  in  the 
being  which,  though  far  removed  from  the  clearness  of  such  self- 
consciousness,  yet  in  some  duller  form  of  feeling  exists  for  itself 
and  enjoys  its  existence."  * 

In  the  end,  however,  Lotze  seems  to  deny  to  things  the  reality 
which  he  claims  for  them.  There  is  an  immense  difference  be- 
tween the  human  spirit  and  the  mere  '  thing,'  as  to  the  degree  to 
which  each  is  able  to  *  detach  itself  from  the  Infinite.'  Lotze 
finally  declares  that  the  true  reaHty  is  conscious,  personal  spirit, 
"  the  living,  personal  spirit  of  God  and  the  world  of  personal  spirits 
which  He  has  created."^  Again,  Lotze  states  that  "  '  real  beings  * 
are  those  of  his  actions  that  the  Infinite  permanently  maintains  as 
centers  of  out-  and  in-going  effects  that  are  susceptible  of  acting 
and  of  being  affected  ;  their  reality  consists  ...  in  this,  that  they 
as  spiritual  elements  have  being  for  self.  This  '  being  for  self  is 
the  essential  factor  in  that  which  we  .  .  .  designate  as  '  being 
outside  the  Infinite.'  On  the  contrary,  what  we  are  accustomed 
to  call  '  things  '  and  '  events  between  things,'  is  the  sum  of  those 

J  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  532-537-  ^'Mikr.,  3  :  p.  536. 

2  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  534.  ^Mikr.,  3  :  p.  623. 

^Mikr.,  3:  p.  531. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE    WORLD.  55 

other  actions  which  the  Highest  Principle  variously  executes  in  all 
spirits  so  uniformly  and  in  such  coherency  according  to  law,  that 
to  these  spirits  there  must  appear  to  be  one  world  of  substantial 
and  efficient  '  things,'  existing  in  space  outside  themselves."^  This 
is  one  of  those  perplexing  statements  by  which  Lotze  not  infre- 
quently makes  equivocal  his  position  in  the  controversy  between 
Realism  and  Idealism.  It  is  quoted  here  to  show  that  in  this  one 
passage,  at  least,  he  seems  to  affirm  *  being-for-self '  only  of  self- 
conscious  spirits,  and  to  assert  that  the  sole  function  of  *  things '  is 
to  produce  in  these  spirits  the  appearance  of  an  ordered  universe. 

It  is  obviously  the  ethical  concept  of  value  that  determines 
Lotze  to  attribute  a  psychical  life  to  things.  Everything  must 
have  value,  and  not  alone  for  other  beings,  but  a  value  for  self. 
Value  is  apprehended  in  feeling ;  hence  things  must  feel,  and 
enjoy  their  own  existence.  Von  Hartmann  pronounces  Lotze's 
assertion  that  reality  is  '  being-for-self '  quite  arbitrary  and  un- 
warrantable ;  ^  but  it  is  wholly  in  accord  with  the  general  ideal- 
istic conviction,  surely,  to  maintain  that  in  the  highest  and  truest 
sense  of  the  term,  that  only  is  real  which  is  for  itself ^  which  has 
the  power  to  set  before  it  definite  ends,  and  to  realize  itself  in 
action.  The  truth  of  this  view  does  not,  however,  carry  with  it 
the  necessity  of  attributing  a  psychical  life  to  things.  Other  alter- 
natives are  possible  and  preferable.  We  have  seen  that  Lotze 
finds  himself  obliged  to  deny  reality  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term 
to  things,  even  after  he  has  endowed  them  with  psychical  life. 
Much  more  than  mere  feeling  is  essential  for  the  existence  of  that 
*  being-for-self  which  is  synonymous  with  true  reality.  What 
value  there  can  be  in  mere  sentient  feeling,  and  that  the  lowest  and 
most  confused  possible,  is  by  no  means  clear.  The  possibility  of 
suffering,  to  which  all  sentient  life  is  liable,  does  not  seem  to  sug- 
gest itself  to  Lotze  as  a  possible  complication  of  the  problem. 

The  doctrine  that  things  are  spirits  is  clearly  rooted  in  the 
ethical  presuppositions  of  Lotze's  philosophy,  though  supported 
by  metaphysical  arguments  as  well.  It  is,  perhaps,  the  least 
tenable  of  his  characteristic  doctrines,  and  one  that  many  sym- 
pathetic readers  would  be  glad  to  see  eliminated  from  his  system. 

1  Outl.  of  Met.,  \  94;  cf.  Mikr.,  3:  p.  530. 

8  Von  Hartmann  :  Lotze's  Philosophic,  p.  62  ;  cf.  pp.  74-76. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Conception   of   God  :   God   as  the  World-Ground,  and  as 
Infinite  Personality. 

THE  notion  of  the  Absolute  must  hold  a  place  of  chief  im- 
portance in  any  comprehensive  philosophical  system. 
Lotze's  conception  of  the  Absolute,  however,  has  a  two-fold  sig- 
nificance due  to  the  two-fold  object  of  his  inquiry.  The  unity  of 
all  finite  things  in  the  World-Ground  is  the  central  doctrine  of 
his  metaphysics.  From  the  metaphysical  point  of  view  it  is 
complete  in  itself,  it  need  appeal  to  no  external  source  for  the 
guarantee  of  its  validity.  But  the  metaphysical  inquiry  is  never, 
with  Lotze,  the  sole  nor  the  chief  aim.  The  world  is  predomi- 
nantly ethical.  More  fundamental  even  than  the  primary  facts 
of  existence  and  the  truths  expressed  in  the  universal  law,  is  the 
reality  of  ethical  values.  The  Absolute  must  for  Lotze  meet  the 
requirements  of  a  universe  which,  with  all  its  diversity,  is  ethical 
to  the  core.  It  must  be  the  ground  of  the  real  world  and  of  the 
ethical  meaning  of  that  world.  Impelled  by  this  two-fold  re- 
quirement, Lotze  conceives  the  Infinite  Being  as  the  World - 
Ground  and  as  complete  Personality.  When  we  have  considered 
these  two  aspects  of  the  Absolute  separately,  we  may  very  prop- 
erly ask  whether  Lotze  has  succeeded  in  uniting  them  in  one 
Being,  or  whether,  indeed,  such  a  synthesis  is  possible.  At 
present  we  will  turn  to  the  argument  by  which  the  unity  of  the 
metaphysical  World-Ground  is  established. 

The  fact  of  change,  or  *  becoming,'  must  be  regarded  as 
fundamental.  The  '  thing,'  as  we  have  found,  resolves  itself  into 
a  spiritual  being,  the  very  essence  of  which  is  activity  within 
fixed  hmits  and  in  a  definite  manner  which  may  be  termed  its 
law.^  The  concept  of  change  is  then  unavoidable.  But  this 
concept  is  furthermore  found  to  imply  the  union  of  the  members 

^MeL,Ch.  III. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  57 

of  the  series  in  the  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent.  The 
order  of  nature  can  not  be  conceived  as  a  mere  sequence  ;  the 
attempt  to  conceive  it  thus  involves  reason  in  serious  difficulties 
and  inconsistences.^  The  concept  of  change  must  be  supple- 
mented by  the  concept  of  cause. 

The  next  step  is  to  show  that  the  effect  c,  following  from  the 
action  of  a  upon  b,  depends  quite  as  much  upon  the  nature  of  b 
as  upon  the  nature  and  agency  of  a ;  that  is,  causation  implies 
reciprocal  action.  We  have  seen  in  the  course  of  the  discussion 
of  mechanism  that  no  element  can  be  conceived  as  merely  pas- 
sive.^ Nothing  takes  to  itself  any  ready-made  state  merely  as 
an  accession  to  its  own  nature.  On  the  contrary,  everything  re- 
sponds according  to  its  nature  to  every  external  stimulus.  For 
example,  a  blow  of  exactly  the  same  force  produces  very  differ- 
ent effects  upon  different  bodies  :  one  it  shivers  into  fragments  ; 
one  it  sets  into  rhythmic  vibrations ;  in  one  it  causes  merely 
change  of  shape,  and  in  another,  violent  explosion.'  Not 
only,  however,  does  the  action  of  a  differ  according  as  it  is 
exerted  upon  b,  c,  or  d^  but  in  order  that  a  may  have  an  effect 
upon  b  at  all,  it  must  be  induced  to  exercise  this  effect  by  being 
itself  subject  to  an  effect  from  b.  The  same  is  true  of  the  causal 
action  of  b  upon  a,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  The  reciprocal  causa- 
tion of  all  things  must  be  regarded  as  "  an  eternal,  uninterrupted 
matter  of  fact."  ^  None  but  an  artificial  view  has  attempted  to 
deny  the  reciprocal  action  of  things.  Natural  science  is  con- 
strained to  recognize  it.^  The  question  is,  how  are  we  to  appre- 
hend it  ?  Immanent  action — the  development  of  state  out  of 
state  within  one  and  the  same  being — is  ordinarily  assumed  as  a 
matter  of  fact  that  requires  no  further  effort  of  thought.  It  is 
really  quite  as  inexplicable,  however,  as  the  action  of  one  thing 
upon  another.® 

Lotze  next  proceeds  to  show  that  reciprocal  action  is  imposs- 

i  Met.  I  43  ;   Outl.  of  Met.,  \\  34,  35,  Z^- 

^Met.,  I  50. 

3  Oiitl.  of  Met.,  §  57. 

*  Outl.  of  Met.,  I  47.     Cf.  I  39.     Met.  §  45. 

^Met.,UAA,Sl' 
^Met.,  \\  46-68. 


58        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

ible  between  independent  and  self-subsisting  beings.  Hence,  he 
argues,  since  causation  in  the  form  of  interaction  can  not  be  de- 
nied, things  are  not,  as  they  appear  to  be,  independent,  but  rather 
are  parts  of  and  immanent  in  one  Being,  which  is  the  World- 
Ground.  This  conclusion  is  reached  negatively,  by  showing  the 
inconceivability  of  any  form  of  *  transeunt '  action  between  two 
things  regarded  as  independent.  Cause  cannot  be  conceived  as 
taking  place  between  things.  It  is  commonly  sought  to  explain 
the  causal  action  of  things  as  a  transfer  of  an  influence,  a  force, 
action,  or  state,  ^,  from  a  to  b.  The  difficulties  inherent  in  such 
a  view  become  apparent  as  soon  as  we  examine  it  closely.  Why 
should  a  give  off  ^  ?  Why  does  e  take  the  direction  a—b  rather 
than  a—c^  or  any  other  ?  How  are  we  to  think  e  in  the  interval, 
during  its  passage  ?  Why,  once  the  movement  is  initiated, 
should  e  stop  at  b  and  become  a  state  of  the  latter  ?  The  at- 
tempt to  answer  these  queries  makes  it  clear  that  the  proposed 
explanation  of  causal  action  between  two  things  as  the  passing 
over  of  an  influence  or  force  from  one  to  the  other,  in  truth  as- 
sumes cause  by  assuming  that  a  in  some  way  initiates  the  move- 
ment and  gives  it  the  direction  a-b,  and  that  b  receives  and  in 
some  way  takes  unto  itself  the  hypothetical  traveller.  "  What 
we  call  such  a  transfer  is  nothing  but  a  designation  of  that  which 
has  taken  place  in  the  still  unexplained  process  of  causation,  or 
which  may  be  regarded  as  its  result."  ^ 

If  things  are  still  to  be  conceived  as  independent,  since  '  trans- 
eunt '  action  is  impossible,  but  two  alternatives  remain,  those 
of  'Occasionalism,'  and  of  a  '  Preestablished  Harmony.'  The 
former  is  dismissed  by  Lotze  with  the  minimum  of  consideration 
which  it  deserves.  At  best  it  can  not  be  accepted  as  a  metaphys- 
ical theory ;  it  substitutes  for  explanation  an  arbitrary  assump- 
tion.^ The  theory  of  a  predetermined  harmony  of  cosmic  order, 
as  held  by  Leibniz,  receives  from  Lotze  somewhat  prolonged 
discussion.*  According  to  this  theory  the  states  of  the  differ- 
ent things  accompany  and  correspond  to  one  another,  without 
having  to  be  produced  by  reciprocal  action.     From  a  metaphys- 

^Met.,  \  56.     Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :    p.  484 ;  Outl.  of  Met.,  \  42. 
«  Met.,  \  61. 
3i7/^/.,  ?g  63-67. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  59 

ical  point  of  view  Lotze  objects  to  this  on  the  ground  that  it  also 
fails  to  explain  the  course  of  the  world/  The  problem  is  but 
referred  back  to  an  unintelligible  preestablishment  of  the  world- 
order.  Moreover,  the  Leibnizian  world  lacks  unity ;  it  is  not 
a  cosmos  at  all,  but  an  aggregation  of  discrete  and  independent 
units,  an  infinity  of  worlds,  indeed,  corresponding  to  one  another, 
but  in  no  wise  interrelated.^ 

There  is  but  one  resource  left  us, — to  deny  the  independent 
existence  of  things,  and  to  maintain  that  all  elements  are  parts  of 
a  single  real  Being.  Thus,  so-called  transeunt  action  becomes 
immanent  action.  Pluralism  gives  place  to  Monism.  A  first 
suggestion  of  the  impossibility  of  Pluralism  is  afforded  as  soon  as 
we  recognize  that  the  elements  of  the  world  are  so  related  as  to 
be  comparable ;  but  this  rendered  their  origin  or  immanence  in 
one  Being  probable,  merely,  not  necessary.  It  is  not  till  we 
search  into  the  meaning  of  what  we  term  cause  and  effect  that 
the  monistic  view  becomes  a  necessity  for  thought.^  If  ''  causal 
action  is  to  appear  possible,  this  assumption  of  the  independence 
of  '  things  '  toward  one  another  must  be  denied  absolutely.  A 
state  which  takes  place  in  the  element  a,  must  for  the  very  reason 
that  it  is  in  a,  likewise  be  an  affection  oi  b.  .  .  .  The  foregoing 
requirement  can  be  met  only  by  the  assumption  that  all  individual 
things  are  substantially  one  :  that  is  to  say,  they  do  not  merely 
become  combined  subsequently  by  all  manner  of  relations,  each 
individual  having  previously  been  present  as  an  independent  exist- 
ence ;  but  from  the  very  beginning  onward  there  are  only  different 
modifications  of  one  individual  Being  which  we  propose  to  desig- 
nate provisionally  by  the  title  of  the  Infinite,  of  the  Absolute  = 
My  ^  Any  change  in  a  is  at  once,  ''without  having  to  wait  to 
become  so,"  a  change  of  M.  So,  also,  this  change  in  J/ "does 
not  need  to  travel  "  to  make  its  sign  in  b,  it  is  already  a  change  in 
b  by  virtue  of  the  immanence  of  both  a  and  b  in  M.^     M  main- 

»  Met.,  66  ;  cf.  \  67,  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  485. 
'^Met.,  I  79. 

"^Met.,  I  69;  Philos.  of  Relig.  §§  17-18. 
*  Outl.  of  Met.,  §48. 

5  Von  Hartmann's  objection  that  Lotze  here  introduces  two  puzzles  instead  of  one, 
viz.,  that  in  place  of  the  effect  of  a  upon  b,  we  have  the  effect  of  a  upon  the  Absolute, 


6o        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

tains  its  identity  with  itself,  and  does  not  admit  of  a  change  in  a 
without  restoring  the  same  nature  Mhy  the  production  of  a  com- 
pensatory change  in  b.  The  procedure  which  we  conceive  as  the 
action  of  «  upon  b,  is  in  truth  the  action  of  J/ upon  itself.^ 

The  world  must  then  be  regarded  as  immanent  in  one  Absolute 
Being,  in  which  all  finite  things  live,  and  move,  and  have  their 
finite  being.  It  is  not  the  conception  of  an  immanent  God,  but 
of  an  immanent  world.  Indeed,  we  have  no  right  as  yet  to 
apply  the  name  God,  with  its  religious  implications,  to  the  World- 
Ground.  The  question  as  to  how  we  are  to  conceive  of  the 
Absolute  in  itself  and  in  its  relation  to  finite  things,  is  not  very 
satisfactorily  answered  by  Lotze.  At  least,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  difficulties  that  arise  are  not  peculiar  to  his  system.  In  a 
certain  sense,  Lotze  says,  all  monistic  systems  amount  merely  to 
negation.  That  is,  "they  all  deny  the  independent  reality  of 
finite  things,  but  they  can  not  determine  positively  the  nature  of 
the  bond  which  unites  them."  ^  The  relation  of  the  One  to  the 
Many  does  not  admit  of  determination  in  any  positive  way.^ 
Every  individual  thing  exists  in  virtue  not  of  any  being  of  its 
own,  but  of  the  commission  given  it  by  the  Absolute,  It  is  what 
J/ charges  it  to  be,  and  exists  just  so  long  as  its  particular  being 
is  required  for  the  equation  M=  M,  The  mode  and  amount  of 
its  so-called  operation  upon  other  things  is  prescribed  for  it  at 
each  moment  by  M,  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  equation  re- 
ferred to.  ^  Only  in  so  far  as  something  has  *  being-for-self,'  is 
an  object  to  itself,  distinguishes  itself  from  something  else, — only 
in  so  far  does  it,  by  this  very  act,  '  detach  itself  from  the  Infin- 
ite.' As  we  have  seen,  only  spiritual  beings  can  do  this.  Strictly 
speaking,  only  that  being  which  can  feel  and  assert  itself  as  a  self 
is  so  detached  from  the  universal,  all-comprehensive  basis  of  be- 
ing as  to  admit  of  being  described  as  outside  it ;  whatever  has  not 

and  of  the  Absolute  upon  b,  seems  to  miss  the  mark.  This  very  objection  is  rightly 
urged  by  Lotze  himself  against  the  conception  of  Leibniz.  See  von  Hartmann  : 
Lotze' s  Philosophic^  p.  87  ;  cf.  Mikr.  3  :  p.  485. 

iCf.  Met.,  I  70;  Philos.  of  Pelig.,  §  19;    Outl.  of  Met.,  I  48  ;  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  486. 

a  Met.,  §  73. 

^Met.,l^^. 

*Met.,iSs. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD,  6 1 

this  capability  will  always  be  included  as  *  immanent  *  within  it.^ 
As  to  the  positive  nature  of  the  World-Ground,  so  far  we  seem 
warranted  only  in  describing  it  as  infinite  activity,  a  constant  be- 
coming. It  is  an  eternally  present  condition  of  action.  It  can 
not  be  conceived  as  ever  really  existing  in  the  general  form  indi- 
cated by  the  sign  M.  It  really  exists  at  each  moment  only  as  a 
case,  having  a  definite  value,  of  the  equation  expressed  by  the 
formula  J/=  ip  {ab  •••  r),  which  formula  indicates  that  a  certain 
definite  connection  of  the  elements  of  the  world,  ^,  exhibits,  at 
this  moment,  the  whole  nature  of  M?  In  this  form  it  is  at  the 
same  time  "  the  efficient  cause  of  the  actuality  of  the  state  next- 
ensuing,  as  well  as  the  conditioning  ground  of  what  this  state 
contains."^  Thus  the  unity  of  M  is  conceived  as  active,  dynamic. 
If  a  sensible  image  is  needed,  such  is  furnished,  Lotze  says,  by 
the  many  simultaneous  parts  of  a  piece  of  polyphonic  music ; 
each  compels  all  the  rest  to  vary  in  harmony  with  itself  and  all  the 
others,  forming  a  series  of  movements  that  result  in  the  unity  of 
a  melody  which  is  consistent  and  complete  in  itself.*  Again, 
Lotze  conceives  the  Absolute  Being  as  the  unity  of  a  living  idea, 
"  the  import  of  which  ...  is  no  mere  aggregate  of  ideas,  but 
a  self-articulated  whole  of  variously  interwoven  parts  ;  each  one 
of  these  parts,  as  well  as  the  several  elements  which  comprise  it, 
acquiring  a  determinate  quantity  according  to  its  value  and  position 
in  the  whole."  ^ 

Lotze  constantly  guards  himself  against  the  misapprehension 
that  he  assigns  a  definite,  positive  meaning  to  the  terms  by  which 
he  designates  the  Absolute  and  seeks  to  express  its  relation  to 
finite  being.  Thus  he  says  the  elasticity  or  self-maintenance  that 
we  ascribe  to  the  Absolute  is  not  a  conception  to  which  a  definite 
meaning  can  be  attached.     It  is  used  merely  "as  a  not  unimag- 

1  Met,  ^  98.     Cf.  Fhilos.  of  Relig.,  §  41. 
^Met.,  ^70,  79,  82. 

<  Jbid. 

^  Met,  I  195.  By  this  statement,  and  others  similar  to  it,  Lotze  approaches  the 
Hegelian  conception,  and  suggests  that  his  own  metaphysical  view  is  in  truth  far  less 
opposed  to  that  of  Hegel  than  he  deems  it  to  be.  See  also  Wm.  Wallace  :  Lectures 
and  Essays,  pp.  482,  510. 


62        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

inable  expression  to  which  different  significations  may  be  given." 
Least  of  all  does  he  wish  to  represent  the  reactions  of  the  Abso- 
lute in  a  merely  mechanical  way,  as  directed  to  the  preservation 
of  the  status  quo ;  instead,  *'we  might  assume  even  an  impulse  of 
development  in  progress  towards  a  definite  goal."  ^ 

We  have  now  before  us,  in  somewhat  meager  outline,  the  ar- 
gument by  which  Lotze  seeks  to  establish  the  unity  of  things  in 
the  World-Ground.  In  criticising  it  we  should  be  careful,  I 
think,  to  distinguish  those  difificulties  which  pertain  to  Lotze's 
own  doctrine,  from  those  which  are  common  to  all  monistic  sys- 
tems. Every  monism  is  open  to  the  charge,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  Absolute  is  but  the  aggregation  of  its  finite  parts,  and, 
on  the  other,  that  the  finite  is  engulfed  and  lost  in  the  Absolute, 
that  *  lion's  lair '  which  many  footsteps  enter,  but  from  which 
none  emerge.  It  may  be,  indeed,  that  this  difficulty  is  enhanced 
in  both  its  aspects  in  the  philosophy  of  Lotze,  because  of  his  in- 
sistence on  the  personality  of  both  the  Infinite  and  of  the  finite, 
yet  at  bottom  it  is  the  old  problem  and  is  in  no  wise  peculiar  to 
Lotze's  monism.  It  is  the  writer's  intention  to  confine  the  dis- 
cussion, so  far  as  is  possible,  to  that  which  is  distinctive  of  the 
view  we  are  considering. 

Much  of  the  criticism  of  Lotze  seems  somewhat  captious. 
The  writer,  at  least,  is  unable  to  agree  with  those  who  pronounce 
his  metaphysics  quite  arbitrary,  and  lacking  in  critical  acumen 
and  logical  consistency.^  Every  metaphysics  must  be  in  so  far 
arbitrary  that  it  must  have  some  starting  point  and  in  its  devel- 
opment imply  certain  definite  conceptions.  Few  thinkers  have 
reached  their  conclusions  by  more  cautious  reasoning  than 
Lotze.  His  analysis  of  cause  as  a  determination  by  reciprocal 
action  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  of  his  positive  contributions  to 
metaphysical  thought,  and  is  a  most  conclusive  argument  against 
empiricism  which  substitutes  a  mere  sequence  for  causal  con- 
nection. 

Let  us  see,  however,  in  just  how  far  Lotze's  monism  affords 
an  explanation  of  the  connection  of  things.     With  the  single  ex- 

1  Phiio^.  of  Relig.,  §  20. 

2  See  Lange's  History  of  Materialism^  tr.  by  Thomas,  II,  285  ;  F.  C.  S.  Schiller: 
**  Lx)tze's  Monism,"  Philos.  Rev.,  1896,  pp.  225  fF. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD,  63 

ception  that  the  Unitary  Being  is  to  be  conceived  as  active,  its 
nature  is  undetermined.  The  designation  of  J/  as  a  unity,  Lotze 
expressly  states,  contains  no  explanation  whatever  of  the  precise 
sort  of  unity  which  obtains ;  it  has  rather  the  distinct  negative 
meaning  which  denies  the  self-dependence  of  individual  things. 
No  definite  meaning  can  be  attached  to  that  action  of  the  Abso- 
lute upon  itself  which  appears  to  us  as  the  reciprocal  action  of 
things.  The  use  of  the  terms  '  reciprocal  action  *  and  *  inter- 
action,' indeed,  becomes  misleading.^ 

The  proof  by  which  the  unity  of  things  is  established  is  a 
negative  one,  resting  upon  the  disproof  of  the  possibility  of 
reciprocal  action  between  things  wholly  independent  and  unre- 
lated. The  immanent  action  which  is  substituted  for  *  transeunt ' 
action  is,  however,  quite  as  incomprehensible  as  the  latter. 
Early  in  his  discussion  Lotze  points  out  that  the  connection  of 
states  within  one  and  the  same  being  is  really  no  better  under- 
stood than  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  between  two  beings, 
though  ordinarily  assumed  as  needing  no  explanation.^  So  at 
the  end,  when  all  action  is  shown  to  be  immanent  action,  the 
real  nature  of  this  immanent  action  of  the  Absolute,  M,  is  quite 
inexplicable.  How  ^initiates  action,  how  a  state  or  affection  of 
a  is  at  once  an  affection  of  b^  but  not  of  c, — these  questions  are 
unanswerable.  In  substituting  immanent  action  for  *  transeunt  * 
action,  we  have  then  gained  by  so  much,  namely,  for  an  hy- 
pothesis which  is  self-contradictoiy,  and  therefore  unthinkable, 
we  have  substituted  an  hypothesis  which  is  inexplicable,  but  not 
unthinkable.  Lotze's  monism  is  in  a  general  sense,  at  least,  in- 
telligible. If  we  are  dissatisfied,  and  think  that  it  stops  short  of  a 
final  explanation,  we  may  do  well  to  ponder  Lotze's  words,  so 
often  repeated,  that  we  cannot  expect  to  learn  *  how  the  world  is 
made.'  The  world  is,  and  is  constituted  in  a  particular  way. 
To  ask  how  causal  action  is  produced,  is  as  futile  as  to  ask  why 

1  One  critic  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  Lotze  has  not  only  stripped  the  term  recipro- 
cal action  of  all  meaning,  but  has  come  perilously  near  destroying  the  notion  of  con- 
nection according  to  law,  and  substituting  therefor  a  lawless  mutability  of  the 
Absolute.     SeeKrestofF:  Lotze^ s  metaphysischer  Seelenbegriff,  pp.  77-78. 

^Met.,  II  46,  68. 


64       ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

there  is  a  world  at  all,  why  its  content  is  M,  and  why  the  action 
of  M\s  as  it  is/ 

We  would  seem  to  be  warranted  in  the  conclusion  that  Lotze 
has  succeeded  in  proving  the  necessary  unity  of  things.  He  has 
done  this  by  a  method  of  exclusion,  rejecting  one  hypothesis 
after  another  as  inadequate,  until  at  length  the  sole  remaining 
alternative  is  that  of  unity.  "  It  was  not  necessary,"  he  says, 
'*  that  the  unity  of  all  individual  beings  should  be  conjectured  or 
discovered  as  an  hypothesis  enabling  us  to  set  aside  difficulties 
that  are  in  our  way.  It  is,  it  seems  to  me,  a  thought  which  by 
mere  analysis  can  be  shown  to  be  involved  in  the  conception  of 
reciprocal  action."^  Lotze  has,  I  think,  proved  conclusively  the 
impossibility  of  interaction  between  unrelated  and  wholly  inde- 
pendent beings.  This  certainly  implies  the  connection  of  things 
in  a  system,  which  in  turn  implies  some  kind  of  a  unity.  The 
nature  of  this  unity  the  metaphysical  argument  so  far  traced 
leaves  indefinite,  to  be  discovered  only  by  further  investigation. 

Having  shown  that  cosmological  speculation  leads  inevitably 
to  the  positing  of  one  Infinite  Being  as  the  Ground  of  all  that 
is,  Lotze  proceeds  to  identify  this  Absolute  with  the  religious  con- 
ception of  God,  and  to  attribute  to  this  Being  absolute  goodness 
and  complete  personality.  In  doing  this,  Lotze  has  left  himself 
open  to  the  criticism  that  he  has  spanned  by  a  single  bold  leap 
the  gulf  between  the  metaphysical  Absolute  and  the  personal 
God.  An  Absolute  is  not  a  God,  it  may  be  said,  and  to  identify 
the  two  summarily  is  not  to  solve  the  problem  of  their  unity  in 
one  Being.  While  feeling  the  force  of  this  criticism,  the  writer 
believes  that  the  transition  is  really  not  so  abrupt  as  it  seems.  It 
is  true  that  in  the  Mikrokosmus  Lotze  begins  his  discussion  of  the 
personality  of  God  by  stating  that  he  will  now  turn  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  as  contained  already  in  re- 
ligious thought,  that  he  will  take  as  the  object  of  reflection,  *'  not 
the  metaphysical  postulate  of  the  Infinite,  but  instead  of  it  the 
full  and  complete  concept  of  the  God  who  is  to  realize  this  pos- 

1  Cf.  Met.,  \  83  ;  Outl.  of  Met.,  §  48. 
*Met.,  §71  ;  cf.  ^69. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD,  65 

tulate."  ^  Notwithstanding  this  and  other  similar  statements,  the 
writer  feels  it  necessary  to  take  exception  to  the  assertion  that 
Lotze  makes  no  attempt  to  show  that  the  Unity  of  Things,  as  dis- 
covered by  metaphysics,  must  be  susceptible  of  religious  predi- 
cates.^ The  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  brief  and  con- 
densed as  it  is,  shows  a  very  evident,  and,  in  good  measure,  a 
successful  attempt  to  unite  the  metaphysical  and  religious  con- 
cepts in  one,  not  by  merely  bringing  them  together,  but  by 
showing  that  our  concept  of  the  Infinite  is  manifestly  incomplete 
when  lacking  either  the  metaphysical  or  the  ethical  attributes. 
This  view  of  the  matter,  if  the  true  one,  will  appear  more  clearly 
as  we  follow  Lotze's  development  of  his  doctrine. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  argument  based  on  the  fact  of 
the  reciprocal  action  of  things  warrants  only  the  assumption  of 
the  necessary  unity  of  the  Absolute.  What  this  Absolute  is,  is  left 
for  further  determination.  The  conception  of  the  Infinite  so  far 
made  use  of  "  merely  designates  a  postulate  in  a  provisional 
way  .  .  .  how  we  are  to  conceive  of  this  Infinite  itself  .  .  . 
is  reserved  for  subsequent  investigation."^  The  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  in  seeking  further  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  Su- 
preme Being,  starts  out  from  this  datum  derived  from  meta- 
physics.^ The  time-honored  '  proofs '  of  the  existence  of  God, 
Lotze  finds  as  destitute  of  demonstrative  force  as  did  Kant  before 
him.^  They  fail  severally  to  establish  that  which  they  attempt, 
and  together  they  fail  to  bring  us  to  the  personality  of  the  Infinite. 
As  the  teleological  argument  had  for  Kant  a  peculiar  attraction, 
so  the  ontological  argument  appeals  to  Lotze  as  rich  in  signifi- 
cance, though  falling  short  of  demonstration.^  Since  these  argu- 
ments fail  us,  says  Lotze,  "  we  will  find  our  point  of  departure  in 
a  simpler  datum,"  and  ''attempt  to  deduce  from  it,  not  exactly 
the  existence  of  God,  but  a  more  modest  conclusion,  which  shall 
serve  us  as  a  preliminary  condition  for  that  other  conclusion."  '' 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  549. 

2F.  C.  S.  Schiller:   ''Lotze's  Monism,"  Fhilos.  Rev.,  1896,  pp.  237-238. 

^Outl.  ofMti.,  I  48;  cf.  Fhilos.  of  Rdig.,  \  20. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  19. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  \l  6-14;  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  554-562. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  §  6  ;  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  561. 

T  Philos.  of  Relig.,  §  16. 


66        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

This  datum  is  in  substance  the  assumption  that  all  the  elements 
of  the  world  act  upon  one  another,  each  exerting  influence  upon 
the  rest,  and  in  turn  receiving  influence  from  all.  This  leads  us 
to  the  conclusion  of  the  metaphysics,  that  is,  the  necessary- 
assumption  of  a  Unit  Being,  or  World-Ground. 

In  seeking  *  more  precise  determinations  of  the  Absolute,'  we 
are  met  first  by  the  query  whether  the  Absolute  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as,  Matter  or  as  Spirit.^  That  the  latter  is  the  true  alter- 
native is  decided  by  Lotze  on  the  ground  that  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple is  necessary  in  order  to  spiritual  processes.  Psychology 
compels  us  to  the  conviction  that  states  of  motion  are  the  occa- 
sions upon  which  there  arise  in  us  spiritual  processes,  such  as  sen- 
sations and  affections.  But  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  these  states 
of  motion  ever  transmute  themselves  into  sensations  and  affec- 
tions. So  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  from  physical  processes 
only  physical  processes  can  originate.  Physical  and  psychical 
processes  are  disparate.^  For  Lotze' s  own  metaphysical  theory 
this  argument  has  a  wider  significance  even  than  the  foregoing, 
since  the  world  is  conceived  by  him  as  spiritual  throughout,  and 
certainly  a  material  principle — if  such  were  conceivable  from  his 
point  of  view — '*  would  be  in  no  condition  to  produce  from  itself 
the  world  of  spiritual  processes."  ^ 

There  are  "two  distinct  series  of  attributes  through  which  man 
tries  to  comprehend  the  being  of  God.  .  .  .  Metaphysical 
attributes  of  Unity,  Eternity,  Omnipresence,  and  Omnipotence, 
determine  Him  as  the  ground  of  all  finite  reality  ;  ethical  attri- 
butes of  Wisdom,  Justice,  and  Holiness  satisfy  our  longing  to 
find  in  that  which  has  supreme  reality,  supreme  worth  also."  ^ 
Thus,  man  seeks  "  to  blend  the  Existent  and  the  Worthy  into 
the  notion  of  the  living  God."  ^  At  this  point  in  the  Mikro- 
kosmus,  Lotze  regards  the  notion  of  a  Personal  God  as  a  goal 

1  See  Philos.  of  Relig.,  ^  21-26. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  22. 

3  Ibid. 

*'Mikr.,  3  :  p.  563  ;  Philos.  of  Relig.,  gg  27-31.  In  the  Philos.  of  Relig.,  the 
predicate  of  Unchangeableness  is  added  to  the  above  list  of  metaphysical  attributes. 
Eternity  and  Unchangeableness  seem,  however,  to  reduce  to  the  same  conception. 
See  U  28-31. 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  562. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  67 

already  reached,  and  goes  on  to  defend  this  against  doubts  as  to 
its  possibility.  In  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  however,  he  sup- 
plies an  immediate  link  which  goes  far  to  refute  those  who  main- 
tain that  the  transition  from  the  metaphysical  to  the  religious 
conception  of  the  Infinite  is  quite  arbitrary  and  abrupt.  There  he 
states  that  "  if  the  predicates  of  '  unconditionateness  '  [that  is,  the 
metaphysical  predicates]  are  to  be  valid  for  the  Highest  Being, 
then  one  condition  of  this  validity  lies  precisely  in  the  addition  of 
a  last  formal  predicate,  namely,  that  of  Personal  Existence."  ^ 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Lotze  did  not  further  develop  this 
thought ;  it  seems  very  probable  that  he  would  have  done  so  had 
the  work  upon  which  he  was  engaged  at  the  time  of  his  death 
been  brought  to  completion.  When  we  remember  that  he  re- 
garded unity  as  conditioned  by  spiritual  existence,  and  being-for- 
self  as  the  essence  of  reality,  that  thing  being  in  the  highest  degree 
real  which  possesses  such  being-for-self  in  the  fullest  measure, 
we  have  some  suggestions  at  least  as  to  the  direction  his  develop- 
ment of  this  idea  would  take. 

Lotze  considers  briefly  certain  attempts  which  have  been  made 
to  frame  a  concept  of  an  impersonal  Infinite,  all  of  which  he  be- 
lieves have  failed.  He  recalls  with  what  noble  motives  and  moral 
earnestness  Fichte  opposed  a  crude  anthropomorphism,  and 
sought  to  dissolve  the  notion  of  God  in  that  of  a  moral  World- 
Order.  Yet  Fichte  was  wrong.  When  thought  out,  the  idea  of 
a  World-Order  resolves  itself  into  that  of  a  Being  that  orders. 
No  order  is  separable  from  the  ordered  material  in  which  it  is 
realized ;  the  order  must  ever  be  a  relation  of  something  which 
exists.  Our  search  is  for  a  Real  Being — the  ground  of  all  reality 
— not  a  relation.  '*  Hence  it  is  nothing  but  order,  as  its  name  says, 
it  is  never  that  which  orders,  which  is  what  we  seek,  and  which  the 
ordinary  notion  of  God  (however  inadequate  in  other  respects) 
determined  rightly  at  any  rate  in  this."  ^ 

Against  the  notion  of  the  Absolute  as  self-developing  Idea,  Lotze 
urges  strenuous  objections.  We  have  had  occasion  frequently  to 
notice  his  antagonism  to  Hegel.  On  this  point  he  believes  that 
the  Hegelian  concept  of  the  Absolute  excludes  personality.     The 

^Philos.  ofRelig.,  ^33. 

^Mikr.,  3:  p.  565  ;  cf.  567-68;  See  Lohan  :  Die  Gottesidee  Lotzes,  p.  22. 


6S        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

truth  of  this  interpretation  need  not  concern  us ;  it  is  one  which 
meets  both  support  and  dissent  from  numerous  critics  and  cham- 
pions of  HegeHanism.  As  we  have  seen,  to  make  an  Idea  supreme 
seemed  to  Lotze  to  deify  thought  and  to  ignore  value.  He  fur- 
ther urges  an  objection  similar  to  that  brought  against  a  World- 
Order  as  the  ultimate  reality :  An  Idea  ''  is  and  remains  nothing 
more  than  the  statement  of  a  thought-formula  by  which  we  fix, 
as  an  aid  to  reflection,  the  inner  connection  between  the  living 
activities  of  the  Real."^  That  is,  it  signifies  a  relation,  merely  ;  it 
does  not  give  us  Reality.  Like  the  notion  of  a  World-Order,  the 
Idea  has  no  content ;  it  is  not  reality,  and  it  lacks  dynamic  power 
to  produce  reality. 

There  are  three  distinct  lines  of  argument  by  which  Lotze 
seeks  positively  to  establish  the  personality  of  God.  The  In- 
finite must  be  a  person  in  order  to  be  the  ground  of  finite  person- 
ality ;  the  source  and  ground  of  the  moral  order  and  moral  ideals 
must  be  sought  in  a  personality ;  and,  finally,  reality  can  be  pre- 
dicated only  of  that  which  exists  as  personality.  These  are  all 
suggested  rather  than  fully  and  clearly  developed,  however. 
Only  the  last  is  in  any  sense  peculiar  to  Lotze' s  view,  and  this 
follows  directly  from  his  metaphysics. 

Throughout  his  works  Lotze  emphasizes  the  value  and  dignity 
of  the  individual  personality.  The  human  spirit  can  not  be  re- 
garded as  wholly  dependent  on  the  course  of  nature,  a  mere 
product  of  nature  which  transiently  appears  and  then  vanishes, 
as  a  thing  of  no  intrinsic  worth.  The  history  of  mankind,  a  his- 
tory of  struggle  and  achievement,  of  progress  from  the  low  and 
brutish  to  ever-increasing  fullness  of  spiritual  life,  constrains  us  to 
reverence  the  human  nature  that  is  ours,  and  to  believe  in  its 
high  calling.  That  distinguishing  endowment  of  the  human 
mind — the  "capacity  of  becoming  conscious  of  the  Infinite"^ — 
would  seem  to  imply  that  its  source  and  its  object  are  to  be 
found  in  something  akin  to  the  human  mind  itself  Is  it  not  far 
from  probable  that  "  the  Absolute,  of  itself  unconscious  and  im- 
personal, produces  even  in  its  blind   development  the  favoring 

i^^z/^n,  3:  p.  574. 

«  Mikr. ,  2  :  pp.  341-342. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  69 

conditions  under  which  its  own  products,  the  finite  spirits,  devel- 
oped the  personality  denied  to  itself?  "  ^  Indeed,  Lotze  boldly 
asserts  that  the  burden  of  proof  must  rest  with  those  who  deny, 
rather  than  with  those  who  affirm,  the  personality  of  the  Infinite. 

But,  furthermore,  we  find  ourselves  under  the  necessity  of 
making  intelligible  from  a  single  real  principle  the  moral  order 
of  the  world  and  the  fact  that  it  furnishes  us  with  obligatory 
ideals  of  the  Good.*  Quoting  the  words  of  Fichte,  Lotze  says  : 
"  It  is  not  doubtful,  '  but  most  certain  and  indeed  the  ground  of 
all  other  certainty,  that  there  is  this  moral  order  of  the  world, 
that  for  every  intelligent  creature  there  is  an  appointed  place  and 
a  work  which  he  is  expected  to  perform,  and  that  every  circum- 
stance of  his  lot  is  part  of  a  plan,  in  independence  of  which  not  a 
hair  of  his  head  can  be  harmed  .  .  .  that  every  good  action  will 
succeed  and  every  evil  action  certainly  fail,  and  that  to  those 
who  do  but  truly  love  that  which  is  good  all  things  shall  work 
together  for  good.'  "  ^  But  if  the  notion  of  any  active  order 
necessarily  and  inevitably  leads  back  to  that  of  an  Ordering 
Being,  the  notion  of  a  moral  order  leads  further.  Only  a  con- 
scious and  moral  Being  can  impart  to  the  cosmic  course  the  im- 
pulses by  which  is  established  the  thorough-going  dominion  of 
what  is  good.^  If  we  regard  the  cosmos  as  moral,  as  we  seem 
forced  to  do,  then  "  Personality  is  the  only  conceivable  form  of 
its  Supreme  Cause."  ^ 

We  have  said  that  the  third  argument,  namely,  that  personality 
is  the  only  Real,  is  the  only  one  that  is  peculiar  to  Lotze' s  view,  and 
that  is  directly  connected  with  his  metaphysical  doctrine.  Spirit- 
ual life,  as  we  have  seen,  is  for  him  the  only  form  of  real  existence. 
The  unity  of  that  which  we  call  a  '  thing,'  its  coherency  accord- 
ing to  law,  would  be  impossible,  save  as  pertaining  to  a  spiritual 
subject.  But  the  essence  of  spiritual  life  is  '  being-for-self ' ;  real 
existence  then  is  that  only  which  has  worth  in  and  for  itself. 
But  while  all  reality  is  such  by  virtue  of  '  being-for-self,'  different 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  I  26. 

2  Philos.  of  Relig.,  §  26. 

3  Fichte  :  Sammtliche  Werke,  V,  p.  188.     Cf.  also  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  566. 
*Cf.  Mikr.,  3:  p.  567. 

^Mikr.,  3  :  p.  568. 


70        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

forms  of  reality  possess  this  attribute  in  different  degrees.  Only 
that  being  which  apprehends  itself  as  a  self  or  ego  is  truly  real, 
and  the  Supreme  Reality  must  possess  in  the  highest  possible  de- 
gree the  *  Being-for-self '  which  is  synonymous  with  Reality. 
Finite  spirits  share  the  reality  of  the  Infinite,  but  the  Infinite  alone 
is  truly  Real  and  truly  an  Ego.^  The  highest  form  of  *  being- 
for-self  '  that  we  know  is  personality ;  ought  we  not,  therefore,  to 
attribute  the  same  to  the  Absolute  Real  in  the  highest  and,  indeed, 
the  only  perfect  degree  ? 

Certain  considerations  have,  however,  led  to  an  unwillingness 
on  the  part  of  many  thinkers  to  attribute  personaHty  to  the  Infin- 
ite. It  has,  indeed,  '*  become  almost  an  axiom  that  personality 
is  a  category  of  finite  being  only."^  This  view  is  based  upon 
certain  conceptions  as  to  the  necessary  relation  of  the  Ego  and 
Non-Ego.  An  Ego  is  not  thinkable,  its  advocates  affirm,  except 
in  contrast  with  a  Non-Ego ;  hence,  to  assert  personal  existence 
of  God  is  to  limit  his  Being,  to  condition  Him  by  something  not 
Himself^  The  foregoing  proposition,  says  Lotze,  is  susceptible 
of  three  interpretations.  The  first  two  of  these  seem  to  run  to- 
gether, however,  and  we  may  consider  them  as  one.  The  first 
interpretation,  therefore,  is  this  :  The  Ego  has  significance  only 
as  contrasted  with  the  Non-Ego,  and  can  be  experienced  only  in 
such  contrast.*  To  this  Lotze  makes  answer  that  Ego  and  Non- 
Ego  are  not  merely  two  correlative  terms,  having  no  meaning 
apart  from  each  other.  Each  can  not  owe  its  whole  content  to 
the  other,  else  both  would  remain  without  content.  One  of  the 
two  must  be  independently  determined.  By  the  usage  of  lang- 
uage the  Ego  alone  has  its  own  independent  name  ;  the  Non- 
Ego  is  only  the  negative  determination  which  excludes  the  Ego 
without  indicating  any  positive  content  of  its  own.  But  quite 
apart  from  what  is  implied  in  language,  the  Ego  is  the  positive, 
referring  to  the  immediate  self-feeling  "  by  which  the  Ego  posit- 
ively apprehends  what  belongs  to  it  as  its  own,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  at  first  excludes  from  itself  in  a  merely  negative  way  what 

I  Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  623,  also  pp.  615-619. 

^Pfleiderer:    Lotze' s philosophische  Weltanschauung,^.  59;  cf.  Alikr.,^  :  p.  564. 

'  Mikr, ,  3  :  p.  509. 

^  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  570. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  7 1 

does  not  belong  to  it."  ^  The  primary  basis  of  personality  is  in 
immediate  self- existence,  and  herein  alone  do  we  find  the  basis  of 
the  possibility  of  the  contrast  of  Ego  and  Non-Ego.^  We  have 
already  seen  in  another  connection  that  Lotze  makes  feeling  the 
basis  of  self-consciousness.  Referring  to  this,  he  says  that  "  this 
discussion  showed  us  that  all  self-consciousness  rests  upon  the 
foundation  of  the  direct  sense  of  self,  which  can  by  no  means  arise 
from  becoming  aware  of  a  contrast  with  the  external  world,  but  is 
itself  the  reason  that  this  contrast  can  be  felt  as  unique,  as  not 
comparable  to  any  other  distinction  between  two  objects.^ 

It  is  the  second  interpretation,  however,  which  posits  the 
weightiest  objection  to  belief  in  a  Personal  God.  This  may  be 
stated  as  follows  :  The  Ego  is  conditioned  by  the  existence  and 
active  influence  of  a  Non-Ego ;  personality  can  not  be  produced 
even  in  a  being  whose  nature  is  capable  of  it  without  the  coopera- 
tive and  educative  influences  of  an  external  world.*  Personality 
is  unthinkable,  therefore,  as  an  attribute  of  the  Infinite ;  it  has 
meaning  only  when  ascribed  to  finite  beings.  Stimulus  from 
the  external  world,  through  the  avenues  of  the  senses,  must 
awaken  the  mind  to  activity,  and  develop  personality,  or  self- 
existence,  which  is  otherwise  only  potential. 

But  while  it  is  true  that  the  incitements  to  its  action  come  to 
it  from  without,  even  the  finite  being  is  in  part  self-conditioned  ; 
the  forms  of  its  activity  proceed  from  its  own  inner  nature,  and 
**  neither  the  content  of  its  sensations  nor  its  feelings,  nor  the 
peculiarity  of  any  other  of  its  manifestations,  is  given  to  it  from 
without."  '^  But  if  finite  personality  can  not  be  regarded  as 
wholly  determined  by  incitements  from  a  source  external  to  itself, 
to  a  much  greater  degree  is  it  absurd  to  assume  that  personality 
as  attributed  to  the  Infinite  Being  implies  such  determination. 
The  transference  of  the  conditions  of  finite  personality  to  the  In- 
finite is  quite  without  justification.  Such  transference  assumes 
that  what  is  true  of  the  finite  must  necessarily  hold  of  the  Infin- 

^  Philos.  ofKelig.,  §38;  Cf.   Mikr.,  3:  p.  570. 
^Mikr.,  3:  PP-  571,  579-580. 
^Mikr.,  3:  p.  571. 
^Mikr.,  3  :  p.  573. 
^Mikr.,  3:  p.  575- 


72        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE' S  METAPHYSICS. 

ite  ;  it  ignores  the  distinction  which  we  invariably  make  in  every 
other  case  between  the  finite  and  the  Absolute,  the  conditioned 
and  the  Unconditioned.  The  finite  being  requires  the  Non-Ego, 
not  because  it  needs  the  contrast  with  something  alien,  but  be- 
cause it  does  not  contain  within  itself  the  conditions  of  its  own 
existence.  The  Infinite  comprehends  within  itself  all  that  is 
finite,  and  is  the  cause  of  its  nature  and  reality.  It  does  not 
need  that  its  activity  *'  should  be  called  forth  by  external  stimuli, 
but  from  the  beginning  its  concept  is  without  that  deficiency 
which  seems  to  us  to  make  such  stimuli  necessary  for  the  finite 
being,  and  its  active  efficiency  thinkable."  ^  The  Infinite  Being 
is  wholly  self-sufficing,  and  possesses  within  itself  the  conditions 
of  its  own  development.  "■  That  which  is  only  approximately 
possible  for  the  finite,  the  conditioning  of  its  life  by  itself,  takes 
place  without  limit  in  God,  and  no  contrast  of  the  external  world 
is  necessary  for  Him."^  To  conceive  of  the  Absolute  as  thus 
the  ground  of  spiritual  and  self-conscious  activities,  is  to  make 
no  greater  demand  upon  the  imagination  than  is  made  by  every 
materialistic  or  pantheistic  view,  or  even  by  any  physical  explan- 
ation of  the  world. ^ 

There  follows  from  the  preceding  argument  a  conclusion  which 
is  the  exact  opposite  of  the  usual  one :  "  Perfect  personality  is 
reconcilable  only  with  the  conception  of  an  Infinite  Being ;  for 
finite  beings  only  an  approximation  to  this  is  attainable."  *  The 
finite  mind  is  a  constituent  of  a  whole ;  it  has  a  definite  place  in 
the  cosmos,  and  is,  therefore,  subject  to  limitations.  Not  only 
must  its  activities  be  awakened  by  successive  stimuli,  so  that  the 
whole  self  can  never  be  brought  together  at  one  moment  of  time, 
but  also  its  inner  life  follows  the  laws  of  a  psychical  mechanism  in 
accordance  with  which  its  activities  are  inevitably  exercised.  The 
finite  being  never  knows  itself  as  a  comprehensible  unity,  neither 
at  any  moment  of  time  nor  in  a  retrospect  which  includes  the 
entire  temporal  course  of  its  life.  It  approximates,  but  never 
quite  attains,  the  ideal  unity  which  it  posits  as  its  self.  There  is 
^Mikr.,  3:  p.  575. 

^Mikr.,  3  :  p.  576.     Cf.  3  :  p.  580;  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \\  39-40. 
3Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  577  ;  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  40. 
*  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  41.     Cf.  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  580. 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  73 

an  obscure  core  of  being  it  can  never  bring  into  complete  self- 
consciousness.  It  finds  the  mystery  within  more  inscrutable 
by  far  than  that  of  the  world  without.  In  point  of  fact,  Lotze 
concludes,  the  personality  of  finite  beings  *'is  an  ideal,  which, 
like  all  that  is  ideal,  belongs  unconditionally  only  to  the  Infinite, 
but  .  .  .  appertains  .to  us  only  conditionally,  and  hence  im- 
perfectly." ^ 

We  have  considered  the  two  aspects  under  which  Lotze  con- 
ceives the  Absolute  Being, — the  metaphysical  Absolute,  or  World- 
Ground,  and  the  Personal  God,  the  concept  of  religion.  An 
attempt  has  been  made  to  show  that  he  does  not  hold  these  con- 
ceptions apart  or  bring  them  together  in  a  merely  external  union. 
On  the  contrary,  the  concept  of  metaphysical  unity  requires  that 
this  unity  be  conceived  under  the  form  of  personality.  The  meta- 
physical inquiry,  as  we  have  seen,  leads  to  the  positing  of  a  Uni- 
tary Being  as  the  World-Ground.  This  concept  is  at  first,  however, 
merely  negative.  It  gives  no  indication  of  the  positive  content  of 
the  World-Ground,  it  asserts  only  that  the  elements  of  the  world 
are  not  to  be  conceived  as  isolated  and  independent.  But  thought 
cannot  rest  in  a  merely  negative  determination.  In  the  effort  to 
determine  positively  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  reality,  Lotze  is 
forced  to  attribute  to  it  a  spiritual  and  self-conscious  existence. 
The  metaphysical  concept  of  the  unity  of  things  is  intelligible  only 
if  this  unity  be  conceived  as  a  spiritual  and  self-conscious  Being. 
The  only  conceivable  unity  is  the  unity  of  consciousness,  the  only 
conceivable  reality  is  the  reality  of  self-existence.  Here  is  the 
link  in  Lotze' s  argument  which  warrants  the  identification  of  the 
metaphysical  Absolute  with  the  Personal  God.  Whether  or  not 
we  assent  to  the  implied  metaphysical  doctrines  which  are  peculiar 
to  Lotze' s  view,  we  cannot  fail  to  admit  the  force  and  clearness 
of  the  argument.  The  concept  of  a  Personal  Absolute  undoubt- 
edly does  make  the  unity  of  the  world  more  intelligible.  We 
have  in  ourselves  the  experience  of  a  unity  which  comprises  all 
its  parts,  and  which  is  something  more  and  other  than  the  mere 
sum  of  them  all.     This  experience  makes  it  possible  for  us  in  some 

1  Mikr.y  3  :  p.  579 ;  also  pp.  577-578.     Cf.  Royce:  The  Conception  of  God,  pp. 
272-273. 


74       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

measure  to  conceive  of  the  relation  between  the  Infinite  Spirit  and 
the  finite  beings  that  constitute  the  world. 

The  metaphysical  inquiry  in  itself,  then,  leads  to  the  conclus- 
ion that  the  ultimate  Reality  must  be  spiritual  and  self-conscious, 
predicates  which  we  know  only  in  personal  beings.  Since  per- 
sonality is  an  ethical  category,  we  see  again, that  in  a  very  literal 
sense  the  ethical  underlies  the  metaphysical  in  Lotze's  philosophy. 
In  that  the  Absolute  is  spiritual,  an  Ego,  conscious  of  self  and  in 
the  fullest  degree  self-determined,  it  is  essentially  ethical.  The 
same  conclusion  is  likewise  reached  by  quite  another  line  of  argu- 
ment, which  follows  in  general  the  reasoning  by  which  it  is  or- 
dinarily sought  to  establish  the  personality  of  God.  The  ethical 
and  religious  consciousness  ascribes  to  the  Infinite  a  supreme 
worth  and  goodness,  which  can  be  realized  only  in  a  Person.  This 
practical  demand  Lotze  recognizes  as  quite  as  legitimate  as  the 
speculative.  Both  are  rooted  deep  in  human  nature.  The  meta- 
physical inquiry  has  its  source  in  man's  apprehension  of  an  ordered 
universe,  the  religious  and  ethical  inquiry  in  his  appreciation  of 
values.  The  Absolute  must  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  the 
ground  and  source  of  all  values.  Supreme  Reality  and  supreme 
Worth  must  be  united  in  the  Highest  Being.  As  Lotze  conceives 
the  goal  of  human  conduct  to  be  benevolence,  so  he  believes  the 
Infinite  is  most  fitly  designated  as  *  Living  Love '  that  '  wills  the 
blessedness '  of  all  dependent  beings,  and  by  the  continual  out- 
flowing of  active  energy  sustains  and  fills  all  finite  existence  with 
its  own  abounding  life. 

Lotze's  conception  of  God  as  the  true  and  complete  personality, 
of  which  human  personality  is  but  the  finite  and  imperfect  copy, 
seems  far  more  intelligible  than  the  assertion,  so  often  made,  that 
the  Infinite  is  more  than  personality,  so  much  more  that  it  is  mis- 
leading to  apply  the  term.  This  affirmation  carries  always  the 
implication  that  the  Infinite  is  quite  other  than  personality ; 
whereas  it  is  surely  reasonable  to  suppose  that  man — the  highest 
thing  that  we  know^  that  which  the  whole  creation  has  travailed 
to  produce  and  to  perfect — affords  the  best  index  of  the  nature 
of  the  Highest  Being.  Man's  distinguishing  characteristic  is 
Reason,  self-conscious  and  worth-appreciative  Reason.     This  in- 


CONCEPTION  OF  GOD.  75 

eludes,  I  think,  all  that  Lotze  means  by  personality.  Reason,  as 
we  know  it,  is  always  self-conscious  and  worth -appreciative.  In 
Lotze' s  own  words,  we  have  no  right  to  strip  from  Reason  the 
predicates  we  always  find  attached  to  it,  and  persuade  ourselves 
that  aught  intelligible  remains.^  The  term  personality  as  applied 
to  the  Infinite  is  probably  no  more  inadequate  than  any  of  the 
other  terms  by  which  we  seek  to  designate  this  Being.  Since 
we  are  finite  beings  ourselves,  all  the  symbols  that  we  invent 
must  derive  their  meaning  from  what  is  finite,  and  must  therefore 
fail  signally  when  applied  to  the  Infinite.^ 

If  now  the  question  be  asked  in  how  far  Lotze' s  conception  of 
the  Absolute  is  determined  by  ethical  and  religious  considerations, 
our  answer  must  take  cognizance  of  the  two-fold  significance  of 
this  conception.  The  concept  of  the  Absolute  as  the  World- 
Ground  rests  upon  a  purely  speculative  basis.  So,  at  least, 
Lotze  himself  affirms  in  terms  that  admit  of  no  ambiguity.  At 
the  close  of  his  metaphysical  discussion,  he  says :  "  Though  I 
am  old-fashioned  enough  not  to  be  indifferent  to  the  religious  in- 
terests which  are  involved  in  these  problems,  the  views  for  which 
I  have  been  contending  rest  on  a  purely  scientific  basis,  quite 
without  reference  to  religion.  No  course  of  things,  whether 
harmonious  or  discordant,  seems  to  be  conceivable  except  on  the 
supposition  of  this  unity  which  alone  makes  possible  the  recip- 
rocal action  of  individual  existences."  ^  This  and  other  state- 
ments to  the  same  effect  leave  no  doubt  as  to  Lotze's  belief  and 
intention  that  his  metaphysical  doctrine  should  rest  on  logical 
proofs. 

The  concept  of  the  Absolute  as  Infinite  Personality  is  reached 
in  two  ways  :  It  is  first  the  logical  consequence  and  implication 
of  Lotze's  metaphysical  doctrine.  In  order  to  be  the  World- 
Ground  the  Absolute  must  be  a  personal  Being.  But  the 
personality  of  the  Absolute  is  likewise  necessary  in  order  to 
explain  the  facts  of  the  realm  of  values.  Here  moral  and  aes- 
thetic ideals,  the  ethical   presuppositions  of  theoretical    ideals, 

^Philos.  ofRelig.,  \  24. 

2Cf.  Fiske  :    Through  Nature  to  God,  pp.  157-159- 

^Met.,  §233;    cf.  §84. 


'jd       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

the  recognition  of  a  moral  world-order,  the  religious  aspiration 
for  a  supreme  object  of  love  and  veneration — all  have  their  place, 
and  contribute  to  that  practical  demand  for  a  personal  God 
which  it  is  the  chief  aim  of  Lotze's  philosophy  to  justify  and  to 
establish  as  objectively  valid. 

Though  prompted  by  different  motives,  the  speculative  and 
practical  inquiries  reach  the  same  goal,  namely,  the  concept  of  a 
supreme  Person  who  is  at  once  the  ground  and  source  of  all 
Reality,  all  Truth,  and  all  Good. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Conception  of  the  Nature  of  Man  :    Man  as  a  Mechanism 
AND  AS  A  Personality. 

IN  the  introduction  to  the  Mikrokosmus,  we  find  Lotze  disclaim- 
ing any  attempt  to  set  forth  in  a  complete  and  comprehensive 
manner  the  system  of  the  universe.  Profoundly  impressed  with 
the  limitations  of  human  reason,  he  always  distrusted  the 
methods  and  conclusions  of  system-building  philosophers.  Kron- 
enberg  says  very  truly  that  Lotze' s  philosophy  is  anthropocen- 
tric  in  its  standpoint.^  It  is  characteristic  of  Lotze' s  attitude  that 
he  approaches  the  philosophical  problem  in  the  interests  of  man, 
not  confident  of  a  full  solution,  but  hopeful  of  gaining  an  insight 
that  shall  answer  the  more  urgent  questions  as  to  the  meaning 
of  man's  life.  The  more  deeply  the  features  of  the  great  world- 
picture  impress  themselves  upon  consciousness,  the  "  more  vividly 
will  they  point  us  back  to  ourselves,  and  stir  up  anew  the  ques- 
tion— What  significance  have  man  and  human  life  with  its  con- 
stant phenomena,  and  the  changing  course  of  history,  in  the 
great  whole  of  Nature."  ^  The  very  title  of  the  Mikrokosmus, 
and  its  modest  sub-title,  An  attempt  at  an  Anthropology,  indi- 
cate the  importance  of  the  place  held  by  man  in  Lotze's  concep- 
tion of  the  total  system  of  things.  This  work,  which  is  the  most 
comprehensive  statement  of  his  philosophy,  has  for  its  express 
aim  the  task  of  ascertaining  the  nature  of  man  and  his  relation  to 
the  cosmos. 

The  problem  of  man's  being  is,  in  its  widest  aspect,  the  problem 
we  have  already  discussed  as  regards  the  universe  as  a  whole, 
namely,  that  of  the  mechanical  versus  the  ideal  view.  Is  man  a 
mechanism,  differing  from  other  mechanisms  only  in  degree  of 
complexity  ?     Are  his  physical  and  mental  life,  his  ethical   and 

1  Kronenberg  :  Moderne  Philosophen,  pp.  23-25. 
2il/z/^r.,  XV-XVI. 


78        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

social  activities,  wholly  explicable  by  mechanical  laws  ?  Or  must 
we,  in  order  adequately  to  explain  these  complex  and  varied 
phenomena,  have  recourse  to  a  principle  quite  other  than  mechan- 
ical ?  This  is  the  real  problem  of  the  Mikrokosmus,  and  the 
answer  to  it  will  be  found  to  involve  Lotze's  answer  to  every 
question  concerning  the  nature  of  man  and  the  meaning  of 
human  life.  We  are  prepared  to  find  a  generous  admission  of 
the  mechanical  point  of  view  as  affording  a  partial  explanation  of 
the  phenomena  in  question,  but  a  firm  denial  that  the  mechan- 
ical explanation  is  ultimate. 

From  the  beginning  of  his  scientific  labors  to  the  close  of  his 
philosophical  career,  Lotze  insisted  upon  the  prevalence  of 
mechanism  in  the  body.  Even  in  the  works  which  preceded  the 
Medicinische  Psychologies  this  view  is  set  forth  and  defended  with 
clearness  and  vigor.^  Later,  in  connection  with  his  philosophical 
theory,  he  but  recapitulates — to  use  his  own  term — the  con- 
clusions thus  early  developed,  for  the  purpose  of  calling  attention 
to  the  fact  that  a  complete  view  must  show  how  the  mechanical 
conception  of  vital  phenomena  harmonizes  with  the  requirements 
of  the  ideal  view  which  philosophy  never  ceases  to  urge.^ 

In  some  form  or  other  there  has  always  existed  a  reluctance 
to  admit  that  the  origin  of  life  and  the  processes  of  life  are  to  be 
accounted  for  by  ordinary  mechanical  laws.  This  reluctance  has 
been  based  not  alone  upon  ethical  and  religious  grounds,  but  upon 
theoretical  considerations  as  well,  and  has  afforded  inducement  to 
postulate  a  '  vital  principle '  of  some  sort,  dependent  in  a  general 
sense  upon  material  conditions,  but  superior  to  the  physical  and 
chemical  laws  which  dominate  matters.^  While  sympathizing  in 
some  measure  with  the  motives  which  lead  to  this  view,  Lotze 
unhesitatingly  denies  the  conclusion.  The  assumption  of  a 
superior  principle  in  organic  bodies  which  presides  over  and 
effects  vital  phenomena,  is  both  unnecessary  and  inadequate  for 
the  explanation  of  such  phenomena.  It  is  unnecessary  ;  for  our 
analysis  never  reaches  the  point  where  we  can  pronounce  with 

iSee  Lebenskraft,  1843,  and  Seeleund  Seelenleben,  1846,  both  published  in  Ru- 
dolph Wagner's  Handworterbuch  der  Physiologic.  Also  AUgemeine  Physiologic  des 
korperlichen  Lebens,  1851. 

^Met.,  I  224. 

3Cf.  Met.,  \\  224-225. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN  79 

assurance  that  the  limit  of  mechanical  efficiency  is  found,  and 
that  now  a  new  principle  must  be  summoned  to  our  aid.  Mech- 
anism in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term  includes  every  case  in 
which  effects  are  produced  by  the  reciprocal  action  of  different 
elements  of  whatever  kind,  working  in  accordance  with  universal 
laws.^  When  used  in  this  sense,  it  becomes  evident  that  there 
is  nowhere  any  exception  to  the  dependence  of  life  on  mechan- 
ical causes.^  Everywhere  we  find  the  interaction  of  parts  in 
accordance  with  fixed  law.  Moreover,  the  assumption  of  another 
and  higher  principle  is  inadequate  for  the  explanation  of  vital 
phenomena,  and  raises  insuperable  difficulties.  It  must  needs  be 
quite  impotent  unless  it  works  by  means  of  just  such  a  system 
of  laws  as  it  is  meant  to  supersede.  ^'  It  is  not  obvious  where 
such  a  force  could  be  inherent,  unless  in  the  sum  of  living  parts 
and  their  systematic  combinations ;  it  is  not  obvious  how  it 
should  come  to  alter  its  mode  of  operation  and  at  each  moment 
effect  what  is  necessary,  so  long  as  we  do  not  suppose  that  by 
regular  necessity  it  becomes  different,  and  works  differently  under 
altered  circumstances,  like  every  force  which  is  the  result  of  a 
variety  of  changeable  parts."  ^ 

In  short,  Lotze  concludes,  a  mechanical  method  is  absolutely 
necessary  in  order  to  explain  the  connection  of  vital  phenomena. 
Life  is  derived  "  not  from  some  peculiar  principle  of  action,  but 
from  a  peculiar  mode  of  utilizing  the  principles  which  govern  the 
whole  physical  world."  ^  To  maintain  this,  however,  is  not  to 
deny  that  the  forms  of  organic  life  exhibit  purpose,  nor  is  it  to 
degrade  them  to  the  level  of  mere  machines.^  The  first  book  of 
the  Mikrokosrnus  aims  to  show  that  we  do  not  need  to  assume 
a  special  life-principle,  but  that  the  structure  of  the  body,  the 
structure  and  functions  of  the  various  organs,  and  the  conserva- 
tion of  life  are  to  be  explained  by  reference  to  mechanical  causes.* 

^ Met.,  \  227. 

2Cf.  Mikr.,  ij  p.  80;  Met.,  §  233. 

^Mikr.,  i:  p.  84;  Cf.  Met.,  ^  227. 

^Met.,  \  229. 

5  On  the  differences  between  the  living  body  and  the  machine  compare  Mikr. ,  I  : 
pp.  80-83  ;  ^et.,  I  228. 

^Cf.  Kronenberg:  Moderne  Philosophen,  pp.  25-26;  Pfleiderer;  Lotze" s  philosoph- 
ische  Weltanshauung ,  pp.  14-17. 


8o       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

The  steady  advance  of  scientific  research  would  seem  to  warrant 
Lotze's  conclusion  that,  however  far  our  analysis  may  be  pushed, 
we  should  still  find  that  the  ends  of  Hfe  are  served  by  the  applica- 
tion of  nature's  general  means  with  which  we  are  already  familiar.^ 
In  the  movable  framework  of  the  body,  as  well  as  in  the  action 
of  the  muscles,  we  find  exhibited  in  the  utmost  variety  and 
delicacy  those  devices  to  promote  movement  which  are  com- 
monly termed  mechanical ;  while  the  functioning  of  the  internal 
organs,  the  constant  renewal  and  progressive  development  of  the 
body,  involve  an  extensive  application  of  chemical  laws  already 
known  to  us  by  the  study  of  inorganic  matter. 

In  fine,  man's  body  is  a  mechanism ;  it  obeys  certain  definite 
physical  and  chemical  laws,  by  reference  to  which  its  structure 
and  functions  are,  from  a  scientific  point  of  view,  wholly  expli- 
cable. Neither  here  nor  elsewhere,  however,  is  the  scientific 
view  final.  The  mechanical  conception,  so  far  from  excluding 
the  teleological,  implies  teleology  as  the  real  ground  of  mech- 
anism.^ We  are  never  justified  in  speaking  of  the  body  as  a 
mere  mechanism.  As  we  have  already  seen,  a  mere  mechanism 
exists  nowhere  in  nature.  Everything  is  what  it  is  and  acts  as 
it  does  by  virtue  of  the  living  potency  of  the  Absolute  present  in 
it,  and  active  through  the  instrumentality  of  mechanical  laws. 
The  flying  projectile  is  obedient  to  this  inner  force,  and  the  living 
body  owes  its  vitality  to  the  same  principle.  The  Absolute  works 
differently  in  different  forms  of  being,  but  it  is  the  one  active 
Being  from  which  all  finite  things  receive,  in  varying  degrees,  a 
derivative  and  limited  power  of  action. 

If  the  objection  be  made  that  after  all  Lotze  has  only  sub- 
stituted a  superior  kind  of  vitalism  for  what  is  ordinarily  meant 
by  that  term,  it  may  be  said  in  reply  that  his  theory  avoids  the 
two!great  errors  of  vitalism  as  the  term  is  commonly  understood  ; 
namely,  that  a  wholly  new  principle  must  be  assumed  in  order 
to  explain  the  phenomena  of  life,  and,  secondly,  that  the  action 
of  this  principle  supersedes  and  transcends  the  physical  laws 
which  operate  universally  in  the  inorganic  world. 

iCf.  Mikr.,  l:  pp.  86-87. 

2  Cf,  von  Hartmann  :    Lotze's  Philosophies  pp.  42. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE    OF  MAN.  8 1 

Turning  now  to  the  consideration  of  man's  mental  life,  we  find 
that  the  conception  of  the  soul  has  existed  long,  and  is  deeply  rooted 
in  the  convictions  of  men.  The  languages  of  all  civilized  peoples 
have  some  word  to  denote  this  somewhat  vague  notion  of  a  sub- 
ject of  our  sensations  and  emotions,  conditioned  and  limited  by 
the  body,  yet  in  truth  sovereign  over  it  and  surviving  its  disso- 
lution. Belief  in  the  existence  of  the  soul  has  been  supported, 
Lotze  finds,  by  three  lines  of  argument  based  upon  an  assumed 
freedom  of  self-determination,  the  incomparability  of  physical  and 
psychical  processes,  and  the  unity  of  consciousness.  Lotze  is 
undoubtedly  right  in  pronouncing  the  first  two  of  these  incon- 
clusive ^ ;  attention,  therefore,  will  here  be  confined  to  the  third. 

The  one  conclusive  argument  for  the  existence  of  the  soul  is 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  of  the  unity  of  consciousness.^  By  this 
term  it  is  not  meant  to  assert  that  for  each  living  form  there  ex- 
ists but  one  soul,  a  conclusion,  indeed,  that  would  seem  to  be 
discredited  by  certain  experiments  upon  low  forms  of  life.  Nor 
is  it  meant  that  we  have  a  persistent  consciousness  of  the  unity  of 
our  being  ;  self-observation  does  not  confirm  this  proposition.  It 
is  not  even  meant  to  affirm  that  the  soul  must  be  a  unity  because 
it  appears  to  itself  as  such.  The  force  of  the  argument  lies  in  the 
fact  that  in  consciousness  we  have  the  unity  of  a  being  conscious 
of  itself  That  the  manifold  variety  of  mental  experience,  pres- 
ent and  past,  can  be  so  brought  together  as  to  be  presented  as 
the  experience  of  the  self,  a  matter  of  self-observation,  is  the  most 
positive  and  convincing  proof  of  jthe  unity  of  that  being  which 
accompHshes  this.  If  the  soul  "  even  but  rarely,  but  to  a  limited 
extent,  nay  even  but  once,"  were  capable  of  this  feat,  the  case 
would  be  proved.  Not  that  we  beHeve  in  the  unity  of  the  soul 
because  it  appears  to  itself  a  unity,  but  simply  because  it  is  able 
to  appear  to  itself  at  all,  because  it  is  able  to  manifest  itself  in 
any  way  whatever.  "The  mere  fact  that,  conceiving  itself  as  a 
subject,  it  connects  itself  with  any  predicate,  proves  to  us  the 
unity  of  that  which  asserts  this  connection.  Every  judgment, 
whatever  it  may  assert,  testifies,  by  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  pro- 

^  For  his  discussion  of  these  arguments  see  Mikr.^  i :  pp.  1 61-169;  Met.^  1^238-240. 
2Cf.  KrestofF:    Lotze' s  metapkysischer  Seelenbegriff,  pp.  14-26. 


82        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE' S  METAPHYSICS. 

nounced  at  all,  to  the  indivisible  unity  of  the  subject  which  utters 
it."  ^  This  whole  argument  is  very  characteristic  of  Lotze,  both 
by  reason  of  the  clear  and  forcible  manner  in  which  he  leads  to 
the  conclusion,  and  by  reason  also  of  the  facility  with  which  this 
conclusion  when  reached  finds  its  place  in  his  system,  and  enters 
into  happy  relations  with  the  doctrines  he  chiefly  insists  upon. 

The  result  reached  thus  far  may  very  well  be  expressed  in  the 
\he  traditional  form  of  a  belief  in  a  supersensuous  soul,  mys- 
teriously connected  with  the  body,  but  not  of  it,  an  indivisible 
and  simple  substance.  But  in  seeking  further  to  determine  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  we  must  take  into  account  the  meaning 
which  Lotze  attaches  to  substance.  Negatively,  it  is  not  any 
substratum  of  reality,  either  a  physical  or  a  spiritual  entity.  *'  My 
only  definition  of  the  idea  of  substance,"  says  Lotze,  "was  this, 
— that  it  signifies  everything  which  possesses  the  power  of  pro- 
ducing and  experiencing  effects,  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  that 
power.  Accordingly,  this  expression  was  simply  a  title  given  to 
a  thing  in  virtue  of  its  having  performed  something ;  it  was  not 
and  could  not  be  meant  to  signify  the  ground,  the  means,  or  the 
cause  which  would  render  that  performance  intelligible."  ^  Men- 
tal activities,  then,  and  the  unifying  of  these  in  consciousness, 
afford  the  best  possible  example  of  what  Lotze  means  by  sub- 
stance.^ As  we  have  seen,  it  is  this  experience  of  the  unity  of 
consciousness,  he  believes,  which  warrants  us  in  regarding  the 
*  thing '  as  in  any  sense  a  substantial  unity,  and  compels  us  to  at- 
tribute to-it  a  spiritual  existence.  It  is  only  an  indivisible  unity 
which  can  produce  or  experience  effects. 

Hence  to  the  question,  '  What  then  is  the  soul  ? '  our  answer 
must  be  to  unfold  the  nature  of  its  activities.  The  activity  of 
anything  is  the  truest  possible  expression  of  its  nature.  The 
living  reaHty  of  the  soul  is  to  be  sought  in  its  concrete  forms  of 
actions,  its  ideas,  emotions,  and  efforts,  not  in  some  noumenal 
'■  substrate.'  It  need  not  trouble  us  that  we  can  not  tell  what 
the  soul  is  in  itself,  apart  from  its  activities.     All  our  definitions 

^  Met.,  \  244;  cf.  Mikr.,  i :  pp.  170-176. 
^Met.,  \  243. 

'On  Lotze' s  concept  of  substance,  compare  Krestoft":  Lotze' s  inetaphysischer 
Seelenbegriff,  pp.  26-34. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN  83 

are  hypothetical ;  they  never  state  what  a  thing  is,  but  how  it 
acts  under  certain  conditions.  That  which  does  not  act  and  re- 
act has  no  existence,  since  the  very  essence  of  being  is  activity. 
Neither  should  we  raise  the  question  how  the  soul  came  to  be. 
This  knowledge,  Lotze  remarks,  could  be  of  moment  to  us  only 
if  it  were  to  be  applied  to  the  creation  of  a  world.  Our  task  is 
simply  to  apprehend  what  is. 

Preliminary  to  his  discussion  of  the  characteristic  activities  of 
the  soul,  Lotze  asks  whether  there  is  a  '*  single  primitive  mode 
of  mental  manifestation  from  which  as  from  a  common  root  the 
other  faculties  proceed."  This  question  he  answers  in  the  nega- 
tive, deciding  in  favor  of  the  three  primary  and  irreducible  activ- 
ities, cognition,  feeling,  and  volition.^  Two  points  here,  or  rather 
two  aspects  of  what  is  essentially  the  same  thing,  are  of  impor- 
tance. First,  that  these  primitive  powers  are  not  to  be  regarded 
as  a  triumvirate  of  distinct  and  separable  faculties,  a  tripartite 
division  of  the  soul.^  On  the  contrary,  what  we  know  as  three  is 
after  all  but  one  in  the  being  of  the  soul.  In  every  mode  of  its 
action  the  whole  soul  is  present  and  energizes  ;  in  ideation,  for 
example,  the  whole  soul  expresses  itself,  but  incompletely.  So 
also  in  affection  and  in  volition.^  The  second  point  is  that  the 
soul  belongs  to  the  category  of  beings  capable  of  excitation.  Its 
activities  are  exercised,  not  spontaneously,  but  in  reaction  to  stimu- 
lus.* The  stimuli  may  be  external  or  internal,  but  the  action  of 
the  soul  is  necessarily  conditioned  thus  :  the  soul  responds  with 
its  own  native  energy  to  a  train  of  ideas  as  well  as  to  an  excita- 
tion through  an  organ  of  sense.  It  is  a  constant  element  in  all 
the  higher  reactions.  Not  only  in  the  simple  forms  of  sensation, 
affection,  and  effort,  but  in  all  the  highly  complex  and  elaborated 
mental  processes  into  which  these  enter  as  constituents,  the  soul 
is  active  after  its  own  fashion.  Nor  is  it  in  any  way  to  disparage 
the  soul  or  the  character  of  its  products  to  maintain  that  its  ac- 
tivity must  be  called  forth  in  response  to  stimulus.     It  is  true  of 

iCf.  Met.,  \  245  ;  Mikr.,  i  :  pp.  212— 215. 
2Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  1 99-201. 
^ Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  202-203. 
^Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  204-21 1. 


84        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

the  soul,  as  of  every  other  element  of  reality,  that  its  action  de- 
pends to  a  greater  extent  upon  its  own  nature  than  upon  the 
nature  of  that  which  excites  it  to  action. 

Here  it  may  be  well  to  notice  Lotze's  solution  of  the  long- 
vexed  problem  of  the  nature  of  the  union  of  mind  and  body. 
Quite  in  harmony  with  his  general  metaphysical  view,  his  con- 
clusion is  that  this  relation  is  one  of  interaction  by  means  of  a 
psycho-physical  mechanism.^  For  Lotze  the  problem  loses  its 
crucial  difficulty  ;  since  his  metaphysics  admits  no  division  of  re- 
ality into  the  two  realms  of  mind  and  matter,  there  is  no  question 
as  to  the  possibility  of  interaction  between  two  disparate  forms 
of  being.  All  reality  being  spiritual,  we  have  only  the  primary 
difficulty  of  the  conception  of  reciprocal  action  between  any  two 
elements  of  reality.  The  solution  of  this  general  problem  we 
have  already  discussed.  The  difficulty  in  the  notion  of  the  union 
of  mind  and  body  as  commonly  conceived  has  been  created, 
Lotze  believes,  by  positing  two  beings  so  wholly  disparate  as  to 
be  incapable  of  reciprocal  action  and  then  attempting  to  unite 
them  by  means  of  a  merely  external  bond.  Our  premises  here 
need  modification.  No  external  bond  could  suffice  to  explain 
the  union  we  do  actually  find.  Their  reciprocal  action  is  itself 
what  holds  them  together  ^ ;  the  union  of  mind  and  body  consists 
in  the  fact  that  they  can  and  do  interact.  This  interaction  must 
have  its  ultimate  ground  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  elements 
themselves.  It  is  a  mistake  to  imagine  that  the  interaction  of 
mind  and  body  presents  a  difficulty  inherently  greater  than  the 
interaction  of  so-called  material  elements.^  As  we  have  seen,  the 
reciprocal  action  of  things  is,  in  the  final  analysis,  inexplicable. 
The  relation  of  mind  and  body  is  but  a  special  case  under  the 
general  problem  of  the  reciprocal  relations  of  ultimate  elements, 
and  this  general  problem  becomes  intelligible  only  by  means 
of  the  conception  of  the  immanence  of  all  finite  things  in  the 
World-Ground. 

1  On  the  interaction  of  mind  and  body,  see  Medicinische  Psychologie  ;  cf.  also  Met.  ^ 
W  247-249;  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  306-323;  Outl.  ofPsy.,  ^^  66-68.  See  also  Krestoff: 
Lotze^s  metaphysischer  Seelenbegriff,  pp.  67-78  ;  Kronenberg  :  Moderne  Philosophen , 
pp.  29,  34-35. 

^  Mikr.y  I  :  p.  306. 

^Met.,  §248. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN  85 

But  even  on  the  assumption  of  an  incomparability  of  physical 
and  psychical  elements,  it  would  still  be  an  unfounded  prejudice 
to  suppose  that  only  like  can  act  on  like/  One  of  the  common 
arguments  against  the  interaction  of  body  and  mind  is  that  the 
physical  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is  incompatible  with 
this  conception.^  Lotze's  discussion  of  this  point  is  luminous.^ 
Of  the  practical  truth  of  this  comprehensive  physical  principle  he 
has  no  doubt ;  he  urges  caution,  however,  and  avoidance  of  hasty 
generalizations  and  deductions  from  this  principle.  We  need 
first  of  all  to  dismiss  the  notion  of  a  nameless  primitive  force  of 
no  determinate  character,  consisting  merely  in  a  constant  amount. 
Such  an  abstraction  can  have  no  meaning  and  no  reality.  "  What 
really  gives  to  each  phenomenon  its  character  is  the  concrete 
nature  of  that  which  embodies  the  quantum  of  force,  either 
wholly  or  partly,  for  the  time  being."  *  Of  greater  importance, 
however,  in  the  interpretation  of  this  principle  is  Lotze's  distinc- 
tion between  equality  and  equivalence  of  force.  In  so  far  as  we 
can  reduce  two  physical  processes  A  and  C  to  comparable  pri- 
mary occurrences  consisting  in  comparable  velocities  of  compar- 
able masses,  in  so  far  it  may  be  shown  that  C,  which  is  produced 
by  A^  contains  precisely  the  same  amount  of  energy  which  A^ 
by  producing  it,  has  lost.  Where  the  two  elements  do  not  admit 
of  this  exact  comparison,  it  is  an  essentially  arbitrary  course  to 
conclude  that  the  two  processes  in  question  involve  the  same 
amount  of  energy  differently  distributed.  In  this  latter  case,  all 
we  can  say  is  that  the  two  are  equivalent,  not  that  they  are  equal} 
Hence,  to  argue  that  the  interaction  of  mind  and  body  is  imposs- 
ible, since  there  can  be  no  equating  of  energy  in  antecedent  and 
consequent,  is  to  ignore  the  fact  that  we  are  now  dealing  with 
elements  in  relation  to  which  the  term  energy,  as  measured  by 
mass  and  velocity,  has  no  meaning  whatever.  We  have  no  unit 
of  measure  common  to  physical  and  psychical  processes.  There 
is  an  equivalence  of  activities,  certainly ;  we  may  say  that  a  spe- 
cific amount  of  one,  measured  by  the  unit  m,  corresponds  to  a 
specific  amount  of  the  other,  measured  by  the  unit  m' .     We  can- 

ij/^/.,  §248.  ^Met,\2\z. 

2Cf.  Ktilpe:   Outl.  ofPsy.,  p.  4.  ^  P^id. 

3Cf.  Met.,  II  211-215. 


S6       ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

not  equate  the  two.  Experience  would  seem  to  show,  therefore, 
that  the  physical  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is  but  a  special 
case  under  the  more  comprehensive  principle  of  the  equivalence 
of  different  effects.^  Lotze  has  here  drawn  a  very  true  distinc- 
tion, and  his  whole  discussion  throws  light  on  a  problem  too 
much  involved  in  obscurity  and  confusion. 

In  the  foregoing  consideration  of  the  proof  of  the  soul's  exist- 
ence and  the  nature  of  its  activity,  we  have  already  received  a 
partial  answer  to  the  question  as  to  how  far  man  is  a  mechanism. 
In  order  to  a  more  complete  answer  to  this  question,  however, 
let  us  consider  the  characteristic  mental  activities,  and  seek  to 
determine  in  what  measure  these  are  explicable  by  the  mechan- 
ical principle. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  train  of  our  ideas,  the  cur- 
rent of  thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions,  well-nigh  infinitely  varied 
and  complex,  which  make  up  our  inner  life,  has  its  course  and 
connections  mechanically  determined.^  "  The  concordant  result 
of  self-observation  has  long  and  generally  been  the  conception  of 
a  mechanism  by  which  the  course  of  internal  phenomena  is 
directed,  perhaps  universally,  certainly  to  a  great  extent,  having 
other  forms  indeed,  and  governed  by  laws  of  its  own  differing 
from  those  of  external  nature,  but  exhibiting  a  like  thorough- 
going dependence  of  each  several  event  on  its  preceding  condi- 
tions." ^  This  psychical  mechanism  reveals  itself  in  many 
ways,  in  the  phenomena  of  memory  and  recollection,  and  in  the 
dependence  of  our  feelings  and  volitions  on  certain  impressions 
by  which  they  are  regularly  evoked.  In  daily  life  we  reckon  on 
its  unfaiHng  efficiency.  Yet  so  much  greater  are  the  difficulties 
of  internal  observation  than  the  observation  of  external  nature 
that  we  are  unable  to  state  with  precision  the  laws  of  this 
mechanism.*  Certain  of  the  modes  of  connection,  however,  are 
so  marked  that  they  are  designated  as  laws,  for  example,  the 
so-called  Laws  of  Association  and  Reproduction.^ 

But  when  we  have  described  the  train  of  ideas,  or  the  *  stream  of 
consciousness,'  and  have  seen  that  it  reveals  the  workings  of  a  psy- 

^Met.y  I  21^.  ^Ibid. 

^Mikr.y  II,  3;  Met,  III,  Ch.  2.         ^Cf.  Mikr.y  i  :  pp.  241-246. 

^  Mikr.^  I  :  p.  218. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN.  8/ 

chical  mechanism,  we  have  by  no  means  exhausted  the  mind's 
wealth  or  explained  its  most  characteristic  activities.  All  know- 
ledge involves  the  comprehending  and  the  judging  of  the  facts  pre- 
sented, the  active  relating  of  ideas.  These  higher  mental  ener- 
gies differ  from  the  mind's  reaction  to  external  stimulus.  They 
are  reactions,  to  be  sure,  but  of  such  a  character  as  to  imply  a 
peculiar  spontaneity  and  creative  energy  on  the  part  of  the  mind. 
So,  at  least,  Lotze  maintains.  To  these  relating  activities  of 
mind  we  now  direct  attention.^ 

Lotze's  modification  of  the  doctrine  of  *  innate  ideas'  ^  makes 
clear  his  view  as  to  what  is  the  essential  character  of  the  mind's 
relating  activity.  The  old  notion  of  '  innate  ideas '  as  original 
possessions  of  the  mind,  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  pre- 
formed and  ready  for  use,  Lotze  rejects  as  utterly  untenable. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  empiricism  which  postulates  a  passive  re- 
ceptivity of  mind  falls  into  an  error  equally  great.  The  so-called 
'innate  ideas' — judgments  of  space,  time,  cause,  and  the  rest — 
are  merely  the  mind's  habitual  reactions.  There  is  that  in  the 
original  constitution  of  mind  which  constrains  it  at  the  suggestion 
of  experience  to  develop  these  modes  of  conception.  "  No  more 
than  the  spark  as  spark  is  already  present  in  the  flint  before 
the  steel  calls  it  forth,  do  these  concepts  hover  complete  before 
consciousness  previously  to  all  impressions  of  experience  .  .  .  "  * 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  as  inconceivable  that  they 
should  be  conveyed  in  experience  :  they  exist  only  for  the  mind 
and  by  virtue  of  the  mind's  action.  The  relating  activity  of  mind 
is  manifest  chiefly  in  two  ways,  in  the  apprehension  of  the 
world  by  the  understanding,  and  in  the  unifying  comprehension 
of  Reason.^     Let  us  consider  each  of  these  briefly. 

Thinking  goes  beyond  the  mechanism  of  perception  and  mem- 
ory. It  tests  and  corrects  the  mechanical  connection  of  ideas  ; 
it  is,  however,  by  no  means  independent  of  mechanism,  but  on  the 


iSee  Mikr.,  II,  4. 

2Cf.   Alikr.,    i:   pp.    254-256;    2:  pp.    294-295;  A'l.   Schr.,   3:    pp.   523-528. 
Logik,  I  324. 

^ Mikr.,  I  :  p.  255. 

^  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  257-268. 


88        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

contrary  it  is  aided  and  directed  in  the  exercise  of  its  function  by 
that  very  mechanical  connection  of  ideas.  The  train  of  ideas  alone 
is  not  thinkings  and  by  itself  can  not  discharge  the  offices  of  think- 
ing. ^  In  the  three  distinct  forms  of  thinking  activity,  the  con- 
cept, the  judgment,  and  the  syllogism,  thought  shows  on  the  one 
side  a  dependence  upon  the  mechanical  connection  of  ideas,  and 
on  the  other  a  spontaneous  and  creative  energy  by  virtue  of  which 
its  product  is  peculiarly  its  own.  The  concept,  for  example,  de- 
pends upon  a  series  of  perceptions  and  images ;  but  it  is  more 
than  the  combination  of  particular  images,  it  is  a  coherent  whole, 
a  true  universal,  and  as  such  is  not  adequately  accounted  for  by 
perception  and  memory.  The  judgment  still  further  transcends 
the  mere  mechanical  order.  It  actively  affirms  a  connection  be- 
yond that  of  the  mere  combination  of  ideas.  ^  The  syllogism 
likewise  shows  in  a  more  elaborated  form  that  which  character- 
izes all  the  activities  of  the  understanding,  namely,  the  presence 
of  a  universal  under  which  the  particulars  of  experience  are 
brought.  ^ 

Besides  sense  and  understanding,  Lotze  finds  in  the  human 
mind  ^'  a  still  higher  cognitive  energy — the  activity  of  Reason, 
that,  aiming  at  unity  in  our  conception  of  things,  seeks  to  com- 
plete experience.'"^  We  have  previously  noticed  the  distinction 
between  Ver stand  and  Vernunft.^  It  is  the  office  of  the  former  to 
combine  and  relate  under  the  categories  of  space  and  time,  of 
substance  and  attribute,  of  antecedent  and  consequent.  It  does 
not  ask  how  the  various  parts  are  to  unite  to  form  a  whole,  nor 
does  it  speculate  as  to  the  nature  and  meaning  of  that  whole. 
The  principles  of  the  understanding,  Lotze  says,  exhibit  to  us 
the  style  of  the  world's  construction,  but  not  the  form  of  the  out- 
lines of  its  completed  whole.^  The  completing  and  unifying  of 
our  knowledge  is  the  true  function  of  Reason,  though  it  is  far  from 
fully  accomplishing  its  task.  In  this  supreme  activity  the  mind 
comes  finally  into  its  own.  The  mechanism  of  the  psychical  life 
is  seen  to  occupy  its  properly  subordinate  place  of  means  to  an 
end. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  261.  *'Mikr.,  1  :  p.  266. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  263.  5  See  Ch.  II. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  264-5.  ^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  267. 


CONCEPTION   OF   THE  NATURE    OF  MAN.  89 

In  how  far,  it  may  now  be  asked,  does  the  mechanical  prin- 
ciple suffice  for  the  explanation  of  man's  mental  life?  We  have, 
first  of  all,  found  the  necessity  of  positing  a  soul — a  self-con- 
scious and  unitary  being  which  manifests  itself  in  its  various 
modes  of  activity — as  the  basis  of  mental  life.  Its  activities  are 
characteristic  reactions  which  by  reason  of  their  uniformity  and 
universality  admit  of  being  formulated  by  us  as  definite  psychical 
laws.  At  least,  some  of  them  are  thus  formulated  by  us.  These 
laws  may  be  termed  mechanical,  in  that  consequent  follows  ante- 
cedent with  invariable  uniformity.  The  mechanical  principle  is 
adequate  for  the  scientific  explanation  of  psychical  phenomena. 
The  mechanical  principle  does  not,  however,  give  a  full  account 
of  the  being  whose  nature  it  is  to  act  as  it  does.  Here,  as  in  the 
external  world,  we  have  an  ultimate  element  of  reality,  the  mean- 
ing of  which  we  have  not  solved  when  we  have  determined 
merely  the  laws  of  its  action.  The  reality  is  a  concrete  whole, 
the  law  is  an  abstract  formula  obtained  by  the  analysis  of  its 
activity.  Science  discovers  and  formulates  the  laws  which  are 
the  modes  of  procedure  of  things.  There  remain,  after  science 
has  done  its  work,  the  further  questions  :  What  is  the  function  of 
the  thing  as  a  whole,  and  what  is  its  relation  to  other  wholes  ? 
What  is  its  significance  in  the  system  of  reality  ?  There  is  no 
conflict  between  mechanism  and  teleology.  Each  implies  the 
other.  Mechanism  not  only  leaves  room  for  teleology,  but  implies 
teleology  as  affording  the  final  explanation  which  is  beyond  its  own 
province.  Teleology  implies  mechanism,  or,  at  least,  a  system 
of  means  for  the  realization  of  its  ends.  The  distinction  here 
drawn  is  not  without  significance  even  in  the  realm  of  inanimate 
things.  The  engine  is  adequately  explained  for  scientific  pur- 
poses when  the  principles  of  its  construction  are  understood,  and 
the  laws  by  which  the  latent  energy  of  fuel  becomes  available  for 
motive  power.  Its  final  explanation,  however,  is  teleological, 
involving  an  account  of  its  function  in  the  social  economy  of  the 
world. 

A  further  question  arises  here.  Do  teleology  and  mechanism 
bear  the  same  relation  to  each  other  in  Lotze's  conception  of  man 
as  in  his  conception  of  the  world  ?     We  have  seen  that  he  insists 


90        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

upon  the  universal  extent  of  mechanism  throughout  the  realm  of 
nature,  organic  and  inorganic  alike.  No  higher  principle  need 
be  appealed  to  at  any  point  in  order  to  explain  any  physical 
process.  Mechanism  is  absolutely  universal  in  extent,  but  quite 
subordinate  in  significance.  Its  explanation  is  scientifically  com- 
plete, but  it  is  never  ultimate.  Does  the  mental  life  likewise 
testify  to  the  universality  of  the  mechanical  principle,  or  are  we 
forced  to  admit  here  the  possibility  of  activities  not  in  any  sense 
mechanical  ? 

On  this  point  Lotze  is  by  no  means  clear.  Not  infrequently 
we  find  him  maintaining  the  universal  prevalence  of  mechanism 
in  the  mental  life.^  The  processes  of  thinking — ^the  formation  of 
the  concept,  the  judgment,  the  syllogism — all  involve  a  necessary 
dependence  on  mechanical  law.^  The  ideal  nature  of  mind  is  real- 
ized only  through  and  by  means  of  the  psychical  mechanism.* 
Over  against  these  affirmations,  we  find  others  of  quite  different 
import.  Lotze  seems  quite  unmistakably  to  say  that  as  we  pass 
beyond  the  simpler  mental  processes  to  those  more  complex  pro- 
cesses which  involve  the  relating  activity  of  mind,  the  principle 
of  mechanism  is  in  some  sense  transcended,  and  gives  place  to  a 
peculiarly  spontaneous  action  not  to  be  res^arded  as  mechanical.* 
There  is  still  a  partial  dependence  on  the  mechanical  principle, 
to  be  sure,  since  these  higher  activities  involve  and  comprehend 
the  simpler  ones.  For  example,  the  concept  involves  the  mem- 
ory-image, and  hence  the  mechanism  of  association  and  repro- 
duction. The  essential  feature  in  the  concept,  however,  is  the 
reference  to  a  true  universal,  a  coherent  and  indivisible  whole 
which  postulates  an  act  of  thought  quite  different  from  the  mere 
holding  together  of  a  group  of  particulars.^  The  thought-activ- 
ity which  produces  the  concept,  Lotze  seems  to  say,  cannot, 
from  any  point  of  view,  be  termed  mechanical.  The  same  is  true 
of  all  the  higher  activities  involved  in  thought.  As  the  mental 
life  evolves  from  lower  to  higher  forms,  the  presence  of  the  uni- 

iCf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  218-219;  2  :  pp.  241-246;  Met.,  g  247. 

^Mikr.y  I  :  pp.  262-265. 

3  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  275-276.  ^ 

*Cf.  Mikr.,  I  :  pp.  250-253,  256. 

^Mikr.,  I  :  p.  262. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE    OF  MAN.  9 1 

versal  becomes  increasingly  evident  in  the  processes  of  thought. 
Indeed,  the  distinguishing  mark  of  thought  is  just  this  presence 
of  the  universal.  *'  It  is  distinctive  of  the  mind  of  man  to  be  able, 
by  reflecting  on  the  cognitive  acts  it  has  mechanically  executed, 
to  discern  in  these  the  presence  of  laws  that  reach  out  indefinitely 
beyond  the  particular  cases  in  which  internal  experience  finds 
them  fulfilled."  ^  The  mere  mechanical  course  of  our  ideas, 
Lotze  here  maintains,  can  never  account  for  this  attainment  of  the 
universal. 

There  is  obviously  some  confusion  in  Lotze' s  thought  as  to  the 
degree  to  which  mechanism  prevails  in  the  mental  life.  There  is 
apparently,  also,  a  discrepancy  between  the  limitation  imposed 
upon  the  mechanical  principle  here,  and  the  universality  claimed 
for  it  in  the  physical  world.  Lotze  does  not  seem  to  be  con- 
scious of  any  inconsistency,  or  of  any  need  of  reconciling  the 
two  conceptions.  In  the  physical  world,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
thorough-going  mechanism  is  yet  not  incompatible  with  teleol- 
ogy. May  not  this  position  be  quite  as  tenable  in  the  explana- 
tion of  the  mental  life  ?  Mechanism  and  teleology  are  either  in- 
compatible everywhere  or  nowhere.  I  believe  that  Lotze  is 
right  in  maintaining  that  the  two  principles  are  not  at  variance, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  are  reciprocally  implied  in  reality.  If  this 
be  the  true  conception  it  must  hold  good  for  all  reality,  for  the 
spiritual  reality  which  we  know  as  the  soul,  as  well  as  for  that 
which  we  term  matter.  In  both  cases,  on  Lotze' s  principles,  we 
are  dealing  with  elements  that  are  spiritual  in  their  nature.  In  no 
case  is  the  so-called  law  something  imposed  from  without  which 
the  element  is  bound  to  obey.  Nor  can  it  be  regarded  as  even 
an  inner  necessity.  It  is,  rather,  the  characteristic  manner  in 
which  the  element  responds  to  excitation.  It  is  the  spontane- 
ous exercise  of  a  primitive  and  inherent  energy.  There  is  place 
here  for  freedom,  within  a  certain  range,  at  least,  and  for  a  tend- 
ency to  develop  improving  reactions  and  hence  to  make  progress 
towards  a  goal.  The  lower  an  element  is  in  the  scale  of  being, 
the  less  richly  is  it  endowed  by  nature,  doubtless,  and  the  more 
simple  and  uniform  are  its  reactions.     What  we  term  mechanical 

^Mikr.,  2:  pp.  300-301. 


92        ETHICAL-  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

law  merely  designates  such  uniform  actions  as  attract  our  notice 
by  their  constant  recurrence.  They  are  analyzed  by  thought  out 
of  the  very  warp  and  woof  of  rational  experience.  There  would 
seem  to  be,  however,  no  just  ground  for  a  distinction  in  kind  be- 
tween the  simple,  frequently  recurring  reactions  which  are  mani- 
fest in  *  things '  and  in  the  simpler  mental  operations,  and  those 
more  complex  and  apparently  more  spontaneous  reactions  which 
we  have  designated  as  the  relating  activities  of  mind.  The  latter 
are  more  significant,  doubtless,  as  indicating  the  nature  and  pos- 
sibilities of  man ;  strictly  speaking,  they  are  not  more  spontane- 
ous, nor  do  they  render  any  more  imperative  a  teleological  inter- 
pretation. Not  that  the  lower  activities  are  to  be  explained  by 
the  mechanical  principle,  and  the  higher  by  the  teleological,  but 
that  lower  and  higher  alike  require  both  the  teleological  and 
mechanical  principles  for  their  complete  explanation.  Through- 
out the  'whole  range  of  reality  we  must  recognize  '  the  realism 
of  Xh^form  of  being,  the  idealism  of  its  contefit'  * 

In  close  connection  with  the  view  of  man's  nature  as  teleologi- 
cal in  significance  but  mechanical  in  the  mode  of  its  activities,  is 
Lotze's  conception  of  man  as  a  personality.  Indeed,  the  latter 
conception  is  in  an  important  sense  fundamental  to  and  presup- 
posed by  the  former.  Not  only  is  Lotze's  philosophy  anthropo- 
centric,  his  chief  contention  is  for  the  recognition  of  the  whole 
nature  of  man.  ^  Man  is  a  being  possessed  not  alone  of  under- 
standing, but  of  feelings  and  will ;  his  affections  and  aspirations, 
his  ideals  of  worth,  of  duty,  and  of  truth  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count, for  they  form  a  part  of  the  data  of  experience  which  no  phil- 
osophy can  overlook  with  impunity.  It  is  just  this  ignoring  of 
the  living,  concrete  content  of  experience,  which  is  '  richer  than 
thought,'  that  constitutes  the  great  defect  of  the  Hegelian  system, 
according  to  Lotze's  thinking,  and  makes  of  the  famous  dialectic 
'a  ghostly  ballet  of  bloodless  categories.' 

While  Lotze  spared  no  denunciations  of  what  he  regarded  as 

1  Cf.  Pfleiderer  :  Lotz^ s  philosophische  Weltanschauung,  pp.  63,  66 ;  Vorbrodt : 
Principien  der  Ethik  und  Religionsphilosophie  Lotzes,  p.  37. 

2  Cf.  Kronenberg  :  Moderne  Philosophen,  p.  24  secj. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE    OF  MAN.  93 

an  arrogant  intellectualism,  it  is  by  no  means  just  to  assume  that 
his  attitude  is  accurately  stated  by  classing  him  as  one  whose 
chief  aim  is  to  defend  the  rights  of  faith  against  the  pretensions  of 
knowledge,  or  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  practical  over  the 
theoretical  reason.  Professor  H.  Jones  says  of  Lotze  that  he  re- 
garded the  antithesis  between  faith  and  knowledge  as  final,  and 
tried  to  establish  harmony  by  separating  the  antagonists,  and  divid- 
ing the  realm  of  reality  between  them,  making  some  things  objects 
of  belief,  and  others  objects  of  knowledge.  ^  The  truth  seems 
rather  to  be  that  Lotze  recognized  these  two  spheres,  and  recog- 
nizing also  the  fact  that  most  men  take  part  in  both  without  being 
able  to  unite  the  two,  sought  earnestly  to  show  their  essential  unity 
in  a  complete  Weltanschauung.  ^  The  outcome  of  this  attempt  is  his 
doctrine  of  the  Good  as  the  supreme  principle  which  realizes  itself 
in  the  world  of  finite  reality  by  means  of  a  system  of  eternal  laws 
or  truths.  This  attempt  may  or  may  not  be  deemed  successful ; 
the  point  to  be  noted  here  is  that  the  fact  that  it  was  made  at  all 
argues  against  the  view  that  Lotze  held  faith  and  knowledge  to 
be  fundamentally  opposed  and  irreconcilable.  At  the  end  of  a 
brief  discussion  of  the  familiar  antithesis  between  faith  and  knowl- 
edge, Lotze  remarks  that  ''  the  only  remnant  of  any  useful  result 
from  this  opposition  of  science  to  faith  is,  therefore,  the  conviction 
that  the  whole  of  our  knowledge  certainly  does  not  originate  from 
external  experience,  which  is  mediated  for  us  by  the  senses  ;  but 
that  there  are  also  inner  states  which  are  available  as  data  for  the 
acquisition  of  truth."  ^  Among  these  inner  data  are  those  of 
feeling,  and  Reason's  judgments  of  worth  as  based  upon  such 
data  are  as  valid  as  Reason's  judgments  of  truth. 

In  connection  with  Lotze's  general  ethical  conceptions  we  have 
already  discussed  at  some  length  his  doctrine  of  the  feelings  and 
their  significance  for  mental  life.^  It  was  there  shown  that  the 
mind  possesses  by  original  endowment  the  power  of  reacting  upon 
impressions  with  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  that  these 
feelings  form  the  data  of  judgments  of  value,  quite  distinct  from 

1  Jones  :  Lotze's  Doctrine  of  Thought,  pp.  24,  39. 

2Cf.  Introd.  to  Mikr.,  X. 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,  ^ ;  see  also  g§  2-3. 

<Cf.  Ch.  II. 


94        ETHICAL   ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

judgments  of  fact  and  of  truth.  It  was  further  shown  that  self- 
consciousness  grows  out  of  this  primitive  self-feeling,  and  that  all 
effort  of  will  must  be  traced  back  to  the  same  source.  Self- 
consciousness  is  the  sme  qua  non  of  personality,  and  hence 
personality  is  rooted  in  feeling.  It  is  conceivable  that  a  being 
might  possess  a  superior  intelligence,  but  lack  all  capacity  for 
experiencing  pleasure  and  pain  ;  such  a  being  could  never  know 
itself  as  an  ego,  the  subject  of  its  own  states  as  over  against  the 
non-ego.^  The  function  of  feeling  as  the  basis  of  the  apprehension 
of  value  has  also  been  discussed  somewhat  at  length  in  a  forego- 
ing chapter.  It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  here  the  argument  de- 
veloped there.  Emphasis  was  laid  upon  the  fact  that  feeling 
forms  the  basis  of  Reason's  determinations  of  worth  in  theoretical, 
aesthetic,  and  ethical  ideals.  Thus  the  regulative  Ideas,  the 
norms  of  judgment  and  conduct,  are  what  they  are  and  influence 
life  as  they  do  by  virtue  of  the  presence  and  potency  in  them  of 
feeling.  Reason,  man's  crowning  faculty,  which  impels  him  to 
unify  and  complete  his  fragmentary  knowledge,  is  not  coldly 
cognitive  but  '  worth-appreciative.*  It  is  rooted  in  the  cognitive 
reaction  and  the  feeling  reaction,  two  primal  activities  of  the  soul. 

It  would  be  easy  to  show  that  feeling  also  manifests  a  depend- 
ence on  mechanism  ;  for  example,  it  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  subtle  laws  of  association.  It  is  evoked  by  stimulus,  and  in 
its  simpler  forms  shows  the  mechanical  uniformity  noticeable  in 
the  simpler  cognitive  processes.  As  forming  a  constituent  ele- 
ment in  the  more  highly  elaborated  mental  activities  it  shows  the 
spontaneity  which  in  general  characterizes  the  higher  phases  of 
mental  life.  Feeling,  no  less  than  thought,  tends  to  transcend 
the  particular  and  attain  to  the  universal.  This  it  does  in  the 
Ideals  of  the  worth-determining  Reason. 

Man's  life,  developing  according  to  mechanical  principles, 
leads  out  into  the  wide  regions  of  ideal  truth  and  conduct. 
Feeling  and  cognition  alike  begin  with  the  particular,  under  the 
strict  necessity  of  mechanical  law,  but  lead  to  the  universal,  and 
show  an  increasingly  evident  subordination  of  mechanism  to 
ideal  ends.     The  conclusion   of  the   fifth  book  of  the  Mikro- 

^Philos.  of  Relig.,\yj. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE    OF  MAN.  95 

kosmiis  puts  the  matter  as  follows  :  **  If  we  choose  to  sum  up 
under  the  name  of  the  Infinite  that  which  stands  opposed  to  par- 
ticular finite  manifestations,  we  may  say  that  the  capacity  of  be- 
coming conscious  of  the  Infinite  is  the  distinguishing  endowment 
of  the  human  mind,  and  we  believe  that  we  can  at  the  same  time 
pronounce  that  this  capacity  has  not  been  produced  in  us  by  the 
influence  of  experience,  but  that  having  its  origin  in  the  very 
nature  of  our  being,  it  only  needed  favoring  conditions  of  experi- 
ence for  its  development."  ^ 

In  man,  as  in  the  cosmos,  mechanism  exists  in  order  to  the 
realization  of  ideal  ends.  Man's  nature  prompts  him  '  to  make 
very  large  claims  on  existence.'  Truth  and  Worth  are  to  be 
realized  in  and  by  him.  The  mechanism  of  the  body  and  of 
mental  action  is  but  the  means  by  which  he  comes  into  this  more 
abundant  life.^  The  emphasis  is  thus  chiefly  on  personality. 
It  is  only  in  the  measure  that  the  human  spirit  partakes  of  the 
personality  of  the  Infinite  that  it  is  truly  real,  and  only  in  this 
measure  can  Good  and  good  things  have  any  meaning  for  it.^ 

Every  specific  problem  bearing  upon  the  life  and  destiny  of 
man  is  referred  by  Lotze  to  this  fundamental  conception  of  man's 
nature.  The  problem  of  freedom  presents  especial  difficulties 
for  him  because  of  his  insistence  on  the  universal  applicability  of 
the  principle  of  mechanism.*  He  does  little  more  with  it  than 
sift  the  arguments  on  both  sides,  and  finally  pronounce  freedom 
of  action  an  indispensable  attribute  of  spiritual  life.  Without 
freedom  "■  the  world  would  be,  not  indeed  unthinkable  and  self- 
contradictory,  but  unmeaning  and  incredible."  ^  That  human 
spirits  are  "  secondary  centers  of  intelligent  activity  not  entirely 
determined  in  their  effects  by  the  mechanical  system  of  things,"^ 
Lotze  holds  to  be  an  indubitable  truth.  Though  immanent  in 
the  Infinite,  they  are  yet  in  a  certain  sense  '  outside '  Him,  by  virtue 

"^Mikr.,  2:  pp.  341-342. 
2  Cf.  Mikr.,  2  :  pp.  275-276. 
'Cf.  Mikr.^  3  :  P-  623. 

*  On  freedom  in  relation  to  mechanism  and  teleology,  see  Wahn  :  Kritik  der  Lehre 
Lotze' s  von  der  itienschlichen  Wahlfreiheit^  pp.  38-50,  57. 
^Met.,  I  65. 
^ Met.,  \  230. 


96        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

of  their  very  selfhood.  Thus  they  become  self-acting  centers, 
able  in  a  restricted  measure  to  initiate  new  processes  which  do 
not  proceed  from  the  Absolute.^  Lotze  defends  with  vigor  the 
doctrine  of  freedom  in  the  sense  of  an  unconditioned  and  abso- 
lutely free  choice ;  he  frankly  admits  that  freedom  in  this  sense 
is  incomprehensible,  and  directs  the  force  of  his  logic  chiefly  to 
showing  that  the  objections  to  this  view  are  less  insuperable  than 
determinists  have  been  wont  to  assume.^ 

Quite  as  disappointing  is  Lotze's  dismissal  of  the  problem  ot 
evil  a§  theoretically  insolvable.  His  keenly  analytic  mind  was 
well  aware  of  the  difficulties  in  both  these  riddles.  He  has 
shown  extraordinary  acumen  in  discovering  the  weaknesses  of 
the  arguments  by  which  men  have  ordinarily  sought  to  minimize 
the  glaring  fact  of  the  prevalence  of  evil,  and  to  apologize  for 
their  conviction  that,  notwithstanding  this,  the  ground  and  goal 
of  the  world  is  good.  No  one  has  dealt  more  ruthlessly  with 
such  arguments,  nor  faced  the  actual  facts  more  unflinchingly.^ 
To  assume  that  evil  is  necessary — that  God,  though  having  in 
view  only  the  good,  is  bound  to  laws  that  do  not  permit  the  good 
— is  to  limit  the  omnipotence  of  the  Supreme  Being,  to  subject 
the  Unconditioned  to  conditions.  Such  a  view,  so  far  from  being 
any  gain  to  speculation,  would  call  a  halt  to  all  speculation  until 
metaphysics  could  be  established  on  a  new  foundation.^  The 
view  that  regards  evil  as  an  education,  and  hence  a  means  to 
good,  not  only  leads  back  to  the  difficulty  just  named,  but  fails 
to  grasp  the  problem  in  its  magnitude.  It  leaves  out  of  account 
the  amount  of  evil  for  which  there  is  no  compensation.  It  passes 
over,  for  instance,  the  natural  and  inexorable  torture  and  de- 
struction of  life  in  the  animal  world,  and  the  engulfing  of  count- 
less hopelessly  stunted  human  lives  in  misery  and  sin.^  A  third 
view  is  that  which  regards  moral  evil  as  prior  to  and  the  cause 
of  physical  evil,  and  moral  evil  itself  as  necessarily  involved  in 

^  Philos.  of  Relig.,  \  56. 

2Cf.   Philos.   of  Relig.,   ^§59-61;    Tract.  Phil,  l\   17-23.     See  G.  T.  Ladd : 
"  Lotze's  Influence  on  Theology,"  The  New  World,  No.  15. 
^'^^^  Philos.  of  Relig.,  l\  70-74. 
*  Cf.  Philos.  of  Relig.,  ^71. 
5Cf.  Philos.  of  Relig.,  ^  72. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN  97 

freedom.  This  statement  of  the  case  has  more  to  commend  it, 
yet  it  is  likewise  at  fault.  It  is  inexplicable  why  physical  evil 
should  follow  moral  evil  as  a  natural  consequence,  or  why  the 
innocent  should  suffer  with  the  guilty.  But,  moreover,  "  the  as- 
sumption that  nature  was  originally  without  evil,  and  that  sin  first 
brought  it  into  the  world,  not  only  lacks  all  empirical  foundation, 
but  is  even  in  itself  considered  untenable,"  ^  since  it  implies  that 
moral  evil  is  a  principle  that  can  work  in  nature  and  to  which 
nature  yields  a  pliant  obedience. 

At  the  point  where  criticism  should  gwo.  place  to  construction, 
Lotze,  with  characteristic  caution,  withdraws  from  the  field.  For 
the  problem  of  evil  he  has  no  solution  to  offer,  save  that  which 
is  implied  in  his  entire  system  of  philosophy.  He  does  not  hesi- 
tate, indeed,  to  maintain  that  the  problem  is  theoretically  insolvable. 
The  existence  of  sin  and  evil  in  nature  and  in  history  is  'a  de- 
cisive and  altogether  insurmountable  difficulty '  in  the  way  of  es- 
tabHshing  the  indubitable  supremacy  of  the  good.^  For  the 
solution  of  the  enigma  would  require  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
ultimate  plan  of  the  world, ^  and  such  a  knowledge  man  can  never 
hope  to  attain.  It  is  because  he  deems  it  useless  and  worse  than 
useless  to  attempt  any  theoretical  solution  of  the  difficulty  that 
Lotze  attacks  the  time-worn  arguments.  "  There  ought  not  to 
remain  any  seeming  as  if  there  were  .  .  .  any  real  speculative 
proof  for  the  correctness  of  the  religious  feeling  upon  which  rests 
our  faith  in  a  good  and  holy  God  and  in  the  destination  of  the 
world  to  the  attainment  of  a  blessed  end."^ 

Left  thus,  the  discussion  is  far  from  satisfactory,  and  deserves,  per- 
haps, the  severity  of  von  Hartmann's  criticism.^  But  it  is  not  fair 
to  Lotze  to  leave  it  thus  badly  stated.  Detached  from  the  body  of 
his  doctrine,  this  discussion  does  indeed  leave  the  antithesis  between 
faith  and  knowledge  complete  and  final.  Interpreted  in  the  light 
of  his  entire  philosophy,  however,  the  antithesis  in  large  measure 
disappears.  The  Reason,  in  the  full  scope  of  its  functions  as 
worth-appreciative,  approves  and  confirms  much  that  by  the  exer- 

1  Philos.  of  Relig.,  §  73.  *  Philos.  of  Relig.,  I  74. 

^Mikr.,  3  :  p.  610.  ^  Lotze' s  Philosophies  pp.  22-23. 

»Cf.  Met.,  §233. 


98        ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

cise  of  its  purely  speculative  activity  it  is  unable  to  demonstrate. 
Its  judgments  are  not  therefore  irrational.  They  are  based  upon 
empirically  given  data  no  less  than  are  rational  judgments  of  a 
speculative  character.^  Ultimately  all  knowledge  appeals  for  the 
guarantee  and  criterion  of  its  validity  to  the  worth -appreciative 
Reason.^  The  antithesis  is  not  between  reason  and  feeling,  not 
even,  in  truth,  between  knowledge  and  faith ;  but,  rather  between 
the  speculative  and  the  worth -appreciative  Reason,  that  is,  be- 
tween Reason  in  its  narrower  sense,  limited  to  the  judgment  of  fact 
and  of  truth,  and  Reason  in  its  broader  signification,  extending  its 
sovereignty  over  the  whole  realm  of  experience,  judging  not  only 
of  truth  but  of  value.  We  find  Lotze  constantly  reverting  to  and 
insisting  upon  this  distinction.  His  great  predecessors,  Schelling 
and  Hegel,  he  believes  to  have  erred  in  large  measure  from  an 
over-estimate  of  mere  intelligence  in  comparison  with  the  whole 
spiritual  life.  In  his  own  view  "  all  intelligence  is  only  the  con- 
ditio sine  qua  non,  under  which  alone  the  final  purposes  that  are 
really  supreme — personal  love  and  hate,  the  moral  culture  of 
character — and,  in  general,  the  whole  content  of  life  so  far  as  it 
has  value  appears  possible  at  all."  ' 

The  question  of  the  final  destiny  of  the  human  spirit  is  dealt 
with  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  problem  of  evil.  It  is  cus- 
tomary to  speak  of  Lotze's  view  as  that  of  a  conditional  immor- 
tality. This  term  is  somewhat  misleading,  however.  He  un- 
doubtedly maintains  that  the  sole  ground  for  belief  in  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  spirit  is  in  the  intrinsic  worth  of  the 
human  personality.  In  this  sense,  then,  immortality  is  condit- 
ional :  If  the  human  spirit  possesses  such  intrinsic  worth  that  its 
destruction  would  impeach  the  meaning  of  the  system  of  things, 
then  its  destruction  is  in  the  highest  degree  improbable.  It  is 
a  question  of  values  within  the  realm  of  Value.  It  can  not  be 
decided  as  a  matter  of  fact,  nor  as  a  truth  discerned  by  the  intel- 
ligence. This  view,  however,  contains  no  suggestion  of  a  limi- 
tation of  immortality  to  those  of  the  human  race  who  attain  a 

1  Cf.  Ch.  II. 

2  Met.,  §  94  ;  Logik.,  H  301,  303,  349  ;  Fhilos.  of  Relig.,  \  2 ;  Kl.  Schr.,z  :  pp. 
529,  540-541- 

^  Encycl.  0/  Fhilos.,  |  18. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NA  TURE   OF  MAN  99 

certain,  though  unknown,  standard  of  excellence.  So  far  as  the 
writer  is  aware,  no  such  idea  was  ever  seriously  considered  by 
Lotze,  and  it  is  certainly  opposed  to  the  trend  of  his  thought. 
So  to  limit  immortality  would  be  to  make  quantitative  differences 
of  paramount  importance,  as  well  as  wholly  to  ignore  differences 
of  environment,  and  make  the  destiny  of  the  individual  hang 
upon  the  incidents  of  race,  time,  and  birth. 

As  in  his  discussion  of  the  problem  of  evil,  here  also  we  find 
Lotze  maintaining  that  the  truth  of  immortality  can  not  be  estab- 
lished by  reasoning.  In  the  Metaphysik  he  points  out  the  weak- 
ness of  the  logical  argument  that  the  soul  is  an  eternal  and 
immutable  element,  and  hence  must  continue  to  exist.  This 
conception,  he  says,  forces  upon  us  the  equally  valid  conclusion 
of  the  soul's  pre-existence,  and  is  incompatible  with  the  mon- 
istic view.^  Without  pausing  to  establish  this  point,  he  puts 
aside  the  problem  as  one  that  does  not  belong  to  metaphysics  : 
**  We  have  no  other  principle  for  deciding  it  beyond  this  general 
idealistic  conviction  that  every  created  thing  will  continue,  if  and 
so  long  as  its  continuance  belongs  to  the  meaning  of  the  world  ; 
that  everything  will  pass  away  which  had  its  authorized  place 
only  in  a  transitory  phase  of  the  world's  course.  That  this  prin- 
ciple admits  of  no  further  application  in  human  hands  hardly 
needs  to  be  mentioned.  We  certainly  do  not  know  the  merits 
which  may  give  to  one  existence  a  claim  to  eternity,  nor  the 
defects  which  deny  it  to  others."^  In  the  Mikrokosmus  the  course 
of  the  argument  is  much  the  same,  and  the  same  conclusions  are 
reached.^ 

The  problem  of  immortality,  then,  must  take  its  place  with 
those  of  freedom  and  of  evil  as  presenting  difficulties  impossible  of 
solution  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view.  All  these  problems, 
however,  demand  of  the  Reason  a  belief  in  a  solution  which  is 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  knowledge.  Such  an  ultimate  solution 
would  harmonize  theoretical  and  practical  demands,  and  show  the 
validity  of  both.  The  import  of  Lotze's  entire  philosophy  leaves 
no  doubt  as  to  his  own   conviction  that  the  human   personality 

^  Met ,  I  245. 

^Mit.y  I  245  ;  cf.  Encycl.  of  Philos.,  §  lo;  Philos.  ofPelig.,  §  91. 

^  Mikr.y  I  :  pp.  437-440. 


lOO     ETHICAL  ASPECT  OF  LOTZE'S  METAPHYSICS. 

possesses  a  worth  that  is  the  guarantee  of  its  continued  existence. 
This  comes  out  clearly  in  the  Mikrokosmus,  in  the  chapter  on 
*'  The  Meaning  of  History."^  Lotze's  contention  throughout  this 
chapter  is  in  behalf  of  the  individual.  That  view  which  regards 
history  as  the  education  of  humanity  he  rejects  on  the  ground  that 
the  individual  is  lost  sight  of  and  sacrificed  in  the  advance  of  the 
race.  Humanity  does  not  consist  in  a  concept,  but  in  living, 
personal  beings,  and  "  the  reason  of  the  world  would  be  turned  to 
unreason  if  we  did  not  reject  the  thought  that  the  work  of  van- 
ishing generations  should  go  on  forever,  only  benefiting  those 
who  come  later,  and  being  irreparably  wasted  for  the  workers 
themselves.  .  .  .  We  are  impelled  to  a  demand  for  the  lasting 
preservation  of  that,  the  continual  destruction  of  which  would 
render  fruitless  all  effort  to  develop  even  the  universal  itself."  ^  It 
is  Lotze's  conviction  that  those  who  "■  have  passed  away  from  the 
sphere  of  earthly  reality  have  not  passed  away  from  reality  alto- 
gether, and  that  in  some  mysterious  way  the  progress  of  history 
affects  them  too."  ^  For  **  no  education  of  mankind  is  conceivable 
unless  its  final  results  are  to  be  participated  in  by  those  whom 
this  earthly  course  left  in  various  stages  of  backwardness."  ^  Such 
a  faith,  Lotze  grants,  is  less  easy  now  than  it  was  when  the  world 
was  smaller  and  life  simpler  ;  yet  to  this  primitive  faith  he  holds 
fast,  as  he  who  seeks  a  plan  in  history  will  find  himself  inevitably 
compelled  to  do.^ 

Lotze's  doctrine  of  man  rests  upon  the  same  ethical  concepts 
to  which  we  have  traced  his  doctrine  of  the  world  and  of  God, 
namely,  the  concepts  of  personality  and  of  teleology.  Each  of 
these  is  found  to  imply  unity.  As  we  have  seen,  these  concepts 
depend  upon  and  grow  out  of  the  ultimate  category  of  the  Good. 
This  fundamental  aspect  of  Lotze's  philosophy  has  been  too  little 
emphasized  in  the  past.  His  critics  have  for  the  most  part  con- 
cerned themselves  with  details  of  his  system,  and  have  overlooked 
the  importance  of  his  synthesis  of  the  Good,  Reality,  and  Truth 
into  an  organic  whole.     Yet  the  fundamental  unity  of  these  con- 

J  Alikr.,  2,  Ch.  VII.  <  Mikr.,  3  :  p.  53. 

«  Mikr.,  3  :  pp.  50-5 1.  *  Ibid. 

^Mikr.,  3:  p.  51. 


CONCEPTION  OF   THE  NATURE   OF  MAN.  1 01 

ceptions  is  at  once  the  starting-point  and  the  goal  of  his  thought, 
and  it  is  this  alone  which  makes  his  philosophy  in  any  true  sense 
a  system.  Not  that  the  world  first  is,  and  then  is  seen  to  be 
good ;  the  Good  is  not  something  evolved  out  of  or  added  to 
Reality,  it  is  the  ground  of  all  Reality,  the  Supreme  Principle 
which  manifests  and  realizes  itself  in  the  world.  It  is  the  material 
postulate  of  all  being.  Reality  is  the  concrete  embodiment  of 
the  Good ;  the  system  of  mechanical  laws  is  but  the  mode  of  its 
activity.  The  concept  of  the  Good  plays  much  the  same  part 
in  Lotze's  philosophy  as  it  does  in  that  of  Plato.  It  may  be 
symboHzed,  though  inadequately,  by  the  sun  Jas  th]e:  ^eyiter  of  i;' 
the  solar  universe ;  it  is  the  center  of  all  being  ^rid  6^  ail  lactiv^'  ' 
energy,  it  dominates  the  course  of  every  finite, thing  and  'of  :tjiev'  \ ; 
entire  system  of  things.  We  have  sought  to  show  how  all  Lotze's 
characteristic  metaphysical  doctrines  grow  out  of  this  conception. 
The  Good,  further  defined  as  Personality,  prescribes  every  tenet 
of  his  doctrine  of  the  world,  of  man,  and  of  God.  Thus  in  his 
own  system  is  embodied  Lotze's  conviction  that  the  true  beginning 
of  metaphysics  lies  in  ethics. 


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